Beggs v. Shue, Unpublished Decision (3-16-2005)

2005 Ohio 1128
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedMarch 16, 2005
DocketNo. 04CA0031.
StatusUnpublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2005 Ohio 1128 (Beggs v. Shue, Unpublished Decision (3-16-2005)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Beggs v. Shue, Unpublished Decision (3-16-2005), 2005 Ohio 1128 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).

Opinion

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
{¶ 1} Appellants, Lucille and Earl Beggs (the "Beggs"), appeal from the judgment of the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas, that found in favor of Appellees, Kay and Terry Shue (the "Shues"), pursuant to a favorable jury verdict. We affirm.

I.
{¶ 2} The Beggs are owners of a residence and surrounding grounds located at 4005 Sommers Road, in the Township of Sugarcreek, Ohio, in Wayne County, which they purchased in 1994. The Beggs constructed a home on the property with a detached garage in 1996. The Shues own and reside at 4000 Steinwood Drive in Sugarcreek, an adjacent property located southwest of and directly uphill from the Beggs' property. The Shues have lived there since 1997.

{¶ 3} These properties had been used as farmland by the family of Clayton Steiner, d.b.a. Steinwood Allotments. Steiner later developed the land and sold these lots to the parties. Contained in the restrictions attached to the Beggs' deed is a provision noting that the lots are surrounded by "a farming community with farms and farming operations being carried on all sides of said allotment with the normal noises, odors, and run-off from said operations." The restrictions also noted that lots 27 and 28 in the allotment, located nearby the Beggs' and the Shues' property, were maintained as an open drainage area constructed to handle "surface runoff," and were identified as a Drainage Easement, which acted as a ditch to where water could flow. No drainage easements are known to exist on either the Beggs' or the Shues' property.

{¶ 4} In December 1999, the Shues built a pond on their property. The pond measured approximately 44 feet by 22 feet, with a depth of four feet, and was located directly west and up the slope from the Beggs' house. The Shues installed an overflow pipe which faced the Beggs' property, and which took excess water from the pond and deposited it on the Shues' property.

{¶ 5} In January 2000, the area had a large rainfall. The water from the rainfall overfilled the pond, and subsequently the pond began to leak, its water level dropping about eight inches in two weeks. It was discovered that a plug in a drain tile located under the pond released, which caused water to drain into the field tile and head downhill through the Beggs' property by their garage. The Beggs asserted that their sump pump began to run continuously about one month later. They also maintained that due to this water flow, they began to experience wetness and mold in their basement as well as cracks in their driveway, cement and foundation of the residence and detached garage, and that they incurred numerous expenses from repainting and replacing their sump pump and flooring.

{¶ 6} In September 2000, the Beggs filed a complaint against the Shues1 asserting negligence in the construction and maintenance of the pond, and trespass. In February 2001, the Beggs dismissed the complaint without prejudice.

{¶ 7} On February 13, 2002, the Beggs refiled their complaint with the addition of Steiner and his wife, Ruth Steiner, as well as unnamed John Does, as defendants. The Beggs asserted a breach of warranties claim, stating that the Steiner's had failed to disclose the existence of substantial lines of farm field tiles on their property and that these tiles caused excessive run-off water to flow onto their premises. On September 23, 2003, the Steiner's filed a motion for summary judgment. The court granted the motion, finding in favor of the Steiner's on the Beggs' claims.

{¶ 8} On November 15, 2002, the Beggs filed a motion in limine to prevent the admission of certain information, to wit, 1) the Beggs' assertions that Terry Shue had brandished a gun towards them, and 2) evidence of emails sent to Terry Shue by the Beggs' expert witness, John Fenton, regarding settlement of the case. The Beggs asserted that this information would be highly prejudicial and would only confuse and mislead the jury. The court timely denied the motion.

{¶ 9} The matter proceeded to a three-day jury trial, pursuant to which the jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of the Shues. This verdict was supported by the jury's unanimous interrogatory answers indicating that the Beggs had failed to prove that the construction and/or maintenance of the pond caused any damage to the Beggs' premises or their residence, and that, therefore, the Shues were not negligent. The court journalized the verdict and entered judgment in favor of the Shues. This appeal followed.

{¶ 10} The Beggs timely appealed, asserting two assignments of error for review.

II.
A.
First Assignment of Error
"The jury's verdict in favor of defendants (appellees) is against the manifest weight of the evidence."

{¶ 11} In their first assignment of error, the Beggs assert that the jury's verdict finding in favor of the Shues was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.

{¶ 12} Initially, we note the appropriate standard of review. When the manifest weight of the evidence is challenged, "[a]n appellate court conducts the same manifest weight analysis in both criminal and civil cases." Ray v. Vansickle (Oct. 14, 1998), 9th Dist. Nos. 97CA006897 97CA006907, at 3.

"The [reviewing] court * * * weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [verdict] must be reversed and a new trial ordered." State v. Thompkins (1997),78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, quoting State v. Martin (1983),20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175.

{¶ 13} This action is preserved for the exceptional circumstance where the evidence presented weighs heavily in favor of the party opposing the verdict and judgment. State v. Otten (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340.

{¶ 14} An appellate court that overturns a judgment as against the manifest weight of the evidence acts in effect as a "thirteenth juror," setting aside the trier of fact's resolution of the testimony and evidence. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387. Every reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment and the findings of fact of the trial court. Karches v. Cincinnati (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 12, 19.

{¶ 15} Moreover, a judgment is not against the manifest weight of the evidence simply because conflicting evidence exists before trier of fact. State v. Haydon (Dec. 22, 1999), 9th Dist. No. 19094, at 14. "[I]f the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, we must give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the trial court's verdict and judgment." Karches, 38 Ohio St.3d at 19.

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2005 Ohio 1128, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/beggs-v-shue-unpublished-decision-3-16-2005-ohioctapp-2005.