Begum v. Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: November 22, 2024
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-2586
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

NZINGA BEGUM, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-02586 (UNA) ) BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON ) TRUST COMPANY, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on its initial review of the purported pro se notice of removal

(“Not.”), ECF No. 1, and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP App.”), ECF

No. 2, filed by Nzinga Begum, who also lists several pseudonyms, see Not. at 1–2, 4–6. For the

reasons explained below, the Court hereby denies Begum’s IFP application and dismisses this

matter.

Both of Begum’s submissions are quite difficult to follow. In her IFP application, Begum

merely asserts that she is exempt from federal taxation. See IFP App. at 1. Even assuming

arguendo that statement is true, it does not exempt her from complying with the requirements to

provide the Court with her relevant financial information in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a)(1), or to alternatively submit the filing fee attributable to civil actions in this District. As

it stands, the Court is without any information regarding Plaintiff’s financial circumstances, and

she has thus failed to establish that she qualifies for IFP status.

Begum’s “notice” fares no better. She has supplied only a P.O. Box address, see Not. at

1, which is only allowed upon leave of court, see D.C. LCvR 5.1(c)(1); see also Mail Returned as Undeliverable to Begum, ECF No. 3. The charges that follow are nebulous, at best. As far as it

can be discerned, Begum takes issue with (1) civil and criminal proceedings in the 21st Judicial

Circuit of Missouri, located in St. Louis, and (2) bankruptcy proceedings in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. See Not. at 1–5. She seeks to remove those

cases, in which she named as a defendant, to this District, see id., but she faces insurmountable

hurdles.

First, although Begum has presented this matter as a removal, there is absolutely no

indication that the state matters were actually removed from the 21st Judicial Circuit of Missouri,

or any other local court. In essence, Begum has attempted to open a civil matter without a

complaint, which she may not do. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 3; In re Sealed Case No. 98-3077, 151 F.3d

1059, 1069 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 3); see also Adair v. England, 193 F. Supp.

2d 196, 200 (D.D.C. 2002) (“A party commences a civil action by filing a complaint . . . [and]

[w]hen no complaint is filed, the court lacks jurisdiction[.]”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 3).

Second, a defendant is required to file for removal in the district court for the district and

division within which such action is pending. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1455(a), 1446(a). None of these

cited state actions were ever pending in a District of Columbia local court; therefore, they may not

be removed to this federal District.

Third, to the extent that Begum attempts to “remove” a case from the Eastern District of

Missouri to this district, she may not do so. She cites to no authority under which a defendant may

“remove” a case from one district to another, nor is the Court of aware of any. Indeed, this Court

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to review the decisions of other federal district courts. See In re

Marin, 956 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Panko v. Rodak, 606 F. 2d 168, 171 n.6 (7th Cir. 1979)

(finding it “axiomatic” that a federal court may order judges or officers of another federal court “to take an action.”), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980); United States v. Choi, 818 F. Supp. 2d

79, 85 (D.D.C. 2011) (stating that federal district courts “generally lack[] appellate jurisdiction

over other judicial bodies, and cannot exercise appellate mandamus over other courts”) (citing

Lewis v. Green, 629 F. Supp. 546, 553 (D.D.C. 1986)); Fleming v. United States, 847 F. Supp.

170, 172 (D.D.C. 1994) (applying District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.

462, 482 (1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415, 416 (1923)).

In short, Begum is asking a federal court in Washington, D.C. to intervene in civil and

criminal matters that were filed in state and federal courts in Missouri, but this Court cannot do so.

Accordingly, this case is dismissed. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: November 22, 2024 /s/_________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge