Beecher v. TAMBRANDS, INC.

840 F. Supp. 86, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18813, 1993 WL 535643
CourtDistrict Court, D. Minnesota
DecidedFebruary 12, 1993
DocketCiv. 3-90-639
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 840 F. Supp. 86 (Beecher v. TAMBRANDS, INC.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Beecher v. TAMBRANDS, INC., 840 F. Supp. 86, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18813, 1993 WL 535643 (mnd 1993).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RENNER, Senior District Judge.

At a hearing on November 19, 1992, this Court orally granted defendant Tambrands, Inc.’s motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs’ claims of state law failure to warn in packaging and in advertising, and federal law failure to warn prior to 1982. However, the Court ordered further briefing on Tambrands’ motion for partial summary judgment with respect to Kathleen and Keith Beecher’s claim of failure to comply with federal package warning requirements and on Tambrands’ motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the Beechers have not offered sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the link between Kathleen Beecher’s use of tampons and her episode of Toxic Shock Syndrome (TSS) in December of 1989. After carefully considering the parties’ supplemental briefing, the Court concludes that Tam-brands is entitled to summary judgment on the remaining two issues.

I. The Package Warning Claim

The first of the two remaining claims is the Beechers’ assertion that Tambrands’ package warnings do not comply with 21 U.S.C. § 352(c) (1988). Section 352(c) requires that labeling prescribed by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act be sufficiently conspicuous and understandable to be “likely to be read and understood by the ordinary individual under customary conditions of purchase and use.”

Pursuant to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has promulgated regulations requiring manufacturers of tampons to include in tampon packaging warnings, or alert statements, notifying consumers of the link between tampon use and TSS. Courts of this District have held twice that there is no genuine issue of fact as to whether the Tampax alert statements comply with the FDA’s TSS alert statement regulations, including the requirement that such alert statements be prominent. See Lindquist v. Tambrands, Inc., 721 F.Supp. 1058, 1064 (D.Minn.1989); Cornelison v. Tambrands, Inc., 710 F.Supp. 706 (D.Minn.1989). However, no reported case has determined whether a manufacturer’s tampon package TSS alert statement complies with the general requirement of conspicuousness imposed by § 352(c).

A brief examination of the plaintiffs’ § 352(c) arguments reveals that they are without merit. The Beechers first claim that Tambrands violated § 352(c) by placing a TSS alert statement on the bottom instead of on the front of its Tampax box. However, the FDA expressly declined to require that the alert statement appear on any particular panel of the package. See 47 Fed.Reg. 26,-987 (1982) (“FDA has concluded that there is no need to require that the alert statement appear in any specific location, thus providing flexibility to manufacturers”). The Beechers also complain that the bulk of the alert statement is provided in an insert, not on the exterior of the package. However, the FDA permits manufacturers to include the information “as a package insert” rather than on the exterior of the package. See 21 C.F.R. § 801.430(c) (1992). Because the FDA explicitly refused to require that the TSS alert statement appear on the front of the package, and because it explicitly permits manufacturers to use an insert, there is no material issue of fact as to whether Tam-brands’ external package alert statements violate the general requirements of 21 U.S.C. § 352(e) (1988).

Next, the Beechers assert that the alert statement on the insert itself violates § 352(c) in a variety of ways. First they state that “the insert starts out by stating: ‘If you’re using TAMPAX tampons for the *88 first time, please read these directions carefully.’ ” Because Kathleen Beecher was not a first time user, the Beechers argue, this statement would have induced her to ignore the alert statement printed on the insert. This argument is disingenuous. The statement the Beechers refer to appears on the opposite side of the insert from the TSS alert statement and the insert is folded so that the consumer sees the TSS alert statement first.

The Beechers also assert that the alert statement on the insert fails to warn the consumer that “the particular tampon she is about to use has been associated with [TSS],” and because it “fails to point out to the consumer that ... any woman is at risk for [TSS].” (Emphasis in original.) This argument borders on being frivolous. The alert statement in no way indicates that TSS is linked only with a particular brand of tampon, or that only particular classes of women are at risk for TSS. Hence, the clear implication of the alert statement is that any tampon can be associated with TSS in any woman. Indeed, although the FDA regulations specify in detail what information the TSS alert statement must include, they do not require manufacturers to address any specific misapprehensions about TSS and tampons that users might have. Thus, there is no basis for the Beecher’s claim that § 352(c) requires Tambrands to include such information in its TSS alert statement.

Therefore, there is no genuine issue of fact as to whether the wording of the alert statement violates § 352(c).

II. The Link Between Beecher’s Tampon Use and Her TSS

The last remaining issue is whether the Beechers have offered sufficient competent evidence to create a genuine issue of fact as to the material issue of whether Kathleen Beecher’s episode of TSS was linked to her use of tampons. At the November 19, 1992 hearing the Court discussed the factual dispute in detail. In summary, the Court found that Tambrands’ and the Beechers’ experts flatly disagree as to whether Kathleen Beecher’s TSS was mediated by a Staph, aureus infection, the only infection that has been linked to tampon-related TSS. Both sides agree that if Kathleen Beecher’s TSS was not staph mediated, she cannot claim that tampons caused her TSS.

When Tambrands brought its summary judgment motions there was no evidence in the record that any expert had opined that Kathleen Beecher’s TSS was staph mediated. In response to the summary judgment motions, however, the Beechers submitted the affidavits of four experts stating to the requisite reasonable degree of medical certainty Kathleen Beecher’s TSS was staph mediated and therefore possibly linked to her use of tampons. The affidavits of three of these experts, all physicians who saw Kathleen Beecher during her hospitalization for TSS, appear to contradict their earlier deposition statements that they would not or could not conclude to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the TSS was staph mediated or tampon related.

Tambrands asserts that the affidavits of all four of the Beechers’ experts should be disregarded because they are based on an inadequate foundation. Tambrands also argues that the three affidavits which contradict the deposition testimony of their authors should be disregarded as sham affidavits filed solely for the purpose of opposing a summary judgment motion.

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Related

Kandis L. Papike v. Tambrands Inc.
107 F.3d 737 (Ninth Circuit, 1997)
Lulov v. Tambrands, Inc.
198 A.D.2d 479 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1993)

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Bluebook (online)
840 F. Supp. 86, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18813, 1993 WL 535643, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/beecher-v-tambrands-inc-mnd-1993.