Beeson v. Tri-State Transit Co. of Louisiana, Inc.

146 F.2d 754, 1945 U.S. App. LEXIS 2076
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 18, 1945
DocketNo. 11011
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 146 F.2d 754 (Beeson v. Tri-State Transit Co. of Louisiana, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Beeson v. Tri-State Transit Co. of Louisiana, Inc., 146 F.2d 754, 1945 U.S. App. LEXIS 2076 (5th Cir. 1945).

Opinion

HUTCHESON, Circuit Judges.

Suing as administrator, appellant brought these suits against appellee and another, who did not appeal, for the damages resulting in the deaths of his wife and child. The claim was that -the decedents, while attempting to cross the highway, after alighting on the north side of it from one of appellee’s busses, were struck and killed by a passing automobile. The defense was that the decedents, accompanied by plaintiff, had been safely discharged from the bus on the north side of the road, opposite their home, the place where they had asked to get off, and that if their deaths were the result of fault on the part of anyone but themselves, such fault was not that of the bus company but of the driver of the automobile which struck them. There was some confusion and contradiction as to some of the details of the occurrence as testified to by plaintiff, the main witness in the case, particularly as to when, in reference to their progress across the road, plaintiff or his wife first saw the cars, one of which struck them. But as concerns matters material to the case and defense, the evidence was without substantial conflict.1

[755]*755At the conclusion of plaintiff’s evidence, defendant moved for, and was granted, a directed verdict. Plaintiff is here insisting that his evidence made out a case for the jury upon whether the driver of the bus was negligent either in not driving the bus onto the shoulder and permitting the passengers to alight on it and not on the pavement, or in not traveling further on to the intersection of the paved highway with the gravel road, or in not warning the passengers of the automobiles approaching, [756]*756from the west and the east, instead of, as he did do, bringing the bus to a stop, opening the door of the bus and permitting the passengers to alight on the main traveled portion of the highway and remaining silent without giving warning of the approaching perils.

In support of his position, he invokes the well settled general rule of care required of a carrier in receiving a passenger, conveying him to his destination and setting him down as safely as the means of conveyance and the circumstances will permit. Citing many cases, he relies mainly on that of Gulfport & Mississippi Coast Traction Co. v. Raymond, 157 Miss. 439, 128 So. 327, where a passenger on a street car after being carried by her corner, notwithstanding her signal, was allowed to get off in the middle of the street, and immediately after alighting was struck by an oncoming automobile. Ap-pellee, pointing out that the court found liability there because the car was stopped at an unusual and unsafe place, that is in the middle of the street and between intersections, after she had been carried past her corner, insists that that case is without bearing here. We agree. There the court pointed out that as a rule street cars stop to take on and discharge passengers at street corners. Therefore, persons traveling in automobiles are not required to be on the look out for street cars to stop elsewhere to let off or take on passengers. It concludes at page 329 of 128 So.:

“Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to appellee’s case, as should be done in determining the propriety of a directed verdict for the opposite party, appellant was negligent in carrying appellee beyond her destination, and allowing her to get off at a place more dangerous than the place where she was entitled to be discharged, without giving her notice, and warning her of such added danger. The question of liability, therefore, was one for the jury, and not for the court.”

Appellee, on its part, concedes that it was its duty to discharge the plaintiff in a safe place, and that if it failed to do so and plaintiff was injured as the proximate result thereof, it would be liable. It insists, though that no such case is made out here, for plaintiff and decedents were let off, not in, but on the north side of, the road, and if they had gone onto the shoulder and remained there until a safe crossing was assured, they could not have been in danger. Their injuries, therefore, occurred solely and entirely as the result either of their own negligence in crossing the road without first looking out for oncoming vehicles, the negligence of the driver or drivers of these vehicles, or the combined negligence of themselves and the drivers. Citing as directly in point Mississippi City Lines v. Bullock, 194 Miss. 630, 13 So.2d 34, 145 A.L.R. 1199, it stands on that case as completely exonerating it here. Again we agree with appellee. It is well settled in Mississippi that though ■the bus companies have regular stopping points from and to which fares are calculated, it is the right of a passenger to alight at any place between the points called for in his ticket which he may designate. Because this is so, and the bus company must discharge the passengers on the highway when and as requested, it is not, it cannot be, a breach of duty for them to discharge a passenger at the place designated by him unless there are dangers in the place chosen, known to defendant and not known to the passenger. If, for instance, a passenger should ask to be let off on a trestle or where there was a dangerous declivity or break on the side of the [757]*757road, or some condition existing' at the place selected by him for alighting, which would make it difficult for him to alight with safety, the bus company would not be compelled to let him alight there. But at any place along the road where the only danger would he that arising from the passenger’s attempting to cross the road, after he had alighted in a place of safety, the passenger is entitled to select his place of alighting, and the bus company cannot be held negligent in acceding to his request. The evidence shows without dispute: that the driver did exactly as he had been requested to do; that there were no dangers inherent in or lurking about the place of alighting; that plaintiff and the decedents alighted safely and had a safe place to remain standing in until the way was clear for them to cross; that had they remained off the pavement and on the shoulder until they, in the exercise of the proper care incumbent on them, had selected a safe time to cross, no injury could, or would, have occurred. The bus company, having deposited them in a place where they could safely remain, was entitled to assume that they would so remain until it was safe for them to cross. It had discharged its duty to them, and was not in anywise responsible for their misadventure in attempting to cross the highway in their journey to their home. The law governing the situation here has been so well and fully set out in Bullock’s case, supra, and in the cases it cites with approval, particularly Lewis v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 147 Or. 588, 34 P.2d 616, 96 A.L.R. 718, that we content ourselves with referring to them. The judgment was xight. It is affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)
146 F.2d 754, 1945 U.S. App. LEXIS 2076, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/beeson-v-tri-state-transit-co-of-louisiana-inc-ca5-1945.