Been v. PRODUCERS ASSOCIATION OF SAN ANTONIO, INC
This text of 352 S.W.2d 292 (Been v. PRODUCERS ASSOCIATION OF SAN ANTONIO, INC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Autry Been and others have appealed from an order which temporarily enjoined them from acting as directors of the Producers Association of San Antonio, a milk marketing association. The appeal concerns the validity of a special stockholders meeting which removed the regularly elected directors and elected appellants.
Producers Association is composed of more than four hundred members. At its annual meeting on April 29, 1961, it elected *293 directors. During the summer of 1961, D. T. Perry, a non-member, solicited and obtained requests from the required number of stockholders asking for a special meeting. He delivered the requests to Autry Been, a stockholder, who, on July 7, 1961, called a special meeting for July 14, 1961. Prior to the meeting, the officers and directors protested that the call was illegal and offered to call a legal meeting if requested. They were never requested to call the meeting, and no petition for a called meeting was ever filed with the Association officials. The meeting called by Been was conducted on July 14, at Harlandale High School in San Antonio with about two hundred persons present. The directors who were elected at the annual meeting did not attend. The stockholders voted, 145 to 26, to remove all directors. After ousting the directors, the stockholders elected appellants.
On the afternoon after the special meeting, the ousted directors filed this suit. The court restrained the newly elected directors from acting, and upon trial, one week later, temporarily enjoined them. The court found the facts and concluded, among other things, that the special meeting on July 14, 1961, was invalid because it violated the ten-day notice requirement of Article 5747, Vernon’s Tex.Civ.Stats., and because the request for the meeting was not presented to the Board of Directors so they could call a meeting as required by the Association’s by-laws.
The trial court’s decree is affirmed. It is affirmed because the removal of the directors was contrary to the provisions of Article 5751, Vernon’s Tex.Civ.Stats., and because the July 14 meeting was called in violation of the method required by Article 5747. If the meeting was illegal, the trial court properly granted the temporary injunction. Camp v. Shannon, Tex., 348 S.W.2d 517, 4 S.Ct.Jour. 625. The officers and directors of the Association have done nothing to waive any rights under the statute or the by-laws. They did not participate in the special meeting or its call, and continuously have protested that it was not a valid meeting. Camp v. Shannon, supra.
Article 5751 specifically relates to the removal of directors of marketing associations and states the methods which must be followed. 1 A petition was not filed with the Association Secretary. No charges were lodged against any of the directors, and none were filed with the Association Secretary. Since there were no charges, there was no hearing upon any charges. The notice of the meeting was mailed by Autry Been, a stockholder but not an officer. It stated that the purpose of the special meeting was to determine whether to terminate the terms of any of the directors and to elect new directors.
Appellants seek to justify their disregard of Article 5751, because they believed they were following the provisions of the Association’s by-laws. By-laws which conflict with the statutory requirements for marketing associations are controlled by the statute. This is so because Article 5746, Vernon’s Tex.Civ.Stats., and Art. IX, § 5 *294 of the Association’s by-laws so provide. The by-law which the new directors relied upon was Article V, § 3. 2 It authorizes the removal of a director without cause. It makes no provision for charges, nor that they be filed with any one, nor that the director concerned even know of the complaint or be permitted to defend against it. The conflict between the by-law and Article 5751 is as clear as is the difference between charges and no charges, notice and no notice, hearing and no hearing, opportunity to defend and no opportunity to defend.
Article V, § 3, appears to conflict internally with another of the Association bylaws. Section 23 of the same Article is entitled “Removal from Office.” 3 It provides that in addition to the right to remove without cause, the Association may remove for cause by following the steps provided for the expulsion of a member in Article III, § 4(d). 4 By that method, there must be written charges filed with the Secretary or Board of Directors, a hearing and trial, and ten-days’ notice by registered mail to the one charged.
The new directors reason that the by-law method of removal without cause, charges, notice or hearing is merely another method added to the statutory method which re *295 quires all of those protective steps. In our opinion, the one method is the opposite of and in conflict with the other. If the argument that the removal without cause is merely an additional non-conflicting provision, then the whole marketing act could be repealed by the adoption of by-laws which provide procedures other than and different from the statutory requirements. The Legislature would not have concerned itself with the statement of procedures it felt were needed, if it regarded them as surplusage or optional. We do not believe the Legislature would have written into the law that directors could_ be removed for cause if they could be removed without cause. The by-law which permits removal without cause, in our opinion, conflicts with Article 5751.
The trial court’s conclusion that the special meeting held on July 14 was invalid is also correct. Article 5747 states that stockholders have the right to call a stockholders meeting. It declares how that meeting shall be called, however. There must be a petition by ten per cent of the members. That petition must be “filed”. After it is filed, “Such meeting must thereupon be called by the directors.” Notice of the meeting “shall be mailed to each member at least ten days prior to the meeting.” The statute then gives the Association an option to give notice by newspaper. There is no contention that this Article was followed. No petition was filed asking for a special meeting. The Board of Directors were not asked to call a meeting, though the undisputed evidence is that they expressed a willingness to do so if properly requested. The ten-day notice requirement was ignored. Here again the argument is made that the by-laws provided an additional method of procedure. Here too, however, the method followed in calling the meeting contravened the procedures required by the Legislature. Article 5747 states that the special meeting “must thereupon be called by the directors.” 2 Hildebrand, Texas Corporations, § 532. It states that notice of “all meetings” shall be mailed to each member “at least” ten days prior to the meeting. These are not careless words. 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 543.
The by-laws required only five days’ notice for special meetings. 5 We do not pass upon the adequacy of that notice for regular business matters.
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352 S.W.2d 292, 1961 Tex. App. LEXIS 2042, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/been-v-producers-association-of-san-antonio-inc-texapp-1961.