Bekir Kulozu v. Timothy Proudman

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0008-25

BEKIR KULOZU, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. TIMOTHY PROUDMAN, Defendant-Appellant,

and ANDREA PROUDMAN REILLY, Defendant-Respondent.

Submitted September 14, 2026 – Decided September 17, 2026 Before Judges Sabatino and Perez Friscia.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Docket No. DC-017038-24.

Neal J. Sampat (The Sampat Law Firm) and Becky Lapidow Houser (The Sampat Law Firm), attorneys for appellant (Becky Lapidow Houser, on the briefs).

Bekir Kulozu, self-represented respondent.

PER CURIAM Appellant Timothy Proudman, a former residential co-tenant, appeals the Special Civil Part's July 11, 2025 final judgment of $8,523.56 plus court costs entered against him in his landlord's favor and the court's approval of the landlord's retention of a $4,500 security deposit. Appellant also appeals the court's denial of relief to him under the Security Deposit Act, N.J.S.A. 46:8- 21.1, and its August 15, 2025 order denying reconsideration.

Having reviewed the record in light of the applicable statutes and case law, we vacate the monetary judgment against appellant. We do so principally because the trial court erred under the Holdover Tenant Act, N.J.S.A. 46:8-10, in determining that appellant was liable for post-term rent through a so-called month-to-month "holdover tenancy" in the circumstances presented. In addition, the lease failed to specify with sufficient clarity an obligation by appellant to pay rent when his ex-wife continued to solely occupy the premises after the fifteen-month lease term ended and long after appellant had vacated the premises with timely notice to the landlord.

Given our ruling vacating the monetary judgment against appellant, we remand the matter to the trial court for reconsideration of the remaining issues , including those concerning the security deposit.

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The pertinent facts may be summarized as follows. On January 25, 2023, appellant and his now ex-wife Andrea Proudman Reilly 1 co-signed a lease to rent an apartment in Jersey City from Bekir Kulozu ("the landlord") for a term of fifteen months, from January 26, 2023 to April 30, 2024. The lease was on a standard form provided by a broker. The rent was $3,000 per month. The tenants paid the landlord a security deposit of $4,500. The lease was renewable if the landlord offered a new lease at least ninety days before the end date, and if the tenants accepted those renewal terms at least sixty days in advance.

Notably, the lease specified in paragraph 4 that "Each Tenant is individually responsible for the entire rental payment and other provisions of the lease. Any arrangement for contributions or payments between Tenants does not affect or bind the Landlord."

We further highlight paragraph 7 of the lease, which stated that "if the Tenant fails to comply with any agreement in this Lease . . . the Landlord may charge the cost to comply to the Tenant as 'additional rent.'" In addition,

1 We refer to co-defendant in this opinion as "Reilly" or "the ex-wife." She has not appealed the judgment against her, nor has she filed a brief responding to her ex-husband Proudman's appeal. We note that co-defendant's name appears at some places in the record as "Andrea Reilly Proudman."

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paragraph 27 authorized the landlord to charge the tenant for cleaning, repairs, and other associated expenses at the end of the lease term.

During the lease term, appellant and Reilly divorced.2 Appellant moved out of the premises in February 2023,3 only a month after the lease started, and removed his belongings. Appellant contends he gave the landlord notice that he was leaving and did not want to renew the lease. The landlord does not dispute having been provided with such notice, nor does he contend he was unaware of appellant's departure.

After the landlord sent in 2024 a proposed renewal lease calling for a rent increase, appellant responded to him in an email on May 2, 2024. Appellant's email made clear that he was not interested in renewing and that he would not be responsible for any rent if his ex-wife remained on the premises after the lease term ended.

It is undisputed that appellant fully paid the fifteen months of rent due under the lease, although the final payment was a few weeks late. There is no

2 The record does not contain the divorce judgment, nor otherwise inform us of any relevant terms of the divorce that might relate to this tenancy. 3 There is some indication in the record that the actual month may have been February 2024 rather than February 2023, but the discrepancy is immaterial to the legal analysis.

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indication that Reilly made any lease payments herself. In fact, the landlord contends he agreed to lease the apartment to the couple in 2023 solely in reliance upon appellant's personal financial status.

Reilly continued to occupy the unit for a period of four months after the lease ended on April 30, 2024, and did not pay any rent. That caused the landlord to evict her and remove her things from the premises. The landlord also incurred cleaning, repair, and storage costs. The landlord retained the full $4,500 security deposit, applying it as partial payment of the four months of unpaid rent for May, June, July, and August 2024 (which may be calculated as 4 months x $3,000 = $12,000). 4 Beyond that, the landlord sought to recover the net shortfall and other expenses.

The landlord brought an eviction action in the Special Civil Part against both tenants. The action was dismissed as to appellant because he had already left the premises. The co-tenant, Reilly, did not appear in the case and defaulted. The court entered a judgment for possession against Reilly individually on July 2, 2024.

4 The landlord argued to the trial court that the four months' rent should be computed a higher rate specified in a proposed rent increase, but the court rejected that argument and used the extant $3,000 monthly figure.

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In November 2024, the landlord filed the present case in the Special Civil Part seeking money damages against both appellant and Reilly, jointly and severally, for four months of unpaid rent, plus late fees and damages for possessions left behind. Once again, Reilly did not appear and defaulted.

Appellant, meanwhile, contested his liability for any rent after the fifteen-

month lease term had expired. He further argued that the landlord had illegally retained the security deposit and violated the Security Deposit Act by failing to give twenty days' notice of the retention of the deposit, as required under that statute.

The case was tried in the Special Civil Part with testimony by the self-

represented landlord and by appellant, who was represented by counsel. Reilly did not appear and she was not called by either side as a witness. As we noted above, the court ruled in the landlord's favor, although it disallowed his recovery of certain incidental expenses, such as the claimed replacement of a damaged microwave. The court rejected appellant's argument that he should be relieved of having to pay ongoing rent when his ex-wife continued to occupy the premises after the term of the lease expired.

A central premise of the trial court's reasoning was that a month-to-month holdover tenancy binding all parties was created when the lease term expired at

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the end of April 2024 and Reilly remained alone in the apartment. The court observed in this regard that "even when a lease expires, the tenancy continues, if all the parties don't vacate the premises, on a month-to-month basis with the terms and conditions of that lease still relevant." Despite appellant's actions in paying all rent that had been due during the lease term and having vacated the premises with ample notice to the landlord, the court found that appellant's liability as a co-signor "goes on in perpetuity until he legally separates it."

In this regard, the trial court stressed the language in paragraph 4 of the lease, which we have already quoted above, declaring that "[e]ach Tenant is individually responsible for the entire rental payment and other provisions of the lease. Any arrangement for contributions or payments between Tenants does not affect or bind the Landlord." The court reasoned that appellant's notice letter and his departure from the premises did not "unilaterally terminate [the] contract," even though the fifteen-month term of the lease had ended. According to the court, the leasehold "continued month to month" as to both defendants after the lease term ended.

With these assumptions in mind, the court found Proudman and Reilly jointly and severally liable for the four months of rent for May through August 2024, as well as for certain expenses the landlord incurred for the removal and

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storage of Reilly's belongings and other proven costs. The final judgment, inclusive of the discrete expenses the court had specifically approved, totaled $8,523.56.

The court rejected appellant's argument that the landlord violated the Security Deposit Act in deducting sums from the $4,500 security deposit without timely notice to defendants. As the court described it, the lease contains "go- around" provisions that authorize the landlord to deduct amounts from the security deposit for monies owed, without the advance notice prescribed by the statute. In particular, as we noted above, paragraph 7 of the lease states that "if the Tenant fails to comply with any agreement in this Lease . . . [t]he Landlord may charge the cost to comply to the Tenant as 'additional rent.'" Paragraph 27 further authorizes the landlord to charge the tenant for cleaning, repairs, and other associated expenses, at the end of the lease term.

After final judgment against him was entered, appellant moved for reconsideration. The court denied the motion in an order of August 15, 2025, and thereafter declined to stay the judgment pending appeal.

The critical threshold issue before us concerns the trial court's determination that a month-to-month holdover tenancy binding both defendants was formed after the fifteen-month lease term ended. The issue is guided by

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what is known as the Holdover Tenant Act, N.J.S.A. 46:8-10, a statute that has been in force in this state for decades. As presently written, the Holdover Tenant Act prescribes:

Whenever a tenant whose original term of leasing shall be for a period of one month or longer shall hold over or remain in possession of the demised premises beyond the term of the letting, the tenancy created by or resulting from acceptance of rent by the landlord shall be a tenancy from month to month in the absence of any agreement to the contrary.

[N.J.S.A. 46:8-10 (emphasis added).]

A holdover tenancy in New Jersey arises when a tenant who previously had a rental agreement with a landlord remains in possession after the agreed - upon rental period has expired but continues to pay rent. "By accept[ing] the rent the landlord assume[s] the valid holding of the tenant and create[s] a new tenancy. By operation of law this bec[omes] a tenancy for a new term, but it could not become such without the implied agreement of the parties." Dragun v. Connolly, 2 N.J. Misc. 727, 729 (Sup. Ct. 1924).

Once a holdover tenancy has been established, the original lease terms apply without interruption until one of the parties ends the tenancy. Stamboulos v. McKee, 134 N.J. Super. 567, 570–71 (App. Div. 1975); Skyline Gardens, Inc. v. McGarry, 22 N.J. Super. 193, 196 (App. Div. 1952).

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An essential requirement to create a statutory holdover tenancy is that the tenant who has overstayed the lease term continues to pay the rent. N.J.S.A. 46:8-10 ("the tenancy created by or resulting from acceptance of rent by the landlord"). This is not a minor or technical detail; it is an operative condition precedent to the creation of the new tenancy. Only when this requirement is met, "in the absence of any agreement to the contrary," N.J.S.A. 46:8-10, does a tenant for a fixed term become a tenant from month to month, and thus become "subject to all the terms and conditions of the last written lease . . . ." Ctr. Ave. Realty, Inc. v. Smith, 264 N.J. Super. 344, 348 (App. Div. 1993). For instance, in Center Avenue Realty, we held that a holdover tenancy was created when a tenant continued to pay rent after refusing to sign a landlord's annual extension notice once her husband passed away. Id. at 346-48.

Critically here, no more rent was paid after the fifteen-month lease term expired and Reilly remained in the apartment. The landlord could have promptly commenced proceedings to evict her. Because she paid no rent, she became a tenant at sufferance. Xerox Corp. v. Listmark Comput. Sys., 142 N.J. Super. 232, 240 (App. Div. 1976). Reilly had no right to remain there. As it turned out, four months passed before she was forced to vacate the premises. The terms

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of the fifteen-month lease co-signed by appellant in January 2023 did not automatically carry forward.

Although we appreciate the landlord's right to be compensated by someone who is illegally occupying his premises, that right does not impose on a vacated original co-tenant, as the trial court phrased it, a responsibility to continue to pay the rent "in perpetuity," absent clear language in the lease that specifies such ongoing and unbounded rent liability.

Here, there is no such clear language in the form lease supplied by a broker and signed by the parties. In the absence of such an express contractual term, we decline to impute the perpetual individual rent liability the trial court imposed. See also Kanouse v. Wise, 76 N.J.L. 423, 426 (Sup. Ct. 1908) (holding that a guarantor's liability on a lease ceased at the end of its defined term, noting that "while the execution of a written lease is not required if the tenant holds over, nevertheless it is, so far as the surety is concerned, a new lease, and he is not bound beyond the term for which he contracts").

In sum, the trial court erred as a matter of law in deeming appellant to have been individually liable for rent in an imputed post-April 2024 holdover tenancy in the circumstances presented. Applying de novo review to that legal error, see Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan, 140

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N.J. 366, 378 (1995), we vacate the monetary judgment against appellant. However, the default judgment against Reilly individually is not disturbed.

We decline to resolve here other matters in dispute, including the proper disposition of the security deposit and appellant's contentions for remedies under the Security Deposit Act. Those residual issues must be reconsidered on remand, with the benefit of our decision concerning the holdover issue. We note in passing that the security deposit was held in trust for both tenants, and that Reilly may be entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard concerning any post-remand final disposition of that deposit. Likewise, even though no holdover tenancy binding appellant was created, the landlord may nonetheless have viable arguments to retain the deposit in full or in part due to Reilly's failure to pay rent while she still occupied the premises. The trial court shall resolve those and any other pertinent issues on remand.

Vacated in part and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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