[Cite as Bedford Hts. v. Davis, 2024-Ohio-1281.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
CITY OF BEDFORD HEIGHTS, :
Plaintiff- Appellee, : No. 113060 v. :
ROMAINE T. DAVIS, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND VACATED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 4, 2024
Criminal Appeal from the Bedford Municipal Court Case No. 23CRB00118
Appearances:
Marlene J. Ridenour, Bedford Heights Law Director/ Prosecutor, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Francis Cavallo, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J.:
Defendant-appellant Romaine T. Davis appeals from a judgment of the
Bedford Municipal Court that convicted him of obstructing official business. Davis was stopped by a patrol officer for the city of Bedford Heights (“the city”). During
the traffic stop, Davis would not identify himself or provide his driver’s license. He
was charged with obstructing official business as a result. The offense requires an
affirmative, overt act that hinders a police officer’s duties. Our review of the record,
however, indicates the city presented no evidence that Davis engaged in an
affirmative, overt act during the traffic stop. Finding merit to the appeal, we reverse
the trial court’s judgment and vacate Davis’s conviction of obstructing official
business.
Background
Davis was cited for and convicted of improper display of plate and
obstruction of official business. At trial, the prosecutor elicited the following
testimony from Patrolman Vicent Ellis.
Patrolman Ellis observed Davis traveling in a vehicle without a visible
plate. After he stopped Davis’s vehicle, Davis refused to roll down the window. He
also refused to identify himself or provide his driver’s license despite multiple
requests from Ellis. Davis also requested the presence of Ellis’s supervisor. A
sergeant from the Bedford Heights Police Department then arrived to assist Ellis.
Davis eventually rolled down the window, and the officers were able to read the VIN
number on the vehicle and determine Davis’s identity based on the BMV records.
This is the entirety of Ellis’s testimony.
Davis was cited for improper display of plate and a misdemeanor
offense of obstructing official business. He was sentenced to a fine of $100 plus costs for the traffic offense, and $100 plus costs in addition to a suspended jail term of ten
days for obstructing official business. Davis now appeals from his conviction of
obstruction of official business.
Insufficient Evidence for Obstructing Official Business
Under the first assignment of error, Davis contends there is insufficient
evidence produced at trial to support a finding of guilt on the offense of obstructing
official business. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
review the evidence admitted at trial and determine whether such evidence, if
believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991),
paragraph two of the syllabus. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id.
Davis was convicted of obstructing official business in violation of
R.C. 2921.31(A), which states, “No person, without privilege to do so and with
purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any
authorized act within the public official’s capacity, shall do any act that hampers or
impedes a public official in the performance of the public official’s lawful duties.”
The statute requires evidence demonstrating that a defendant acted
with a purpose to impede the performance of an official duty. “The purpose with
which a person does an act is determined from the manner in which it is done, the means used, and all the other facts and circumstances in evidence.” State v. Hardin,
16 Ohio App.3d 243, 245, 475 N.E.2d 483 (10th Dist.1984).
Furthermore, the courts have consistently held that the crime of
obstructing official business requires “‘proof of an affirmative or overt act that
hampered or impeded the performance of the lawful duties of a public official.’”
Parma v. Jackson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112646, 2024-Ohio-575, ¶ 11, quoting
Brooklyn v. Kaczor, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98816, 2013-Ohio-2901, citing Parma
v. Campbell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 79041 and 79042, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS
4907 (Nov. 1, 2001). See also, e.g., State v. Keagle, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 29045
and 29056, 2019-Ohio-3975, ¶ 21; State v. Partee, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 17AP-
804 and 17AP-805, 2018-Ohio-3878, ¶ 26; State v. Vitantonio, 2013-Ohio-4100,
995 N.E.2d 1291, ¶ 16 (11th Dist.); and State v. Prestel, 2d Dist. Montgomery
No. 20822, 2005-Ohio-5236, ¶ 16.
“‘“One cannot be guilty of obstructing official business by doing nothing
because the text of R.C. 2921.31 specifically requires an offender to act.”’” Jackson
at ¶ 11, quoting Kaczor at ¶ 8, quoting State v. Brickner-Latham, 3d Dist. Seneca
No. 13-05-26, 2006-Ohio-609, ¶ 26. Accordingly, “‘the mere refusal to answer a
police officer’s questions regarding one’s identity cannot support a conviction for
obstructing official business.’” Id., quoting Kaczor at ¶ 8, citing Cleveland Hts. v.
Lewis, 187 Ohio App.3d 786, 2010-Ohio-2208, 933 N.E.2d 1146, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.)
(mere failure to obey a law enforcement officer’s request does not bring a defendant
within the ambit of obstructing official business). See also Prestel at ¶ 16 (obstructing official business requires some affirmative or overt act as opposed to
merely failing or refusing to cooperate or obey a police officer’s request for
information); and State v. McCrone, 63 Ohio App.3d 831, 580 N.E.2d 468 (9th
Dist.1989) (a mere refusal to cooperate with police and provide identification upon
request does not constitute obstructing official business). Similarly, a defendant’s
mere refusal to provide his or her driver’s license to an officer upon request does not
constitute obstructing official business. Kaczor at ¶ 8, citing Middletown v. Hollon,
156 Ohio App.3d 565, 2004-Ohio-1502, 807 N.E.2d 945, ¶ 32 (12th Dist.), citing
McCrone, supra.
In contrast, “‘when one takes overt acts to impede or obstruct the
officer’s investigation or business, one may be found guilty of obstructing official
business.’” Middletown v. Hollon, 156 Ohio App.3d 565, 2004-Ohio-1502, 807
N.E.2d 945, ¶ 33 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Merz, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA97-05-
108, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3414 (July 31, 2000). See Keagle (sufficient evidence
for obstructing official business existed when the defendant repeatedly refused to
exit his vehicle for the officers to conduct a probable cause search and also verbally
quarrelled with the officers); State v. Moss, 9th Dist.
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[Cite as Bedford Hts. v. Davis, 2024-Ohio-1281.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
CITY OF BEDFORD HEIGHTS, :
Plaintiff- Appellee, : No. 113060 v. :
ROMAINE T. DAVIS, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND VACATED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 4, 2024
Criminal Appeal from the Bedford Municipal Court Case No. 23CRB00118
Appearances:
Marlene J. Ridenour, Bedford Heights Law Director/ Prosecutor, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Francis Cavallo, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J.:
Defendant-appellant Romaine T. Davis appeals from a judgment of the
Bedford Municipal Court that convicted him of obstructing official business. Davis was stopped by a patrol officer for the city of Bedford Heights (“the city”). During
the traffic stop, Davis would not identify himself or provide his driver’s license. He
was charged with obstructing official business as a result. The offense requires an
affirmative, overt act that hinders a police officer’s duties. Our review of the record,
however, indicates the city presented no evidence that Davis engaged in an
affirmative, overt act during the traffic stop. Finding merit to the appeal, we reverse
the trial court’s judgment and vacate Davis’s conviction of obstructing official
business.
Background
Davis was cited for and convicted of improper display of plate and
obstruction of official business. At trial, the prosecutor elicited the following
testimony from Patrolman Vicent Ellis.
Patrolman Ellis observed Davis traveling in a vehicle without a visible
plate. After he stopped Davis’s vehicle, Davis refused to roll down the window. He
also refused to identify himself or provide his driver’s license despite multiple
requests from Ellis. Davis also requested the presence of Ellis’s supervisor. A
sergeant from the Bedford Heights Police Department then arrived to assist Ellis.
Davis eventually rolled down the window, and the officers were able to read the VIN
number on the vehicle and determine Davis’s identity based on the BMV records.
This is the entirety of Ellis’s testimony.
Davis was cited for improper display of plate and a misdemeanor
offense of obstructing official business. He was sentenced to a fine of $100 plus costs for the traffic offense, and $100 plus costs in addition to a suspended jail term of ten
days for obstructing official business. Davis now appeals from his conviction of
obstruction of official business.
Insufficient Evidence for Obstructing Official Business
Under the first assignment of error, Davis contends there is insufficient
evidence produced at trial to support a finding of guilt on the offense of obstructing
official business. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
review the evidence admitted at trial and determine whether such evidence, if
believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991),
paragraph two of the syllabus. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id.
Davis was convicted of obstructing official business in violation of
R.C. 2921.31(A), which states, “No person, without privilege to do so and with
purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any
authorized act within the public official’s capacity, shall do any act that hampers or
impedes a public official in the performance of the public official’s lawful duties.”
The statute requires evidence demonstrating that a defendant acted
with a purpose to impede the performance of an official duty. “The purpose with
which a person does an act is determined from the manner in which it is done, the means used, and all the other facts and circumstances in evidence.” State v. Hardin,
16 Ohio App.3d 243, 245, 475 N.E.2d 483 (10th Dist.1984).
Furthermore, the courts have consistently held that the crime of
obstructing official business requires “‘proof of an affirmative or overt act that
hampered or impeded the performance of the lawful duties of a public official.’”
Parma v. Jackson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112646, 2024-Ohio-575, ¶ 11, quoting
Brooklyn v. Kaczor, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98816, 2013-Ohio-2901, citing Parma
v. Campbell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 79041 and 79042, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS
4907 (Nov. 1, 2001). See also, e.g., State v. Keagle, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 29045
and 29056, 2019-Ohio-3975, ¶ 21; State v. Partee, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 17AP-
804 and 17AP-805, 2018-Ohio-3878, ¶ 26; State v. Vitantonio, 2013-Ohio-4100,
995 N.E.2d 1291, ¶ 16 (11th Dist.); and State v. Prestel, 2d Dist. Montgomery
No. 20822, 2005-Ohio-5236, ¶ 16.
“‘“One cannot be guilty of obstructing official business by doing nothing
because the text of R.C. 2921.31 specifically requires an offender to act.”’” Jackson
at ¶ 11, quoting Kaczor at ¶ 8, quoting State v. Brickner-Latham, 3d Dist. Seneca
No. 13-05-26, 2006-Ohio-609, ¶ 26. Accordingly, “‘the mere refusal to answer a
police officer’s questions regarding one’s identity cannot support a conviction for
obstructing official business.’” Id., quoting Kaczor at ¶ 8, citing Cleveland Hts. v.
Lewis, 187 Ohio App.3d 786, 2010-Ohio-2208, 933 N.E.2d 1146, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.)
(mere failure to obey a law enforcement officer’s request does not bring a defendant
within the ambit of obstructing official business). See also Prestel at ¶ 16 (obstructing official business requires some affirmative or overt act as opposed to
merely failing or refusing to cooperate or obey a police officer’s request for
information); and State v. McCrone, 63 Ohio App.3d 831, 580 N.E.2d 468 (9th
Dist.1989) (a mere refusal to cooperate with police and provide identification upon
request does not constitute obstructing official business). Similarly, a defendant’s
mere refusal to provide his or her driver’s license to an officer upon request does not
constitute obstructing official business. Kaczor at ¶ 8, citing Middletown v. Hollon,
156 Ohio App.3d 565, 2004-Ohio-1502, 807 N.E.2d 945, ¶ 32 (12th Dist.), citing
McCrone, supra.
In contrast, “‘when one takes overt acts to impede or obstruct the
officer’s investigation or business, one may be found guilty of obstructing official
business.’” Middletown v. Hollon, 156 Ohio App.3d 565, 2004-Ohio-1502, 807
N.E.2d 945, ¶ 33 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Merz, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA97-05-
108, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3414 (July 31, 2000). See Keagle (sufficient evidence
for obstructing official business existed when the defendant repeatedly refused to
exit his vehicle for the officers to conduct a probable cause search and also verbally
quarrelled with the officers); State v. Moss, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28986, 2018-
Ohio-4747, ¶ 12 (sufficient evidence existed when the defendant’s “jostling around,”
refusing to provide any identification, yelling, and repeatedly moving his hands
caused a significant delay of the officers performing their duties); State v. Zefi, 10th
Dist. Franklin No. 00AP-950, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1136 (Mar. 15, 2001) (the
defendant not only refused to produce his driver’s licence or cooperate with the officers but also increased the volume of his car stereo twice while the officers
attempted to gather information); and State v. Lojas, 10th Dist. Franklin No.
97APC08-1082, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 1710, 14-15 (Apr. 21, 1998) (continuously
entering and existing vehicle against the officers’ orders supported a conviction of
obstructing official business); and State v. Cobb, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19474,
2003-Ohio-3034 (providing false information to the police is considered an overt
act).
The city argues that there was sufficient evidence to prove the offense
because Davis’s refusal to identify himself or provide his driver’s license caused a
delay in the police’s investigation of the traffic offense. This argument is not
supported by the well-established precedent. An overt act by the defendant is
required to support the offense of obstructing official business, yet the testimony
elicited from Patrolman Ellis by the prosecutor did not reflect any overt act. See
also Toledo v. Dandridge, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-10-1333, 2013-Ohio-317 (a mere
refusal to answer a police officer’s questions regarding one’s identity during a traffic
stop did not constitute sufficient evidence for a conviction of obstructing official
business).
The city cites Waynesville v. Combs, 66 Ohio App.3d 292, 584 N.E.2d
9 (12th Dist.1990), for the proposition that a defendant’s failure after a traffic stop
to cooperate with the police and provide information constitutes the offense of
obstructing official business. The defendant’s conviction in Combs, however, was
based on different facts. In that case, the officer testified that after the traffic stop, the defendant twice attempted to put her vehicle in gear and drive away, and then
continuously threatened and cursed the officer as he attempted to elicit information
from her. Combs is not applicable here because the defendant in Combs engaged in
multiple affirmative, overt acts impeding the police officer’s performance of his
official duty.
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the first assignment of error.
Under the second assignment of error, Davis argues his conviction of obstructing
official business was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Our conclusion
that insufficient evidence supported Davis’s conviction renders his manifest-weight
claim moot.
Judgment reversed, and conviction vacated.
It is ordered that appellant recover of appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
municipal court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
__________________________________ MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, PRESIDING JUDGE
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., and EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR