Behrens v. Cable

Connecticut Superior Court

Behrens v. Cable

16 Conn. Super. Ct. 293, 16 Conn. Supp. 293, 1949 Conn. Super. LEXIS 87

CourtConnecticut Superior Court

DecidedAugust 1, 1949

DocketFile 78148

StatusPublished

This text of 16 Conn. Super. Ct. 293 (Behrens v. Cable) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Behrens v. Cable, 16 Conn. Super. Ct. 293, 16 Conn. Supp. 293, 1949 Conn. Super. LEXIS 87 (Colo. Ct. App. 1949).

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Opinion

ALCORN, J.

This is an action by an indorsee against the maker of a promissory note. Regardless of what else may be involved, the first special defense seems to allege facts under which the defendant could offer proof that the defendant gave the note to the payee for the latter’s accommodation under a collateral agreement as to when it should become effective, and that the plaintiff, with knowledge of these facts, discounted the note for the payee contrary to the latter’s agreement with the maker. The same allegations are incorporated by reference in the second defense in which the defendant’s knowledge of a diversion is reiterated.

The defense thus stated appears to be that the plaintiff is not a holder in due course because at the time the note was negotiated to him he either did not take it in good faith, or he *294 had notice of an infirmity in it or of a defect in the payee’s title. General Statutes § 6344; that the defect consisted in the negotiation in breach of faith, § 6347; and that the plaintiff’s notice amounted to actual knowledge. § 6348. The defendant is entitled to make that defense. First National Bank v. Fairfield Auto Co., 91 Conn. 260; Hartford National Bank & Trust Co., v. Credenza, 119 Conn. 368.

The demurrer is overruled. Folwell v. Howell, 117 Conn. 565, 568.

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ALCORN, J.

This is an action by an indorsee against the maker of a promissory note. Regardless of what else may be involved, the first special defense seems to allege facts under which the defendant could offer proof that the defendant gave the note to the payee for the latter’s accommodation under a collateral agreement as to when it should become effective, and that the plaintiff, with knowledge of these facts, discounted the note for the payee contrary to the latter’s agreement with the maker. The same allegations are incorporated by reference in the second defense in which the defendant’s knowledge of a diversion is reiterated.

The defense thus stated appears to be that the plaintiff is not a holder in due course because at the time the note was negotiated to him he either did not take it in good faith, or he *294 had notice of an infirmity in it or of a defect in the payee’s title. General Statutes § 6344; that the defect consisted in the negotiation in breach of faith, § 6347; and that the plaintiff’s notice amounted to actual knowledge. § 6348. The defendant is entitled to make that defense. First National Bank v. Fairfield Auto Co., 91 Conn. 260; Hartford National Bank & Trust Co., v. Credenza, 119 Conn. 368.

The demurrer is overruled. Folwell v. Howell, 117 Conn. 565, 568.

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Bluebook (online)

16 Conn. Super. Ct. 293, 16 Conn. Supp. 293, 1949 Conn. Super. LEXIS 87, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/behrens-v-cable-connsuperct-1949.

Opinion

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