Begue v. Louisiana Arkansas Ry. Co.

42 So. 2d 97, 1949 La. App. LEXIS 599
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 4, 1949
DocketNo. 3135.
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 42 So. 2d 97 (Begue v. Louisiana Arkansas Ry. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Begue v. Louisiana Arkansas Ry. Co., 42 So. 2d 97, 1949 La. App. LEXIS 599 (La. Ct. App. 1949).

Opinion

Plaintiff was a guest passenger in the car of Victor Silvio early on the morning of October 17, 1947, and sustained certain physical injuries for which he seeks to recover damages from the defendant railroad company when he was thrown from the automobile as it made a sharp turn to the left in the street in an attempt to avoid a collision with one of the trains of the railroad company.

It was the custom of Silvio to pick up the plaintiff at the postoffice building in Baton Rouge each morning and they drove together to work. On that morning, as usual, they were traveling in a westward direction on Florida Street, and in approaching the railroad crossing at the 1400 block in that street, Silvio, apprehending the danger of running into a train which was about to make the crossing, swerved his car to his left and in doing so it would seem that the right hand front door, next to which the plaintiff was seated, opened in some manner and plaintiff fell on the sidewalk, or at a gate through which the car ran, at the place of business of one Charles S. Stewart, situated on the north side of Florida Street and approximately 35 feet west from the railroad crossing. The Stewart's office is situated in the rear of the office of the Amite Sand and Gravel Company and is reached by a driveway through the gate that was knocked down by Silvio as he went through. It is not disputed that his car, after knocking the gate down, struck a building on the lot, and proceeded on a distance of about 40 or 50 feet and only came to a rest when it struck a truck which was parked on the lot.

This suit is brought against the railroad company on the alleged negligence of the crew in charge of the train that was making the crossing at the moment, in failing to give a warning or signal of any kind, by blowing of the whistle or ringing of the bell and in addition that it permitted the flasher signal at the crossing to be and remain out of order on the morning of the accident. This flasher signal, also referred to as a wig-wag, consists of two red lights arranged horizontally on a cross bar attached to a post, which operate alternately from the moment the train makes contact with an open circuit some 365 feet south of the crossing and continue flashing as a warning, until the train has completed making the crossing over the street.

The defense on the part of the railroad company is that all proper signals as to blowing of the whistle and ringing of the bell were given, in accordance with the regulations and such laws as exists with regard to those matters, and that the flasher signal was properly working on that morning. It is affirmatively averred in the *Page 98 answer, that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff in the accident were caused solely and exclusively by the negligence of Silvio, driver and owner of the car, in failing to keep a proper lookout or to pay heed to the warnings and signals that were given and also in driving his car with defective brakes. All negligence charged against the railroad company is denied and in the alternative it is alleged that plaintiff himself was guilty of contributory negligence as he had every opportunity to observe the situation as well as did Silvio, the driver of the car, and yet he uttered no protest at the manner in which he approached the crossing and besides he also knew of the defective condition of the brakes on the automobile.

The demand is for $6,764.50 including physical injury and physical and mental pain and suffering, as well as doctor's, hospital and other medical expenses.

The trial judge after hearing the case, rendered a written opinion in which he held that the defendant railroad company was not guilty of any negligence whatever and dismissed plaintiff's suit. From a judgment so decreeing, this appeal was taken.

The trial judge has carefully analyzed the facts in the case in the opinion he wrote and properly held that the charges of negligence relating to the failure of giving signals by blowing of the whistle and ringing of the bell had not been supported by the evidence adduced by plaintiff. On this point he held that the positive testimony of the members of the crew in charge of the train that the usual whistle signal was given and that the automatic bell signal was ringing, over-came the more or less negative testimony of the plaintiff and of Silvio and also of a Negro witness by the name of Moses Haynes, who was following them in an automobile by some 50 or 75 feet. The one factor which seemed to give the trial judge concern was whether or not the flasher light signal was operating that morning for, apparently he seemed to have been of the opinion that if it was not, the railroad company might have been guilty of negligence in that respect. After reviewing the testimony of the three witnesses for the plaintiff, as well as that of the engineer and fireman who were riding in the cab of the engine, he reached the conclusion that it was operating and that is why he acquitted the railroad company of all negligence, and consequently, of any blame or liability for the accident.

The evidence discloses that this train which consisted of a Deisel motor engine and two passenger coaches leaves the station of the Louisiana and Arkansas Railroad Company in Baton Rouge each morning at about 6:20 o'clock. It is used as a shuttle train to take employees to work at the Standard Oil plant north of Baton Rouge. It is not disputed that in running through the congested area of the city, after leaving the station, it does not run faster than five or six miles per hour as it was doing on the morning in question. On that morning, like every morning, it stopped at North Boulevard which is two blocks south of Florida Street to take on more passengers, then crossing over Florida Street and stopped again at Main street, two blocks north of Florida Street for the same purpose. It is hardly probable therefore that it traveled any faster than what the evidence in this case reveals. The crew in charge of the train all testified that the bell, which was operated by opening an air valve, started to ring right after leaving the station and that the valve was left open and the bell kept ringing all the time until the train had passed out of the northern end of the congested area of the city. They all testified also that the crossing whistle signal which consists of two long blasts, one short and another long, was given, and the importance of this is shown by what would happen to a man like the engineer in charge of this particular train who, if he failed to give that signal, would stand the loss of 30 years or more seniority and would not have a job any longer.

The testimony of the engineer and fireman, as well as that of the man in charge of keeping the flasher working, shows that in addition to the red lights which flash in front of the driver of an automobile approaching from either the east or west, *Page 99 it is so constructed that the same bulb which flashes red, also flashes a white light visible to the engineer or the fireman in the cab of the engine and in that manner they know that the system is operating. The testimony of these men is that they observed this white light that morning and that is why they are certain that the system was operating as it should. The defendant, in addition, produced the testimony of the man who keeps the signal in order and judging by his testimony it seems to be almost fool-proof and gets out of order so infrequently that he could not recall but very few occasions over a long period of time and then when the trouble was reported, it was immediately corrected.

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Related

Allen v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co.
96 F. Supp. 520 (W.D. Louisiana, 1951)

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Bluebook (online)
42 So. 2d 97, 1949 La. App. LEXIS 599, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/begue-v-louisiana-arkansas-ry-co-lactapp-1949.