Beinlick v. Pace

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 6, 2025
• Docket: 23-2479
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 6 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIAN BEINLICK, No. 23-2479 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:17-cv-00824-WBS-DMC v. MEMORANDUM* ADAM PACE, M.D., Mule Creek State Prison; DAVID SMILEY, Chief Medical Officer, Mule Creek State Prison; C. SMITH, Chief Physicial and Surgeon, Mule Creek State Prison; OLIVER LAU, Chief Medical Officer, Mule Creek State Prison; A. PFILE; O. LAU; D. SMILEY; A. C. PACE,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California William B. Shubb, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 4, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: McKEOWN, FORREST, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Brian Beinlick (“Beinlick”), a California state prisoner, sued David Smiley

(“Smiley”), C. Smith (“Smith”), Oliver Lau (“Lau”), and Dr. Adam Pace (“Pace”)

(collectively, “Mule Creek defendants”) for deliberate indifference to his medical

needs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Beinlick appeals the district court’s order granting

summary judgment to Mule Creek defendants based on his failure to exhaust

administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a). “We review de novo a district court’s summary judgment ruling that

an inmate has not exhausted his claims within the meaning of the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (PLRA).” Fordley v. Lizarraga, 18 F.4th 344, 350 (9th Cir. 2021).

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in part, reverse in part,

and remand.

1. Beinlick filed this lawsuit on April 19, 2017, alleging that five doctors

at two different prisons inadequately treated his irritable bowel syndrome (“IBS”)

in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He filed grievance MCSP-HC-13043736

(“the ’736 Grievance”) shortly after arriving to Mule Creek State Prison, asserting

that his IBS was not being properly treated and managed. Beinlick requested that

he be given psyllium seed powder or referred to a specialist. The ’736 Grievance

was addressed through all three levels of administrative review and ultimately

denied on the grounds that psyllium powder was no longer an approved drug and

that other medications adequately managed Beinlick’s condition.

2 23-2479 2. The district court granted summary judgment for Mule Creek

defendants, concluding that Beinlick failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

under the PLRA because he did not identify any of the defendants in his ’736

Grievance. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The district court erred in doing so. “[T]he

PLRA exhaustion requirement is satisfied if prison officials decide a potentially

procedurally flawed grievance on the merits.” Reyes v. Smith, 810 F.3d 654, 657

(9th Cir. 2016). Although California state prison inmates are generally required to

“list all staff member(s) involved and [] describe their involvement in the issue,”

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(3) (2013), it is undisputed that prison officials

overlooked this procedural flaw and addressed the ’736 Grievance on the merits at

all three stages of review. “[W]hen prison officials address the merits of a

prisoner’s grievance instead of enforcing a procedural bar, the state’s interests in

administrative exhaustion have been served.” Reyes, 810 F.3d at 657. Beinlick

therefore exhausted his claims arising under his ’736 Grievance. Id.

3. The district court properly granted summary judgment to Mule Creek

defendants with respect to grievance SOL-HC-16041900 (“the ’900 Grievance”).

Because the ’900 Grievance only listed individuals at another prison as being

deliberately indifferent to Beinlick’s health care needs, the ’900 Grievance did not

alert prison officials at Mule Creek to any conduct by the Mule Creek defendants

that would allow prison officials to rectify any alleged harm. See Woodford v.

3 23-2479 Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006) (explaining that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement

“seeks to affor[d] corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints

internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case” (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted)). Beinlick’s reliance on a state court habeas corpus petition

order appended to the ’900 Grievance is unavailing. As the district court found,

Dr. Pace was mentioned in the habeas order “only in the context of background

information and not in the context of [Beinlick]’s substantive claims.” Such brief

references did not exhaust administrative remedies as to Dr. Pace or any other

Mule Creek defendant.

4. The district court properly granted summary judgment to Mule Creek

defendants with respect to grievance MCSP-HC-16049620 (“the ’620 Grievance”).

By filing his complaint before the decision at the final level of appeal was

rendered, Beinlick failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Rhodes v.

Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A] prisoner must exhaust his

administrative remedies for the claims contained within his complaint before that

complaint is tendered to the district court.”).

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

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