Bedwell v. Fallbrook Plaza LP

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: July 19, 2022
• Docket: 3:22-cv-00093
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SHAWN BEDWELL, Case No. 22-cv-93-MMA (AHG)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 13 v. MOTION TO DISMISS

14 FALLBROOK PLAZA LP and DOES [Doc. No. 6] 1–10, 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 On January 24, 2022, Plaintiff Shawn Bedwell (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint 19 against Defendant Fallbrook Plaza LP (“Defendant”) and Does 1–10. Doc. No. 1 20 (“Compl.”). Plaintiff alleges violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 41 U.S.C. 21 § 12181, et seq. (“ADA”) and the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code 22 § 51, et seq. (“Unruh Act”). See id. On May 27, 2022, Defendant filed a motion to 23 dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Doc. No. 6. 24 Defendant further requests that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 25 over the Unruh Act claim. Id. Plaintiff filed a statement of non-opposition to 26 Defendant’s motion. Doc. No. 7. The Court found the matter suitable for disposition on 27 the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) 28 and Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. Doc. No. 8. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 1 GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss and DECLINES to exercise supplemental 2 jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claim. 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 Plaintiff is paralyzed and requires a wheelchair or walker for mobility. Compl. ¶ 1. 5 According to Plaintiff, he is a disabled person under the ADA and the Unruh Act. Id. 6 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant owns the property located at 1061 S. Main Ave., 7 Fallbrook, California (the “Property”), which operates as “Little Caesar’s Pizza” (the 8 “Business”). Id. ¶¶ 2–3. Plaintiff also states that the Property is newly constructed or 9 otherwise underwent remodeling or repairs after January 26, 1992, and yet fails to 10 comply with California access standards that were in effect at the time of construction. 11 Id. ¶ 12. 12 Plaintiff alleges he visited the Property on “two (2) separate occasions, in October 13 2021 and November 2021 to patronize the [B]usiness.” Id. ¶ 13. However, Plaintiff 14 claims he encountered barriers that denied him the ability to “use and enjoy the goods, 15 services, privileges, and/or accommodations offered at the Property.” Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff 16 alleges these barriers included a lack of accessible routes of travel on the Property and 17 inside the Business, missing directional and parking signage, uneven surfaces, and 18 improper dimensions of the disabled parking space and accompanying aisle. Id. ¶ 20. 19 Plaintiff brings two causes of action against Defendant: (1) violation of the ADA, and 20 (2) violation of the Unruh Act. Id. ¶¶ 31–56. Defendant moves to dismiss the federal 21 claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and requests the Court decline supplemental 22 jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claim. Doc. No. 6 at 1–2.1 23 II. MOTION TO DISMISS 24 Defendant argues the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 25 ADA claim on two grounds: (1) “the mere list of alleged violations” in Plaintiff’s 26 27 28 1 Complaint fails to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III standing; and 2 (2) the alleged conditions, if they ever existed, have been modified such that the 3 ADA claim is now moot. Doc. No. 6-1 at 20–28. In his non-opposition, Plaintiff 4 concedes that the “[a]rchitectual barriers identified in the Complaint appear to have 5 been remediated in response to Plaintiff’s lawsuit thereby rendering Plaintiff’s 6 federal ADA claim moot.” Doc. No. 7 at 2. Accordingly, the Court begins by 7 addressing the mootness of Plaintiff’s ADA claim. 8 A. Legal Standard 9 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 10 Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). As such, “[a] federal court is presumed to lack 11 jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock West, 12 Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). 13 Without subject matter jurisdiction, a federal court is without “power” to hear or 14 adjudicate a claim. See Leeson v. Transamerica Disability Income Plan, 671 F.3d 969, 15 975 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 16 (1998)); Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. 17 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may seek dismissal 18 of an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, 19 Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003); see also White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 20 (9th Cir. 2000). Jurisdictional attacks under Rule 12(b)(1) can be either facial or factual. 21 White, 227 F.3d at 1242. A facial attack on jurisdiction asserts that the allegations in a 22 complaint are insufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction, whereas a factual attack disputes 23 the truth of the allegations that would otherwise confer federal jurisdiction. Safe Air for 24 Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In resolving a facial challenge 25 to jurisdiction, a court accepts the allegations of the complaint as true and draws all 26 reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th 27 Cir. 2009) (quoting Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004)). “[I]n a 28 factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, 1 would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039. The moving 2 party can convert its “motion to dismiss into a factual motion by presenting affidavits or 3 other evidence.” Id. In resolving a factual attack, “[t]he court need not presume the 4 truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Id. (citing White, 227 F.3d at 1242). “Once 5 the moving party has converted the motion to dismiss into a factual motion . . . the party 6 opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its 7 burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.” Id at 1039 (quotation marks omitted) 8 (quoting Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir.2003)); 9 see also Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 n.4 (1947) (“[W]hen a question of the District 10 Court’s jurisdiction is raised . . . the court may inquire by affidavits or otherwise, into the 11 facts as they exist.”). 12 Here, Defendant submitted the declaration and inspection report of Jason James, a 13 Certified Access Specialist, in support of his motion to dismiss. See Doc. Nos. 6-2, 6-3. 14 Therefore, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is properly classified as a factual attack. As 15 such, the Court does not presume the truthfulness of Plaintiff’s allegations. Thus, the 16 Court only has subject matter jurisdiction if Plaintiff meets his burden of establishing 17 jurisdiction. 18 B. Mootness 19 “A claim is moot ‘when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties 20 lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.’” Alvarez v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061, 21 1064 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396 22 (1980)). In a lawsuit seeking injunctive relief, “[a] case might become moot if 23 subsequent events make it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior 24 could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 25 Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 170 (2000) (citing United States v. 26 27 28 1 Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968). In ADA cases, 2 “[c]ourts have held that where structural modifications are made, then it is 3 absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected 4 to occur in the future.” Zaldivar v. City of San Diego, No. 15-CV-67-GPC, 2016 5 WL 5118534, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2016) (collecting cases). If a claim is 6 rendered moot, the court must dismiss it. Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc., 653 F.3d 7 1081, 1086–87 (9th Cir. 2011). 8 Here, in his declaration and inspection report, Mr. James provides evidence 9 relating to each violation Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint and asserts that each 10 allegation either does not “accurately describe the conditions of the Property nor the 11 [Business]” or is “false.” Doc. Nos. 6-2, 6-3. Relying on these assertions, Defendant 12 argues that Plaintiff’s claims are moot because they have either been remediated or never 13 existed. See Doc. No. 6-1 at 8. In his non-opposition, Plaintiff states, “the Architectural 14 barriers identified in the Complaint appear to have been remediated . . . thereby rendering 15 Plaintiff’s federal ADA claim moot.” Doc. No. 7 at 2. The Court agrees with the parties 16 that the ADA claim is moot. The alleged barriers, if they ever existed, appear to have 17 been remediated.3 As such, the barriers issue is moot and the Court GRANTS 18 Defendant’s motion to dismiss the ADA claim. 19 C. Supplemental Jurisdiction 20 Defendant next argues that the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over 21 Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim because the Unruh Act claim substantially predominates over 22 the ADA claim and there are compelling reasons to decline jurisdiction. Doc. No. 6-1 at 23 21–25. 24 25 2 Injunctive relief is the only remedy available under Title III of the ADA. Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 26 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2002).

27 3 The Court notes it makes no finding as to whether the structures in question were in violation of the relevant building codes and were remedied after Plaintiff’s lawsuit was filed or were never in violation. 28 1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a district court may decline to exercise 2 supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim if one of the following exceptions 3 applies: 4 5 (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district 6 court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims 7 over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 8 9 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). 10 In deciding whether to invoke Section 1367(c)(4), a district court “must articulate 11 why the circumstances of the case are exceptional within the meaning of § 1367(c)(4).” 12 Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted) (quoting Exec. 13 Software N. Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1558 (9th Cir. 1994)). The court 14 should then consider what “best serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, 15 and comity which underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine.” Id. (quotations omitted) 16 (quoting City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172–73 (1997)). 17 California’s legislature has enacted multiple statutes to address perceived abuse of 18 Unruh Act claims by heightening the pleading standard for those claims and increasing 19 the filing fees for “high-frequency litigants.” Id. at 1206–07; see also Cal. Civ. Proc. 20 Code § 425.50(a); Cal. Gov’t Code § 70616.5; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.55. These 21 changes led to a large increase in the filing of ADA and Unruh Act claims in federal 22 district courts in California—presumably to circumvent these new requirements. See 23 Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1207. Several district courts have considered these attempts at 24 circumvention as exceptional circumstances under Section 1367(c)(4), and they found 25 that California’s interest in enforcing the changes through the litigation of Unruh Act 26 claims in state courts was a compelling reason to decline supplemental jurisdiction. See 27 Dalfio v. SECVD & I, Inc., No. 21-CV-929-MMA (AGS), 2021 WL 4197203 at *3 (S.D. 28 Cal. Sept. 15, 2021) (collecting cases). Recently, the Ninth Circuit agreed this is a valid 1 reason to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Unruh Act claims so long as the court 2 has not already resolved the ADA claims in favor of the plaintiff. See Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 3 1215–16. 4 Here, Plaintiff brought both ADA and Unruh Act claims against Defendant in 5 federal court. The Court agrees with other district courts that California’s statutory 6 changes to Unruh Act claim litigation and the subsequent circumvention of these changes 7 by filing Unruh Act claims in federal courts is an exceptional circumstance under Section 8 1367(c)(4). Therefore, the Court finds an exceptional circumstance exists in this action 9 compelling the Court to decline supplemental jurisdiction. Further, California’s interest 10 in enforcing these changes via litigation of Unruh Act claims in state courts is a 11 compelling reason to decline supplemental jurisdiction. Finally, declining supplemental 12 jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim best serves the principle of comity. See Dalfio, 13 2021 WL 4197203 at *3 (“The Court agrees that comity and deference to California’s 14 interest in monitoring and regulating Unruh Act complaints present compelling reasons to 15 decline to exercise jurisdiction”). As such, the Court DECLINES to exercise 16 supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim under Section 1367(c)(4).4 17 18 19 *** 20 21 22 23 24

25 26 4 The Court need not address the question of predomination under section 1367(c)(2) for two reasons. First, discussion of compelling reasons under Section 1367(c)(4) is sufficient to dispose of the issue. 27 Second, section 1367(c)(2) requires the presence of a claim over which the Court has original jurisdiction. Given the dismissal of the ADA claim—the only other claim in this matter—section 28 1 III. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss, 3 || DECLINES to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's Unruh Act Claim pursuant to 28 4 ||U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4), and DISMISSES the case without prejudice. Accordingly, the 5 Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the case. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 |\|Dated: July 19, 2022 8 fUbihih le —Celuphlr 9 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 10 United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28