Begnaud v. Grubb & Hawkins

25 So. 2d 606, 209 La. 826, 1946 La. LEXIS 734
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedMarch 18, 1946
DocketNo. 37790.
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 25 So. 2d 606 (Begnaud v. Grubb & Hawkins) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Begnaud v. Grubb & Hawkins, 25 So. 2d 606, 209 La. 826, 1946 La. LEXIS 734 (La. 1946).

Opinion

ROGERS, Justice.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the district court in favor of the plaintiff, Wilfred J. Begnaud, State Bank Commissioner in charge of the liquidation of the Canal Bank & Trust Company, and against the defendants, State of Louisiana, State Mineral Board, Grubb & Hawkins, Harbor Oil Company, Inc., Mark Wolff and James G. Cowles. The judgment perpetuates a writ of injunction previously issued, enjoining the defendants from trespassing upon or interfering with plaintiff's possession of the bed of Bayou Sale so far as it lies within the limits of Lots 14, 15-A and 15-B of the lands of the Southern Planting & Development Company, Inc., in Sections 15 and 16, Township 16 South, Range 9 East, in the Parish of St. Mary. The judgment also recognizes plaintiff, in his capacity of liquidator, as the owner of the bed of the bayou to the middle or thread of the stream and quiets his title thereto and possession thereof.

The suit was brought as a simple possessory action, coupled with a demand for injunctive relief, against Grubb & Hawkins, Harbor Oil Company, Inc., Mark Wolff and James G. Cowles. In their answers to the petition, defendants called the State of Louisiana and the State' Mineral Board in warranty. The State and the Mineral Board filed exceptions of no cause *831 or right of action to the call in warranty. The exceptions were referred to the merits and the State and the Mineral Board, reserving the benefit thereof, answered plaintiff’s original and supplemental petitions.

Briefly stated, plaintiff’s claim is that Bayou Sale is and always has been non-navigable and therefore is owned and possessed by plaintiff and not by the State. On the other hand, -defendants’ claim is that Bayou Sale was a navigable stream on April 30, 1812, the date Louisiana was admitted into the Union, and its bed therefore belongs to the State by virtue of its sovereignty. From which it appears that the question to be determined in the case is whether Bayou Sale, which at one time connected Bayou Teche on the north with East Cote Blanche Bay on the south, was navigable at the time Louisiana became a State. Before considering that question, however, we direct our attention to the issue presented by the exceptions of no cause of action filed by the State and the Mineral Board in the district court and also in this Court to the call in warranty.

It appears from the reasons assigned in writing by the trial judge for granting the preliminary injunction that no argument was submitted: and no authorities furnished on the question raised by the exceptions-to the call in warranty, and he therefore concluded that the exceptions had been abandoned and.that both the'State and the Mineral Board were parties defendant.

The argument ckr the • exceptions in this Court is that the Mineral Board is a State agency and that in executing mineral leases-it does not act as the owner but merely as the agent of its principal and, therefore, can not be called in warranty; and as the State is sovereign and can be sued only in its own courts with its consent, that it also can not be called in warranty and a judgment rendered against it.

The rights and obligations of the State Mineral Board must be tested by the provisions of Act 93 of 1936 and its amendments, by which the Board was established and under which it is operating. Under the terms of the statute, the Mineral Board was created as a body corporate with all of the usual powers incident to corporations in addition to those conferred upon it by. the statute itself and with express authority to sue and to be sued. The Board is granted full power to lease any lands belonging to the State or the title to which is in the public for mineral development. Under Section 9, the Board is given complete supervision of all existing mineral leases granted by the State or which may be subsequently entered into, in order to determine that the terms of any such lease are fully complied with, and generally is empowered to take any lawful action for the protection of the interest of the State, including the right to institute any action to annul any such lease upon any legal ground whatsoever.

It seems to be clear that the purpose of the Legislature in adopting Act 93 of 1936 was to substitute or superadd the rights and obligations of1 the State Mineral Board to those of the State itself, so far as mineral leases are concerned.,- The lease involved in this litigation shows on its face *833 that it was granted by the State Mineral Board, acting in behalf of the State, under the authority and in accordance with the terms of Act 93 of 1936. In these circumstances, it is as much the duty of the State Mineral Board as it is that of the State to protect the title to the property leased by it.

The argument that because ordinarily the State as a sovereignty can not be sued in its courts except with its consent is untenable. It overlooks the fact that while the State possesses legislative, public and governmental power in the exercise of which it is a sovereignty and governs its people, it also possesses proprietary and quasi private power conferred upon it not for the purpose of governing its people but for the private advantage of the inhabitants of the State itself as a legal personality. This distinction in the powers of the State was pointed out in the case of State ex rel. Shell Oil Co. v. Register of State Land Office, 193 La. 883, 192 So. 519. In that case this Court held that when the State executed a mineral lease it was acting in its proprietary or quasi private capacity and that having accepted the benefits under the lease it could not escape its obligations — -among which was the obligation of warranty. And the Court properly allowed the assignees of the lessee of the State to call their lessors in warranty to protect their possession of the leased premises.

The further argument is that, conceding the State and the Mineral Board are properly in court under the call in warranty, nevertheless, the judgment of the district court' erroneously condemns them as defendants in the main action and not as defendants under the call of warranty. But this Court can only consider the case in the situation which is presented by the record as, otherwise, the Court would be assuming original jurisdiction on appeal.

This suit was begun as a simple possessory action. In their answers to the petition the defendants, Grubb & Hawkins, Harbor Oil Company, Mark Wolff and James G. Cowles, set up that Bayou Sale was a navigable stream in 1812 and therefore the bed of the Bayou belongs to the State by virtue of its sovereignty. The State and the Mineral Board, when brought into court under the call in warranty, also answered plaintiff’s petition and set up that the ownership of the bed of Bayou Sale, covered by the lease, was in the State and specifically prayed for judgment against plaintiff recognizing and confirming the State’s title to the leased premises. In other words, all the parties litigant opposing plaintiff’s claim to the possession of the bed of Bayou Sale covered by the lease expressly claimed that the title to the property was in the State by virtue of its sovereignty and also expressly prayed for judgment against plaintiff recognizing and confirming the State’s ownership thereof. Both the State and the Mineral Board participated in the trial of the case to the same extent as if the proceeding had been initiated by them.

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Bluebook (online)
25 So. 2d 606, 209 La. 826, 1946 La. LEXIS 734, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/begnaud-v-grubb-hawkins-la-1946.