Bedenbaugh v. Glisson

181 So. 416, 132 Fla. 170, 1938 Fla. LEXIS 1728
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedJanuary 5, 1938
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 181 So. 416 (Bedenbaugh v. Glisson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bedenbaugh v. Glisson, 181 So. 416, 132 Fla. 170, 1938 Fla. LEXIS 1728 (Fla. 1938).

Opinions

Chapman, J.

This cause is here on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Florida, to review a judgment in behalf of defendant in an action to recover assessments on two shares of stock held by the defendant in the Merchants & Planters Bank of Sneads, Florida. The assessment is made for two shares of capital stock of said bank in the sum of $60.00 per share, and the total amount of the assessment, so made, against the defendant was $120.00, and the notice thereof was dated June 13, 1936. It is alleged .that the Merchants & Planters Bank of Sneads, prior to June 12, 1936, became insolvent, and the.Comptroller of the State of Florida, under the authority conferred by law, appointed W. B. Bedenbaugh as Liquidator of the bank. The Comptroller, after an examination of the assets of the bank, became satisfied of its insolvency and that an assessment of stockholders of the bank was necessary to pay its indebtedness. Attached to the declaration is an order of assessment against the shareholder, as well as a notice of the assessment dated June 13, 1936, and signed by W. B. Bedenbaugh, Liquidator.

Several pleas by the defendant were filed to the declaration, but a demurrer was sustained thereto, and the-suit went to trial on pleas numbered 4 and 5, which are lengthy, but tendered issues, viz.: (a) that the doors of the bank were voluntarily closed on March 1, 1933, by its officers and directors who owned less than two-thirds of the capital stock of the bank; (b) that at the time the bank closed it was not insolvent; (c) when the bank closed it ceased to transact business as a banking institution and no banking business has been transacted by it since; (d) the bank was not closed *172 pursuant to law controlling the voluntary liquidation of the banking companies; (e) all depositors of the bank were paid in full; (f) on August 30, 1935, the Comptroller entered an order appointing the Liquidator under Section 19, Chapter 13576, Acts of 1929; (g) the Comptroller was actuated in the entry of his order closing the doors of the bank on conditions existing after the closing of the bank and not prior thereto.

The plaintiff at the trial adduced George C. White, George R. Carpenter and W. B. Bedenbaugh, while the defendant called John McFarlin, and the issues were submitted to the jury without argument of counsel, with instructions on law controlling the issues given by the court. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant,-when a motion for a new trial on behalf of plaintiff was made, and by the court denied, the record perfected and the cause is here for review on several assignments of error.

The question involved here is are the issues submitted under pleas numbered 4 and 5 authorized by Section 19 of Chapter 13576, Acts of 1929, Laws of Florida? This Court construed Section, siipra, in the suits of Amos v. Conkling, 99 Fla. 206, 126 Sou. Rep. 283; State, ex rel. Landis, Atty. General, v. Circuit Court, etc., 102 Fla. 112, 135 Sou. Rep. 866; Therrell, as Liquidator, v. Rinaman, 107 Fla. 110, 144 Sou. Rep. 327, when this Court said that “neither the Comptroller nor his Liquidator have any powers except those which have been conferred upon them by provisions of statute law, either in express terms or by necessary implication, or such as are incident to the express powers given, is a proposition which is not capable of successful contradiction.. The Liquidator is an executive creature of the legislative enactment and can exercise only such powers as those with which, by force of the statute, he is expressly or impliedly vested. To put it another way, the *173 Comptroller and his statutory liquidators are executive officials or functionaries of the State and neither is an officer of the Court, which latter is required to adjudicate the facts of a bank’s insolvency by confirming the Comptroller’s initial act of taking possession and control.” It was further said:

“Section 19 of Chapter 13576, supra, authorizes the bank supervisory authorities, upon taking possession of an insolvent bank or trust company, to collect the assets thereof and to preserve, administer and liquidate the business and assets of such bank or trust company for the benefit of depositors and others having an interest therein. There is nothing in that Chapter or in any other provision of the banking laws, that expressly or impliedly confers authority on the Comptroller or his liquidator or which empowers the courts to authorize them, or either of them, to borrow money and pledge the assets of the bank to secure payment of a loan which is to be used principally, if not wholly, to pay preferred claims as well as dividends to the creditors- of common depositors. Whether a loan can be made by a •bank liquidator for any other purpose such as paying taxes on assets and the like, is not necessary to be definitely decided at this time and is not passed upon in this case.”

Section 19, supra, authorizes the State Comptroller in his discretion to appoint a liquidator when certain conditions appear: (a) when the bank has become insolvent and is in default; (b) when the bank is in an unsound condition; (c) when the bank is threatened with insolvency because of illegal or unsafe investments; (d) the liabilities of the bank exceed its assets; (e) that the bank is transacting business without authority of law in violation of law, etc. The Circuit Court under the statute has jurisdiction to make and enter an order confirming the action of the Comptroller in the appointment of a liquidator for such *174 bank under statutory conditions. Pleas 4 and 5, among other things, tender an issue of fact, the solvency of the Merchants & Planters Bank of Sneads. If the bank was solvent, the Comptroller was without authority to appoint a liquidator, and likewise was without authority to make and enter the stockholders assessment order, the basis of this suit. The pleas are authorized by the statute, and decisions of this Court, supra.

The following instructions upon the issues tendered by the pleas were given by the lower court and assigned as error, viz.:

“Gentlemen of the Jury, what you are expected to find out in this case is whether or not this bank was solvent or insolvent at the time it closed its doors and ceased to do business in this State. If the bank was not in fact insolvent, then the Comptroller did not have any authority to appoint a liquidator, but, if it was insolvent, then he did have that authority, and on the question of solvency or insolvency, I am going to give you the special charge No. 3, requested by the Defendant:

“ ‘A bank is insolvent when the capital stock and all its' assets are insufficient to meet its liabilities, or when it is unable to meet current obligations as they mature, though its assets may greatly exceed its liabilities, or when capital stock surplus and undivided profits are exhausted by losses with no immediate prospect of replacing them, or when its condition is such that it cannot in a reasonable'time realize on its assets an amount sufficient to take care of its liabilities.’

“On the question of whether or not the bank was doing business in this State, I will give you special charge No. 1, requested by the defendant:

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
181 So. 416, 132 Fla. 170, 1938 Fla. LEXIS 1728, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bedenbaugh-v-glisson-fla-1938.