Belinda Lasalle v. Honorable Chelsey R. Napoleon, in Her Official Capacity as Clerk of Court for the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: November 4, 2025
• Docket: 2025-CA-0295
• Status: Published

Opinion

BELINDA LASALLE * NO. 2025-CA-0295

VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL

HONORABLE CHELSEY R. * FOURTH CIRCUIT NAPOLEON, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS * STATE OF LOUISIANA CLERK OF COURT FOR THE CIVIL DISTRICT COURT FOR * THE PARISH OF ORLEANS * *******

JCL

LOBRANO, J., DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS

I respectfully dissent. The majority affirms the district court’s dismissal of

Deputy Clerk Belinda Lasalle’s claim on the ground that her reliance on the former

Clerk of Court’s representations was unreasonable as a matter of law. In my view,

that conclusion misapplies both the doctrine of detrimental reliance under La. C.C.

art. 1967 and the unique equities of this case. A 35-year employee of the Orleans

Parish Clerk’s Office acted in good faith under the express assurances of her

superior, assurances that counsel for the Clerk’s Office had vetted and that formed

the basis for a written agreement prepared by the Clerk’s Office on that

understanding.

Appellate courts review a trial court’s factual findings under the manifest

error/clearly wrong standard of review. Hall v. Folger Coffee Co., 03-1734, p. 9

(La. 4/14/04), 874 So.2d 90, 98. “However, where one or more trial court legal

errors interdict the fact-finding process, the manifest error standard of review is no

longer applicable, and if the record is otherwise complete, the appellate court

should make its own independent de novo review of the record and determine a

preponderance of the evidence.” Evans v. Lungrin, 97-0541 (La. 2/6/98), 708

So.2d 731, 735. In this case, I find the district court fails to give effect to the equitable principles codified under La. C.C. art. 1967 such that this Court owes no

deference to district court’s factual findings and must conduct an independent

review of the record. Morris v. Friedman, 94-2808 (La. 11/27/95), 663 So.2d 19,

25-26 (conducting an independent review of the reasonableness of the promisee’s

reliance under La. C.C. art. 1967).

This case does not involve a retiree who sought to manipulate the limits of

La. R.S. 11:1513. Rather, it involves a lifelong public servant who in good faith

relied upon the official statements and formal conduct of her appointing authority,

a constitutional officer acting within her administrative capacity. The record is

undisputed that: (1) the former Clerk of Court solicited Lasalle’s return to service

in 2015 to address personnel shortages; (2) the Clerk’s Office, after consultation

with and advice of its attorney, drafted and executed a written contract designating

her as an “independent contractor,” and ceased reporting her hours to the Clerk’s

Retirement Fund; and (3) Lasalle performed work under that agreement for five

years without objection or notice from any authority until the Retirement Fund

unilaterally declared her non-compliant in 2020.

The district court found, and the majority agrees, that Lasalle “should have

contacted the Retirement Fund herself.” But detrimental reliance exists precisely to

protect those who reasonably act on another’s representations when independent

verification is neither customary nor expected. See Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish

Consol. Gov’t, 04-1459, p. 31-32 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So.2d 37, 59 (citing Morris v.

People’s Bank & Trust Co. of Natchitoches, 580 So.2d 1029, 1036 (La. App. 3rd

Cir. 1991) (the focus is not on the intent to be bound but, instead, “whether a

representation was made in such a manner that the promisor should have expected

the promissee to rely upon it”). In a hierarchical public office where employees

take direction from the elected Clerk, it is neither realistic nor fair to impose on a retired deputy the duty to second-guess her superior’s legal interpretation,

especially where the superior has obtained independent legal advice.

Louisiana jurisprudence recognizes that even when a promise is later

determined to be contrary to statute or unenforceable, recovery in detrimental

reliance may still lie where the promisee’s reliance was induced by official

authority and not tainted by bad faith. See e.g., Suire, 04-1459 at p. 32, 907 So.2d

at 59 (adequate summary judgment proof of actual reliance on City’s

representations to repair property damage resulting from construction project);

Cuccia v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustments of/and the Parish of Jefferson, 07-152 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 7/30/07), 966 So.2d 611, 616 (finding homeowner acted in good faith

reliance after multiple interactions with permitting authority and issuance of

building permit); Cf., Ellsworth v. City of New Orleans, 13-0084, p. 16-17 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 7/31/13), 120 So.3d 897, 907 (plaintiff’s reliance on building permit

was unreasonable where permit was based on plaintiff’s misrepresentations and

work exceeded scope of permit); see also Menzie Tile Co., Inc. v. Prof. Ctr., 594

So.2d 410, 418 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991) (reliance on representations that sufficient

funds existed to complete project was reasonable given the reputation of the firms

involved and the status of the individuals who made the assurances). The doctrine

functions in equity, not in strict legality. To hold otherwise is to transform La. C.C.

art. 1967 into an empty formality whenever a statute is later interpreted differently,

which is a result inconsistent with its purpose to prevent injustice.

Moreover, the majority’s reliance on La. Office of Risk Mgmt. v. Richard,

13-0890 (La. 10/15/13), 125 So.3d 398, is misplaced. In Richard, the employee

received informal assurances from a coworker and undertook no effort to verify

benefits available through a public system designed for individual inquiry. The

Louisiana Supreme Court held that the employee was not justified in relying on a

coworker’s assurances without knowing her title within the agency or what her job duties were. Id. at 13-0890, p. 5-6, 125 So.3d at 402. In the case sub judice, the

“assurance” was an official act of the appointing authority herself that was reduced

to writing and relied upon by multiple parties within a public institution.

Finally, the equities are compelling. Deputy Clerk Lasalle dedicated her

career to public service, retired in good standing, and returned at the request of her

office. She performed needed work, received no windfall, and was later required to

repay nearly $90,000 for having relied in good faith on her employer’s words and

contract. The law of detrimental reliance was enacted for such cases, where literal

application of a statute without equitable consideration offends both fairness and

common sense.

For the reasons assigned, I would reverse the judgment of the district court

and render judgment in favor of appellant Belinda Lasalle on her claim for

detrimental reliance under La. C.C. art. 1967. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.