1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Joyce Lyn Belin, No. CV-20-08087-PCT-SMB
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 At issue is the denial of Plaintiff Joyce Belin’s Application for Social Security 16 Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) 17 under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). Plaintiff filed a Complaint, (Doc. 1), and an 18 Opening Brief, (Doc. 18), seeking judicial review of that denial. Defendant SSA filed an 19 Answering Brief, (Doc. 23), to which Plaintiff replied, (Doc. 24). The Court has reviewed 20 the parties’ briefs, the Administrative Record, (Doc. 15), and the Administrative Law 21 Judge’s (“ALJ’s”) decision, (Doc. 15-3 at 20–29), and will affirm the ALJ’s decision for 22 the reasons addressed herein. 23 I. Background 24 Plaintiff filed an Application for SSDI benefits on December 9, 2014, alleging a 25 disability beginning on October 16, 2014. (Id. at 20.) Plaintiff’s claim was initially denied 26 on March 18, 2015. (Id.) A hearing was held before ALJ Paula Atchison on November 7, 27 2018. (Id.) Plaintiff’s Application was again denied by the ALJ on December 20, 2018. 28 (Id. at 29.) Thereafter, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s Request for Review of the 1 ALJ’s decision—making it the final decision of the SSA Commissioner (the 2 “Commissioner”)—and this appeal followed. (Doc. 1 at 2; Doc. 23 at 2.) 3 Plaintiff alleges disability that began after an automobile accident, which resulted 4 in significant injuries and ongoing limitations. (Doc. 18 at 3.) After considering the 5 medical evidence and opinions, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffers from severe 6 impairments including obesity, sleep apnea, left lower extremity radiculopathy, and 7 peripheral neuropathy. (Doc. 15-3 at 22.) However, the ALJ concluded that despite these 8 impairments, Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work. (Id. 9 at 24.) 10 II. Legal Standards 11 An ALJ’s factual findings “shall be conclusive if supported by substantial 12 evidence.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2019). The Court may set aside 13 the Commissioner’s disability determination only if it is not supported by substantial 14 evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). 15 Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate 16 to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. Generally, “[w]here the 17 evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the 18 ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 19 954 (9th Cir. 2002). In determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the district court 20 reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 21 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). 22 III. Discussion 23 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed error in evaluating Plaintiff’s symptom 24 testimony and in weighing the medical opinion evidence. The Commissioner argues that 25 the ALJ’s opinion is free of harmful error. The Court has reviewed the medical record and 26 agrees with the Commissioner for the following reasons. 27 A. Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony 28 An ALJ performs a two-step analysis to evaluate a claimant’s testimony regarding 1 pain and symptoms. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014). First, the 2 ALJ evaluates whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an 3 impairment that “could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or symptoms alleged.” 4 Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell v. 5 Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, 6 absent evidence of malingering, an ALJ may only discount a claimant’s allegations for 7 reasons that are “specific, clear and convincing” and supported by substantial evidence. 8 Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). 9 “[T]he ALJ must specifically identify the testimony she or he finds not to be credible 10 and must explain what evidence undermines the testimony.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 11 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001). General findings are insufficient. Id. “Although the 12 ALJ’s analysis need not be extensive, the ALJ must provide some reasoning in order for 13 [the Court] to meaningfully determine whether the ALJ’s conclusions were supported by 14 substantial evidence.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th 15 Cir. 2014). “[T]he ALJ may consider inconsistencies either in the claimant’s testimony or 16 between the testimony and the claimant’s conduct.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112. For 17 instance, the ALJ may consider “whether the claimant engages in daily activities 18 inconsistent with the alleged symptoms.” Id. (quoting Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1040). 19 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed materially harmful error by rejecting 20 Plaintiff’s symptom testimony without specific, clear, and convincing reasons that were 21 supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. (Doc. 18 at 9.) The Court 22 disagrees. (See Doc. 15-3 at 23–27.) The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff had some severe 23 impairments, (id. at 22–23), but found that there was “no opinion or other evidence” that 24 Plaintiff’s impairments met or equaled one of qualifying severity under 20 C.R.F. § 404, 25 Subpart P, Appendix 1, (id. at 23). Moreover, the ALJ found Plaintiff had “the residual 26 functional capacity to perform sedentary work.” (Id. at 24.) The ALJ cited specific reasons 27 such as Dr. Randall’s recommendation that Plaintiff “get out of her chair, work and lose 28 weight”; Dr. Mugo’s recommendation that plaintiff keep walking as much as possible; and 1 Dr. Delange’s report that Plaintiff had “full muscle strength in all her extremities.” (Id. at 2 25.) For these and other clearly explained reasons, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was “not 3 as limited as she allege[d].” (Id.) 4 Therefore, the ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons—supported by 5 the record as a whole—for rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. Consequently, the 6 court finds that the ALJ committed no error. 7 B. Evaluation of Medical Testimony 8 While “[t]he ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence,” there is a hierarchy 9 among the sources of medical opinions. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th 10 Cir. 2008). Those who have treated a claimant are treating physicians; those who examined 11 but did not treat the claimant are examining physicians; and those who neither examined, 12 nor treated the claimant are non-examining physicians. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 13 (9th Cir. 1995). “As a general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating 14 source than to the opinion of doctors who did not treat the claimant.” Id.
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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Joyce Lyn Belin, No. CV-20-08087-PCT-SMB
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 At issue is the denial of Plaintiff Joyce Belin’s Application for Social Security 16 Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) 17 under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). Plaintiff filed a Complaint, (Doc. 1), and an 18 Opening Brief, (Doc. 18), seeking judicial review of that denial. Defendant SSA filed an 19 Answering Brief, (Doc. 23), to which Plaintiff replied, (Doc. 24). The Court has reviewed 20 the parties’ briefs, the Administrative Record, (Doc. 15), and the Administrative Law 21 Judge’s (“ALJ’s”) decision, (Doc. 15-3 at 20–29), and will affirm the ALJ’s decision for 22 the reasons addressed herein. 23 I. Background 24 Plaintiff filed an Application for SSDI benefits on December 9, 2014, alleging a 25 disability beginning on October 16, 2014. (Id. at 20.) Plaintiff’s claim was initially denied 26 on March 18, 2015. (Id.) A hearing was held before ALJ Paula Atchison on November 7, 27 2018. (Id.) Plaintiff’s Application was again denied by the ALJ on December 20, 2018. 28 (Id. at 29.) Thereafter, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s Request for Review of the 1 ALJ’s decision—making it the final decision of the SSA Commissioner (the 2 “Commissioner”)—and this appeal followed. (Doc. 1 at 2; Doc. 23 at 2.) 3 Plaintiff alleges disability that began after an automobile accident, which resulted 4 in significant injuries and ongoing limitations. (Doc. 18 at 3.) After considering the 5 medical evidence and opinions, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffers from severe 6 impairments including obesity, sleep apnea, left lower extremity radiculopathy, and 7 peripheral neuropathy. (Doc. 15-3 at 22.) However, the ALJ concluded that despite these 8 impairments, Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work. (Id. 9 at 24.) 10 II. Legal Standards 11 An ALJ’s factual findings “shall be conclusive if supported by substantial 12 evidence.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2019). The Court may set aside 13 the Commissioner’s disability determination only if it is not supported by substantial 14 evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). 15 Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate 16 to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. Generally, “[w]here the 17 evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the 18 ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 19 954 (9th Cir. 2002). In determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the district court 20 reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 21 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). 22 III. Discussion 23 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed error in evaluating Plaintiff’s symptom 24 testimony and in weighing the medical opinion evidence. The Commissioner argues that 25 the ALJ’s opinion is free of harmful error. The Court has reviewed the medical record and 26 agrees with the Commissioner for the following reasons. 27 A. Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony 28 An ALJ performs a two-step analysis to evaluate a claimant’s testimony regarding 1 pain and symptoms. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014). First, the 2 ALJ evaluates whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an 3 impairment that “could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or symptoms alleged.” 4 Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell v. 5 Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, 6 absent evidence of malingering, an ALJ may only discount a claimant’s allegations for 7 reasons that are “specific, clear and convincing” and supported by substantial evidence. 8 Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). 9 “[T]he ALJ must specifically identify the testimony she or he finds not to be credible 10 and must explain what evidence undermines the testimony.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 11 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001). General findings are insufficient. Id. “Although the 12 ALJ’s analysis need not be extensive, the ALJ must provide some reasoning in order for 13 [the Court] to meaningfully determine whether the ALJ’s conclusions were supported by 14 substantial evidence.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th 15 Cir. 2014). “[T]he ALJ may consider inconsistencies either in the claimant’s testimony or 16 between the testimony and the claimant’s conduct.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112. For 17 instance, the ALJ may consider “whether the claimant engages in daily activities 18 inconsistent with the alleged symptoms.” Id. (quoting Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1040). 19 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed materially harmful error by rejecting 20 Plaintiff’s symptom testimony without specific, clear, and convincing reasons that were 21 supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. (Doc. 18 at 9.) The Court 22 disagrees. (See Doc. 15-3 at 23–27.) The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff had some severe 23 impairments, (id. at 22–23), but found that there was “no opinion or other evidence” that 24 Plaintiff’s impairments met or equaled one of qualifying severity under 20 C.R.F. § 404, 25 Subpart P, Appendix 1, (id. at 23). Moreover, the ALJ found Plaintiff had “the residual 26 functional capacity to perform sedentary work.” (Id. at 24.) The ALJ cited specific reasons 27 such as Dr. Randall’s recommendation that Plaintiff “get out of her chair, work and lose 28 weight”; Dr. Mugo’s recommendation that plaintiff keep walking as much as possible; and 1 Dr. Delange’s report that Plaintiff had “full muscle strength in all her extremities.” (Id. at 2 25.) For these and other clearly explained reasons, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was “not 3 as limited as she allege[d].” (Id.) 4 Therefore, the ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons—supported by 5 the record as a whole—for rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. Consequently, the 6 court finds that the ALJ committed no error. 7 B. Evaluation of Medical Testimony 8 While “[t]he ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence,” there is a hierarchy 9 among the sources of medical opinions. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th 10 Cir. 2008). Those who have treated a claimant are treating physicians; those who examined 11 but did not treat the claimant are examining physicians; and those who neither examined, 12 nor treated the claimant are non-examining physicians. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 13 (9th Cir. 1995). “As a general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating 14 source than to the opinion of doctors who did not treat the claimant.” Id. This is so because 15 treating physicians have the advantage of in-person interaction and typically a longer 16 history of treatment than a claimant’s other doctors, and their “subjective 17 judgments . . . . are important, and properly play a part in their medical evaluations.” 18 Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988). 19 An ALJ “may only reject a treating or examining physician’s uncontradicted 20 medical opinion based on ‘clear and convincing reasons.’” Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. 21 Sec., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 830–31). “Where 22 such an opinion is contradicted, however, it may be rejected for specific and legitimate 23 reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Id. An ALJ meets this 24 standard by “setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting 25 medical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Magallanes v. 26 Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). 27 Here, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s assignment of “great weight” to the opinion of 28 Dr. Keer—a state agency non-examining physician—because Dr. Keer did not examine 1 Plaintiff and reviewed Plaintiff’s file more than two years before the ALJ’s decision. (See 2 Doc. 18 at 15, 19.) These arguments are unpersuasive. 3 As a legal matter, neither argument is dispositive. First, as explained above, an ALJ 4 may rely on the opinion of a non-examining physician. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 5 (explaining that an ALJ may rely on a non-examining physician’s testimony, even to reject 6 that of an examining physician, when the ALJ’s decision is supported by the record as a 7 whole). Second, there is no time limit on the opinions of state agency physicians, and an 8 ALJ may rely on them even if subsequent evidence enters the record. See, e.g., Owen v. 9 Saul, 808 F. App'x 421, 423 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[T]here is always some time lapse between 10 a consultant's report and the ALJ hearing and decision, and the Social Security regulations 11 impose no limit on such a gap in time.”); Jennings v. Saul, 804 F. App'x 458, 462 (9th Cir. 12 2020) (same); Garner v. Saul, 805 F. App'x 455, 458 (9th Cir. 2020) (same). 13 Moreover, as a factual matter, Dr. Keer’s opinion is supported by the record as a 14 whole. (See Doc. 15-3 at 26.) For example, the ALJ found that Dr. Keer’s opinion was 15 consistent with that of Dr. Delange, who reported that Plaintiff had full muscle strength in 16 all her extremities. (Id.) The ALJ also found it was consistent with medical evidence, such 17 as x-rays that did not show any degenerative disease in Plaintiff’s hip. (Id.) Additionally, 18 the ALJ found it was consistent with Plaintiff’s own testimony that, with medication, her 19 pain was down to a four out of ten. (Id.) 20 Therefore, the Court finds that Dr. Keer’s opinion was consistent with the record as 21 a whole, and the ALJ did not error in affording great weight to the opinion of Dr. Keer. 22 III. Conclusion 23 Having found no error, 24 IT IS ORDERED affirming the December 20, 2019 decision of the ALJ, as upheld 25 by the Appeals Council. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter final judgment 2 || consistent with this Order and close this case. 3 Dated this 15th day of February, 2022. 4 5 “Ss > fonorable Susan M. Brnovich = 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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