Belfance v. Bancohio/National Bank (In Re Gastaldo)

13 B.R. 808, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 3062
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedAugust 28, 1981
Docket19-60445
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 13 B.R. 808 (Belfance v. Bancohio/National Bank (In Re Gastaldo)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Belfance v. Bancohio/National Bank (In Re Gastaldo), 13 B.R. 808, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 3062 (Ohio 1981).

Opinion

FINDING AS TO PREFERENCE

H. F. WHITE, Bankruptcy Judge.

Three separate complaints to recover property as a preferential transfer were filed by the trustee in bankruptcy for each estate. The facts and issue of law are the same in each case.

The defendant, BancOhio, filed an answer in the Spry case admitting receipts of $432.84, but denied that it received a greater percentage of its debt than it would have received under the distribution provisions of the Bankruptcy Code had it not received such a transfer.

In the Larry C. Jones and Linda Carol Jones case the Trustee seeks to recover $356.86 from BancOhio for the same reason.

The Trustee in the Lawrence Steven Gas-taldo case, in the complaint, sought to recover the sum of $554.70 for the estate from BancOhio for the same reason. The Trustee subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to recover the sum of $369.80. The Trustee and bankrupts were the only witnesses at the trials. The defendant offered no evidence to refute the Trustee’s claims.

FINDING OF FACT

The Court finds that in the Dennis Wayne Spry case the Trustee has $100.00 in *809 her Trustee’s account. The debts as scheduled amount to $35,914.99 and the assets amount to $26,700.00. The assets are either mortgaged to creditors or are subject to the debtors’ claims for exemption.

The testimony of the Trustee and Dennis Wayne Spry is that there are no other assets in the estate for the creditors, except the preference action against the bank. There are other creditors in the same class as BancOhio National Bank that received no payments within the ninety-day period.

The Court finds that in the Larry C. and Linda C. Jones case the Trustee has $136.70 in her Trustee’s account. Debts scheduled amount to $28,716.00 and assets amount to $6,000.00. Said assets are either mortgaged to creditors or are subject to the debtors’ claims for exemptions. There were no objections filed to the debtors’ claims for exemptions. The Trustee and the debtors testified that there are no other assets in the estate available for distribution to creditors except for the instant preference action against the bank. There are other creditors in the same class as BancOhio National Bank that received no payment within the ninety-day period.

The Court finds that in the Lawrence Steven Gastaldo case the Trustee has $116.46 in her Trustee’s account. Debts scheduled amount to $12,265.00 and assets scheduled amount to $4,750.00. Said assets are either mortgaged to creditors or are subject to debtor’s claims for exemptions. There were no objections filed to debtor’s claim for exemptions. The Trustee and the debtor testified that there are no other assets in the estate available for distribution to creditors except for the instant preference action against the bank. There are other creditors in the same class as Banc-Ohio National Bank that received no payment within the ninety-day period.

The creditor in all these cases never offered any evidence to support its contention, but rested after the Trustee rested her cases.

ISSUES

Did the transfers of property of the debtors to the creditor constitute voidable preferences under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) and did the Trustee prove, as an element of the preferences, that the creditor in these eases received more than it would have received out of the bankruptcy estates if said transfers had not been made?

DISCUSSION OF LAW

A Trustee may avoid a transfer of property of the debtor to a creditor as a preference if the Trustee proves that the five elements of a preference under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) are met. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) provides that:

Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor—
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made—
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if such creditor, at the time of such transfer—
(i) was an insider; and
(ii) had reasonable cause to believe
the debtor was insolvent at the time
of such transfer; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if—
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) The transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the provisions of this title.

Creditor, herein concedes that the transfers at issue meet the first four elements of a preference under § 547(b). However, creditor denies the existence of the fifth *810 and final element of a preference known as the greater percentage test. To meet the greater percentage test, the Trustee must prove that there will not be sufficient assets in the bankruptcy estate to pay other creditors in the same class as the preferred creditor the same amount the preferred creditor received.

Curtis L. Mann in an article in the Commercial Law Journal, February 1981, page 49 states:

However, for a great number of cases, the drafters of the new Code have created a very substantial new problem for the Trustee. The new element of proof can make it impossible or nearly impossible for him to recover a preference. The Trustee’s problem is that he either will not be able to prove the ‘greater percentage’ element, even if it is reasonably clear that the creditor has been preferred, or the proof is going to be extremely difficult and expensive.

Mr. Mann further states:

We can foresee countless hours being spent in assembling proof and then presenting to the Court evidence necessary to prove or disprove the ‘greater percentage’ test, particularly if the dollar amount is substantial. Conversely, we can see meritorious preference actions being abandoned if the dollar amount is more modest, as the cost of proving ‘greater percentage’ can quickly become very substantial. A relatively simple preference case has certainly become very difficult and expensive to prove by virtue of this new test.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
13 B.R. 808, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 3062, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/belfance-v-bancohionational-bank-in-re-gastaldo-ohnb-1981.