Becky, Ltd. v. the City of Cedar Park, Matt Powell, Stephen Thomas, Lyle Grimes, Lowell Moore, Jon Lux, and Don Tracy

Opinion

ACCEPTED 03-15-00259-CV 6282836 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 7/29/2015 5:39:39 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE CLERK NO. 03-15-00259-CV

FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS IN THE COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS 7/29/2015 5:39:39 PM AUSTIN JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk

BECKY, LTD., Appellant v. THE CITY OF CEDAR PARK, STEPHEN THOMAS, MATT POWELL, MITCH FULLER, LYLE GRIMES, LOWELL MOORE, JON LUX, AND DON TRACY, Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 126TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-14-001293

APPELLEES’ BRIEF

BICKERSTAFF HEATH COBBY A. CAPUTO DELGADO ACOSTA LLP State Bar No. 03784650 3711 S. MoPac Expressway ccaputo@bickerstaff.com Building One, Suite 300 Austin, TX 78746 BRADLEY B. YOUNG (512) 472-8021 State Bar No. 24028245 (512) 320-5638 FACSIMILE byoung@bickerstaff.com

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

The parties and counsel are correctly identified in the Initial Brief of

Appellant Becky, Ltd.

RECORD REFERENCES

The Clerk's Record filed with the Third Court of Appeals on May 6, 2015

will be cited as “CR __,” where the blank refers to the District Clerk’s consecutive

page numbering.

Appellees’ Appendix will be cited as “Appendix.” Appellant’s Appendix

will be cited as “Appellant’s Appendix.”

DESIGNATION OF PARTIES

The parties shall be referred to as follows: (i) “Appellant” or “Becky” refers

to Appellant Becky Ltd.; and (ii) “Appellees” or “the city” refers collectively to

Appellees the City of Cedar Park, Stephen Thomas, Matt Powell, Mitch Fuller,

Lyle Grimes, Lowell Moore, Jon Lux, and Don Tracy. “Milestone” refers to

Milestone Community Builders, LLC, a party to the proceeding below prior to

severance.

i TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL .............................................................i

RECORD REFERENCES .........................................................................................i

DESIGNATION OF PARTIES ..................................................................................i

TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.....................................................................................iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................. 2

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ............................................... 2

ISSUES PRESENTED............................................................................................... 3

STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................ 4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................ 7

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ........................................................................ 8

I. Neither the facts that Becky has alleged nor the jurisdictional evidence support subject-matter jurisdiction over Becky’s claims. [Appellant’s Br. at 6-11] ................. 8

II. Both the city and the city council members acting in their official capacities are entitled to governmental immunity ...................................................................... 10

A. Becky has not implicated the ultra vires exception to immunity because the City Council’s decision to contract with Milestone was a discretionary act. [Appellant’s Br. at 12-17] ......................................................... 10

ii B. The UDJA does not waive a city’s governmental immunity from a suit to declare rights under an ordinance. [Appellant’s Br. at 17-19] ...................................... 17

III. Becky lacks standing because it was not a party to the Agreement. [Appellant’s Br. at 19-23] ..................................... 19

IV. Becky’s claims were not ripe because it never submitted a completed plat application to the city for review. [Appellant’s Br. at 24-25] ...................................................... 24

V. Becky’s claims are moot. [Appellant’s Br. at 25-28] ........................ 27

PRAYER .................................................................................................................. 27

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 29

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................................... 30

APPENDIX .............................................................................................................. 31

iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases Bd. of Adjustment of the City of San Antonio v. Wende, 92 S.W.3d 424 (Tex. 2002)................................................................................. 14

Brunson v. Woolsey, 63 S.W.3d 583 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) ....................................... 19

Cadle Co. v. Lobingier, 50 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied)................................. 19

Catalina Dev., Inc. v. County of El Paso, 121 S.W.3d 704 (Tex.2003)................................................................................ 11

City of Corinth v. NuRock Dev., Inc., 293 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth 2009, no pet.)................................... 26

City of Dallas v. Texas EZPAWN, L.P., No. 05-12-01269-CV, 2013 WL 1320513 (Tex. App. – Dallas Apr. 1, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.)..........................................................................17, 18

City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009) ........................................................................11, 16

City of El Paso v. Maddox, 276 S.W.3d 66 (Tex. App. – El Paso 2008, pet. denied) ..............................25, 26

City of Laredo v. Rio Grande H2O Guardian, No. 04-10-00872-CV, 2011 WL 3122205 (Tex. App. – San Antonio Jul. 27, 2011, no pet.) .....................................................................23, 24

City of New Braunfels v. Tovar, No. 03-14-00693-CV, 2015 WL 2183479 (Tex. App. – Austin May 7, 2015, no pet. h.) ...................................................................................... 15

Coble v. City of Mansfield, 134 S.W.3d 449 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth 2004, no pet.)................................... 26

iv Cokins v. City of Lakeway, No. 03-12-00083-CV, 2013 WL 4007522 (Tex. App. – Austin July 25, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) ............................................................................. 10

Creedmoor-Maha Water Supply Corp. v. Tex. Com’n on Envtl. Quality, 307 S.W.3d 505 (Tex. App. – Austin 2010, no pet.) .......................................... 16

DeSoto Wildwood Dev., Inc. v. City of Lewisville, 184 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth 2006, no pet.)................................... 14

Exxon Corp. v. Pluff, 94 S.W.3d 22 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2002, pet. denied) ............................................. 19

Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. 2012) .............................................................................. 20

Lone Star College Sys. v. Immigration Reform Coalition of Texas (IRCOT), 418 S.W.3d 263 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet denied) ........................................................................................................... 18

Nobles v. Marcus, 533 S.W.2d 923 (Tex.1976)................................................................................ 20

Nootsie Ltd. v. Williamson County Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659 (Tex.1996)................................................................................ 19

Robinson v. Parker, 353 S.W.3d 753 (Tex. 2011) .............................................................................. 26

Saifi v. City of Texas City, No. 14-13-00815-CV, 2015 WL 1843540 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 23, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) ............................................18, 19

Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. [SOS] v. City of Austin, 149 S.W.3d 674 (Tex. App. – Austin 2004, no pet.) ................................3, 21, 27

Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. [SOS] v. City of Dripping Springs, 304 S.W.3d 871 (Tex. App. – Austin 2010, pet. denied) .............................20, 24

Schechter v. Wildwood Developers, LLC, 214 S.W.3d 117 (Tex. App. – El Paso 2006, no pet.) ........................................ 21

v Stop the Ordinances Please v. City of New Braunfels, 306 S.W.3d 919 (Tex. App. – Austin 2010, no pet.) ....................................21, 22

Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Emmett, 459 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. 2015) ..................................................................13, 14, 15

Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) .......................................................................... 9, 10

Texas Dept. of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. 2011) ........................................................................17, 19

Texas Logos, LP v. TxDOT, 241 S.W. 3d 105 (Tex. App. – Austin 2007, no pet.) .............................10, 11, 16

Texas Lottery Com’n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628 (Tex. 2010) .............................................................................. 17

VanderWerff v. Tex. Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, No. 03-12-00711-CV, 2014 WL 7466814 (Tex. App. – Austin Dec. 18, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) ..................................................................... 19

Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2000)................................................................................. 25

Williams v. Texas Tech Univ. Health Sciences Ctr., No. 10-15-00005-CV, 2015 WL 2452513 (Tex. App. – Waco May 21, 2015, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) ......................................................................... 19

Statutes

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.016(1) (Code Construction Act) ...................................... 14

TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 212.009(a) ......................................................................... 6

Chapter 212 of the Texas Local Government Code .................................................. 8

Miscellaneous City of Cedar Park Code of Ordinances, § 16.02.005 ...................................9, 13, 14

vi NO. 03-15-00259-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN

BECKY, LTD., Appellant v. THE CITY OF CEDAR PARK, STEPHEN THOMAS, MATT POWELL, MITCH FULLER, LYLE GRIMES, LOWELL MOORE, JON LUX, AND DON TRACY, Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 126TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-14-001293

APPELLEES’ BRIEF

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

COME NOW Appellees, the City of Cedar Park, Stephen Thomas, Matt

Powell, Mitch Fuller, Lyle Grimes, Lowell Moore, Jon Lux, and Don Tracy, and

respectfully file this Appellees’ Brief pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate

Procedure 38.2 and would show the Court the following:

1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellees disagree with Appellant’s characterization of the nature of the

case. A more accurate statement of the nature of the case is:

Nature of the Case: This is a suit by Becky under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (UDJA) to challenge the terms of a development agreement between the city and Milestone.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Appellees concur in Becky’s request for oral argument.

2 ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Do Becky’s claims based on the City Council’s discretionary decision to contract with Milestone fall within the ultra vires exception to governmental immunity? [Appellant’s Issue No. 1]

2. Does the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (UDJA) waive the city’s governmental immunity from a suit that does not seek to invalidate a city ordinance but merely seeks a declaration of rights under the ordinance? [Appellant’s Issue No. 2]

3. Does Becky have standing to challenge a contract to which it is not a party and that relates to property that Becky does not own? [Appellant’s Issue No. 3]

4. Are Becky’s speculative claims that it will have to bear the cost of the extension of Old Mill Road ripe for adjudication, even though the city has not required Becky to pay for the extension of the road, and Becky has not submitted sufficient information for the city to determine the extent to which Becky’s participation in road construction may be necessary? [Appellant’s Issue No. 4]

5. Are Becky’s claims moot under Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. [SOS] v. City of Austin, 149 S.W.3d 674 (Tex. App. – Austin 2004, no pet.)? [Appellant’s Issue No. 5]

3 STATEMENT OF FACTS

This case is about a future road to a vacant lot. Becky owns a vacant tract

of property in the city (the “Becky tract”).1 Becky wants the city to build a road to

the Becky tract so that Becky can obtain a more favorable price when it sells the

property to a developer. Milestone owns a piece of property adjacent to the Becky

tract that recently went through the city’s platting process.2

Becky contends that the city should have required Milestone to construct a

road called Old Mill Road all the way from Lakeline Boulevard to the Becky tract.3

Instead, the city, acting through its City Council,4 entered into a Unified

Development Agreement (Agreement) with Milestone through which Milestone

agreed to the following: (1) Milestone agreed to dedicate to the city sufficient

right-of-way to extend Old Mill Road from its current terminus at South Lakeline

Boulevard to the edge of Milestone’s property where it abuts the Becky tract; and

(2) Milestone agreed to construct a portion of the Old Mill Road Extension (the

Phase 1 Extension) sufficient to serve the proposed development on Milestone’s 1 CR 53-54 (Affidavit of Sam P. Roberts, Assistant City Manager [Roberts Aff.]), at ¶ 8. 2 Id. at ¶¶ 3, 5. 3 See CR 22 / Appendix A (Unified Development Agreement), at Exhibit C, for a map of the property that shows the relative locations of Lakeline Boulevard and Phases 1 and 2 of the Old Mill Road extension. 4 Stephen Thomas, Matt Powell, Mitch Fuller, Lyle Grimes, Lowell Moore, Jon Lux, and Don Tracy were the members of the City Council at the time that the city entered into the Agreement. Becky has sued them in their official capacities as city council members.

4 property.5 Although the city required Milestone to dedicate sufficient right-of-way

to meet the city’s possible future needs, the city did not require Milestone to

construct Phase II of Old Mill Road, which would extend the road all the way to

the unplatted, landlocked Becky tract.6

When the city initially filed its plea to the jurisdiction, Becky had not

submitted an application to develop the Becky tract. After the city filed its plea,

however (and presumably in response to the city’s ripeness arguments), Becky did

file a set of development materials. The following timeline summarizes the events

that ensued:7

October 24, 2014: City receives Becky’s preliminary plan application and final plat application.

November 7, 2014: City staff provides comments to Becky’s engineer.

November 11, 2014: City receives follow-up email from Becky’s engineer.

November 17, 2014: City staff responds to engineer’s email.

November 18, 2014: Planning and Zoning Commission statutorily disapproves preliminary plan application and final plat application without bias against future consideration, providing

5 CR 53-54 [Roberts Aff.], at ¶ 5. 6 Id. at ¶ 6; see also CR 9-23 / Appendix A (Unified Development Agreement). 7 CR 140-232 (Second Affidavit of Sam P. Roberts, Assistant City Manager [Roberts Aff. II]).

5 applicant the opportunity to submit revised drawings that address city staff’s comments.

“Statutory disapproval” is a term that Cedar Park and many other cities use

to address the statutory requirements of section 212.009(a) of the Texas Local

Government Code. Under the statute, the Planning and Zoning Commission must

disapprove a plat application – even a plat application that lacks essential

information – or else it will be considered statutorily approved.8 In this case, the

Planning and Zoning Commission disapproved Becky’s application in order to

provide Becky with additional time to address the city staff’s comments, which

will enable staff to complete its review. The Commission’s November 18, 2014

“statutory disapproval” did not bias future consideration of Becky’s applications.

As illustrated by the November 2014 correspondence between Becky’s

engineer and the city’s planning staff, the city repeatedly informed Becky that it

could not determine whether Becky would be required to construct a roadway to

the Becky tract until Becky provided further information about the nature of its

proposed project.9 That information was not forthcoming prior to the November

18, 2014 Planning and Zoning Commission meeting.10

8 See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 212.009(a) (“The municipal authority responsible for approving plats shall act on a plat within 30 days after the date the plat is filed. A plat is considered approved by the municipal authority unless it is disapproved within that period.”). 9 CR 177-84. 10 CR 140-41 [Roberts Aff. II], at ¶ 7; CR 187-90.

6 The trial court heard the city’s plea to the jurisdiction on December 4, 2014

and granted the plea on December 24, 2014.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

In order to implicate the ultra vires exception to governmental immunity, a

plaintiff must make more than a bare assertion that public officials have acted

without authority. The plaintiff must allege facts that, if true, would fall within the

ultra vires exception. Here, the only fact that Becky has alleged is that the City

Council authorized a development agreement with Milestone for the development

of property that Becky does not own.

The ultra vires exception does not apply to discretionary actions. Not only

is the City Council’s decision to enter into a contract discretionary, but the specific

contract term that Becky complains of – a provision that only requires Milestone to

construct Phase 1 of the Old Mill Road extension to Becky’s property – is itself

discretionary per city ordinance. Specifically, the city’s right-of-way ordinance

provides that the city “may” require construction of a roadway depending on the

traffic effects generated by a proposed development.

Contrary to Becky’s assertion, the entirety of Phase II of the Old Mill Road

Extension would not have been built by now but for the city’s development

agreement with Milestone. The fact is that but for the development agreement,

there would not be a dedicated right-of-way connecting Becky’s tract with South

7 Lakeline Boulevard at all, much less a fully constructed road. Whether for reasons

of governmental immunity, standing, or ripeness, the trial court correctly

determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Becky’s claims.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

I. Neither the facts that Becky has alleged nor the jurisdictional evidence support subject-matter jurisdiction over Becky’s claims. [Appellant’s Br. at 6-11].

Becky begins its “Argument and Authorities” section by entreating the Court

to focus on the facts alleged in its pleadings. Ironically, Becky has not pled facts

that support its allegations, instead describing its lawsuit as follows: “In a nutshell,

Becky asserts that the City, having delegated sole authority to the City’s Planning

Commission to approve plats and grant variances, had no authority, through its

City Council, to grant a variance to Milestone.”11 Becky uses the term “variance”

throughout its briefing. But Becky has not alleged any facts in its pleadings that

would demonstrate that the City Council approved a “variance” as that term is

generally understood.12

11 Appellant’s Br. at 7. 12 The term “variance” as it relates to subdivision regulations is a procedural term of art defined by Chapter 212 of the Texas Local Government Code and section 12.03.004 of the City of Cedar Park Code of Ordinances. CR 242-43; Appellant’s Appendix F. Becky concedes that Milestone never applied for a “variance” as that term is defined in section 12.03.004 or the Local Government Code. Appellant’s Br. at 10. Despite Becky’s citation to City Code, it appears that Becky is using the term “variance” more generally to mean any deviation from the city’s subdivision regulations.

8 Instead, Becky complains that the City Council approved a development

agreement that: (1) did not require Milestone to construct the portion of Old Mill

Road that connects to the Becky tract; and (2) did not require Milestone to

construct “infrastructure improvements” – which Becky defines as the portion of

Old Mill Road that connects to the Becky tract – within one year from the date that

the city approved Milestone’s final plat. Neither of these allegations constitutes a

“waiver, exemption, or variance”13 from the City’s Code of Ordinances. To the

contrary, the City Code specifically provides the city with discretion regarding

whether to require road construction at all, depending in part on whether a roadway

is needed “to offset the traffic effects generated by a proposed development.”14

The City Council’s decision to approve a development agreement that only

required Milestone to construct the portion of Old Mill Road that the city deemed

necessary to serve Milestone’s proposed development was entirely consistent with

this provision.

In Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 227-28

(Tex. 2004), the Texas Supreme Court held that a defendants’ plea to the

jurisdiction may implicate the merits of the plaintiff’s cause of action and may

13 Appellant’s Br. at 3. 14 CR 56-57 / Appendix B (City of Cedar Park Code of Ordinances, § 16.02.005). The City Charter and Code of Ordinances also are publicly available at http://z2.franklinlegal.net/franklin/Z2Browser2.html? showset=cedarparkset.

9 include evidence. If it does, the Court must review the relevant evidence to

determine if a fact issue exists.15 If the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to

raise a fact issue, the trial court should grant the plea.16 Here, the city submitted

uncontroverted affidavits and other supporting documentation and requested that

the Court consider it when ruling on the city’s plea to the jurisdiction.17 The Court

therefore may consider the city’s jurisdictional evidence in determining whether

the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction.

Neither the facts alleged nor the evidence submitted in this case implicate

the approval of a “variance” under the Cedar Park Code of Ordinances. Therefore,

even if true, none of the facts that Becky, Ltd. has alleged actually support its legal

claims.

II. Both the city and the city council members acting in their official capacities are entitled to governmental immunity.

A. Becky has not implicated the ultra vires exception to immunity because the City Council’s decision to contract with Milestone was a discretionary act. [Appellant’s Br. at 12-17] 15 Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 227-28 (Tex. 2004). 16 Id. 17 CR 38, 40 (“The City hereby incorporates by reference and for all purposes the affidavits and other supporting documentation included in the attached Appendix and asks the Court to consider it when ruling on the City’s plea to the jurisdiction.”). In a concurring opinion in Cokins v. City of Lakeway, No. 03-12-00083-CV, 2013 WL 4007522, at *5 (Tex. App. – Austin July 25, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.), Chief Justice Jones explained that in order for the Court to consider evidence as part of a jurisdictional challenge under Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex.2004), the party challenging jurisdiction must request that the court consider evidence when ruling on the plea. That is what the city did here.

10 Governmental immunity bars suits that seek to control government action.18

A suit seeks to control government action when the judgment would effectively

direct or control a government official in the exercise of his or her discretionary

statutory authority.19 The Texas Supreme Court has recognized a limited exception

to the doctrine of governmental immunity when the plaintiff has alleged that

governmental officials have acted without legal authority or failed to perform a

purely ministerial act.20 An action is not ultra vires, however, when it falls within

the governmental official’s exercise of discretion.21

Here, governmental immunity bars Becky’s claims because they seek to

invalidate the city’s development agreement with Milestone.22 A city council’s

decision to enter into a contract is a discretionary, legislative decision that is not

subject to attack through the ultra vires exception to immunity from suit.23 On

18 Texas Logos, LP v. TxDOT, 241 S.W. 3d 105, 118 (Tex. App. – Austin 2007, no pet.). 19 Id. 20 City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009). 21 See Texas Logos, 241 S.W. 3d at 118. 22 CR 191, 192 (Pl.’s 2nd Am. Pet.) (“By this suit, Plaintiffs challenge the validity of a Unified Development Agreement (the “Agreement”) by and between Cedar Park and Milestone as an ultra vires act of the City Council.”). 23 See, e.g, Catalina Dev., Inc. v. County of El Paso, 121 S.W.3d 704, 706 (Tex.2003) (holding newly elected commissioners court immune from suit where it “acted within its discretion to protect the perceived interests of the public” in rejecting contract approved by predecessor).

11 September 12, 2013, the City Council voted unanimously to authorize the City

Manager to execute the Agreement.24 That is the only action by the City Council

that Becky has identified. Although Becky’s petition does allege that the approval

or disapproval of a plat is a ministerial function,25 none of Becky’s causes of action

challenge the Planning and Zoning Commission ‘s action approving Milestone’s

plat. Nor has Becky sued the commissioners in their official capacities.

Instead, Becky has sued the council members in their official capacities

based on their approval of the Agreement. Because that was a discretionary

decision, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Becky’s claims

against the city council members.

Although Becky concedes that the City Council has the discretion to contract

generally, Becky alleges that the council exceeded its discretionary authority as to

this particular contract by including a term that required Milestone to construct the

Phase I extension of Old Mill Road but did not mandate the construction of Phase

II all the way to the Becky property. Even taken at face value, Becky’s argument

fails. Becky has not and cannot point to a provision in the City’s Code of

Ordinances that makes the construction of a roadway mandatory in this situation.

Instead, Becky directs the Court to general language in the subdivision ordinance

24 CR 59-71 (Minutes of September 12, 2013 meeting of the Cedar Park City Council). 25 CR 191, 193.

12 that refers to the completion of an undefined set of “required subdivision

improvements.”26

The applicable portion of the City Code is section 16.01.005 of the city’s

transportation regulations, “Dedication of right-of-way.”27 Subsections (a) through

(c) describe the circumstances under which a developer must dedicate right-of-way

as part of the platting process. Those provisions apply only “[i]f the director of

planning determines that all or portion of the right-of-way is needed to

accommodate additional traffic expected to be generated by the proposed

development.”28 It is undisputed from the city’s jurisdictional evidence that the

Agreement required Milestone to dedicate sufficient right-of-way to reach the

Becky development.29 Even this provision is discretionary: not every proposed

development will require a dedication of right-of-way because not every proposal

will create sufficient additional traffic.

Becky’s real complaint, however, is addressed by subsection (d), which

applies to roadway construction:

26 See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. at 2 (citing City of Cedar Park Code of Ordinances §§ 12.15.003(b) and (c) / Appellant’s Appendix G). 27 CR 55-57 / Appendix B. 28 Id. at § 16.02.005(a). 29 See CR 52-54 [Roberts Aff.], at ¶¶ 3-5.

13 In addition to the dedication of right-of-way, the city may require the construction of a roadway improvement or may assess a fee instead of requiring construction of a roadway improvement to offset the traffic effects generated by a proposed development.30

Just as the use of the word “shall” evidences the mandatory nature of a duty

imposed by a legislative act,31 the use of the word “may” “creates discretionary

authority or grants permission or power.”32 Not every development requires a new

road to offset traffic effects generated by the proposed development. And by

providing that the decision maker is to be the “city” generally, the City Council has

reserved to itself the ultimate discretion of whether to require roadway

construction.33 In the instant case, that council manifested that discretion through

the terms of the Agreement.34

The cases Becky cites are distinguishable. In Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Emmett,

459 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. 2015), Southwestern Bell alleged that the governing body of

30 CR 56-57/Appendix B (City of Cedar Park Code of Ordinances, § 16.02.005(d)) (emphasis added). 31 Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Emmett, 459 S.W.3d 578, 588 (Tex. 2015). 32 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.016(1) (Code Construction Act); Bd. of Adjustment of the City of San Antonio v. Wende, 92 S.W.3d 424, 430 (Tex. 2002) (“Courts use the same rules that are used to construe statutes to construe municipal ordinances.”). 33 See DeSoto Wildwood Dev., Inc. v. City of Lewisville, 184 S.W.3d 814, 826 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (recognizing that cities express themselves through actions of the City Council in a meeting duly assembled). 34 CR 53 [Roberts Aff.], at ¶¶ 3-6; see also CR 9-23 / Appendix A (Agreement), at ¶¶ 2- 3, 10.

14 a water district exceeded its authority under a statute that provided that certain

types of public infrastructure relocations “shall be done at the sole expense of the

district or water supply corporation unless otherwise agreed to in writing.”35 The

Supreme Court held that the legislature’s use of the word “shall” indicated that the

commissioners’ duty under the statute to provide for payment of infrastructure

relocations was mandatory.36 Therefore, the individual commissioners were not

immune from suit against them in their official capacities alleging that the actions

they took to shift those costs to the utility were ultra vires.37

Similarly, City of New Braunfels v. Tovar, No. 03-14-00693-CV, 2015 WL

2183479 (Tex. App. – Austin May 7, 2015, no pet. h.) involved a suit by a police

officer against the members of a municipal civil service commission in their

official capacities. Tovar alleged that the commissioners acted ultra vires when

they failed to award him additional seniority points on his civil service exam as

mandated by a statute that provided, “The grade that must be placed on the

eligibility list for each police officer or fire fighter shall be computed by adding the

applicant’s points for seniority to the applicant’s grade on the written

35 Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Emmett, 459 S.W.3d 578, 588 (Tex. 2015). 36 Id. 37 Id.

15 examination[.]”38 The Court held that because Tovar was suing to enforce a

mandatory right under the statute, Tovar had properly invoked the ultra vires

exception to governmental immunity.39 Here, Becky has pointed to no such

mandatory, ministerial duty on the part of the council members because no such

duty exists.

There has been no waiver of the city’s governmental immunity under the

ultra vires exception for at least one other reason. “[T]he ultra vires rule is subject

to important qualifications. Even if such a claim may be brought, the remedy may

implicate immunity” if it constitutes anything other than prospective relief.40 A

suit that seeks to control state action by invalidating a contract is retrospective in

nature.41 Here, Becky wants the Court to declare that “the City Council’s action in

granting a variance through the Agreement was ultra vires, rendering at least that

portion of the Agreement void.”42 Therefore, even assuming, for the sake of

argument, that the City Council’s decision to contract with Milestone were a

38 City of New Braunfels v. Tovar, No. 13-14-00693-CV, 2015 WL 2183479, at *1-2 (Tex. App. – Austin May 7, 2015, no pet. h.) (emphasis added). 39 Id. at *4. 40 Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 373-76. 41 Texas Logos, 241 S.W.3d at 120-21 (distinguishing impermissible suit to invalidate a contract from permissible suits to compel state official and agencies to comply with their statutory authority). 42 Appellant’s Br. at 8.

16 ministerial act, the remedy that Becky is seeking would constitute impermissible

retrospective relief. Governmental immunity still would bar Becky’s claims

against the city.

“[B]are conclusions . . . are not sufficient—the pleader must allege facts that

affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction.”43 Becky

cannot conjure subject matter jurisdiction merely by invoking the phrase “ultra

vires.” Rather, Becky must at a minimum direct the Court to some ministerial duty

created by statute or possibly ordinance that the city council members have

exceeded. Because Becky has not alleged facts that, if true, would amount to an

ultra vires act by the named council members, there has been no waiver of the

city’s governmental immunity.

B. The UDJA does not waive a city’s governmental immunity from a suit to declare rights under an ordinance. [Appellant’s Br. at 17- 19]

Alternatively, Becky argues that the UDJA waives governmental immunity

from its claims against the city because Becky is seeking a declaration to construe

rights under city ordinances. The Texas Supreme Court considered and rejected

this argument in Texas Dept. of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. 2011).

There, the Court held, “The UDJA does not waive the state’s sovereign immunity

43 Creedmoor-Maha Water Supply Corp. v. Tex. Com’n on Envtl. Quality, 307 S.W.3d 505, 525 (Tex. App. – Austin 2010, no pet.) (emphasis in original).

17 when the plaintiff seeks a declaration of his or her rights under a statute or other

law.”44 The Court held that because Sefzik was not challenging the validity of a

statute but only a state agency’s actions under it, there was no waiver of immunity

from his claims.45 In this case, Becky wants the court to “determine the parties’

rights, status, and legal relations under those ordinances.”46 The UDJA does not

waive the city’s governmental immunity from these types of claims.

Becky’s reliance on Texas Lottery Com’n v. First State Bank of DeQueen,

325 S.W.3d 628 (Tex. 2010) is misplaced.47 The appellant in City of Dallas v.

Texas EZPAWN, L.P., No. 05-12-01269-CV, 2013 WL 1320513, at * 3 (Tex. App.

– Dallas Apr. 1, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) made the same argument that Becky

makes here. But as the Dallas Court of Appeals explained:

The issue in [Texas Lottery Commission] was whether provisions of the Texas Uniform Commercial Code conflicted with provisions of the Texas Lottery Act and, consequently, rendered the provisions of the Texas Lottery Act ineffective. Although the court used language like “statutory interpretation” and “statutory construction,” it was undisputed that the lawsuit challenged the validity of the provisions of the Texas

44 Texas. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2011). 45 Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 622. 46 Appellant’s Br. at 19. 47 See id. at 18.

18 Lottery Act and did not simply seek an interpretation of the statute.48

The court of appeals held that because EZPAWN sought only the interpretation of

an ordinance and a declaration of its rights under it, those allegations affirmatively

negated the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.49

Similarly, in Lone Star College Sys. v. Immigration Reform Coalition of

Texas (IRCOT), 418 S.W.3d 263 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist. 2013, pet.

denied), which Becky also cites, the appellant both sought an interpretation and

asserted the invalidity of Texas statutes.50 In a more recent opinion, Saifi v. City

of Texas City, No. 14-13-00815-CV, 2015 WL 1843540 (Tex. App. – Houston

[14th Dist.] Apr. 23, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.), the Fourteenth Court of Appeals

affirmed that the UDJA does not waive a city’s governmental immunity to the

extent a plaintiff is merely seeking a declaration of rights under a statute or

ordinance.51

48 City of Dallas v. Texas. EZPAWN, L.P., No. 05-12-01269-CV, 2013 WL 1320513, at * 3 (Tex. App. – Dallas Apr. 1, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citations omitted). 49 Id. 50 Lone Star Coll. Sys. v. Immigration Reform Coal. of Texas (IRCOT), 418 S.W.3d 263, 271 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). 51 Saifi v. City of Texas City, No. 14-13-00815-CV, 2015 WL 1843540, at *3 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 23, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).

19 It is well-settled following Sefzik that the UDJA does not waive a city’s

governmental immunity from a suit that merely seeks the interpretation of a

statute or ordinance.52 Therefore, there has been no wavier of the city’s immunity

in this case.

III. Becky lacks standing because it was not a party to the Agreement. [Appellant’s Br. at 19-23]

A person has standing to sue when he is personally aggrieved by an alleged

wrong.53 Without a breach of a legal right belonging to a plaintiff, that plaintiff

has no standing to litigate.54 Only the person whose primary legal right has been

breached may seek redress for an injury.55 The alleged injury must be “concrete

and particularized, not merely conjectural or hypothetical.56 “Without breach of a

52 See, e.g., Williams v. Texas Tech Univ. Health Sciences Ctr., No. 10-15-00005-CV, 2015 WL 2452513, at *2 (Tex. App. – Waco May 21, 2015, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (recognizing that UDJA does not waive immunity where appellant only challenged interpretation of university policy and did not challenge validity of municipal ordinance or statute); VanderWerff v. Tex. Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, No. 03-12-00711-CV, 2014 WL 7466814, at *3 n. 4 (Tex. App. – Austin Dec. 18, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Appellant’s petition does not challenge the validity of any statutes . . . [T[he UDJA does not waive sovereign immunity when a plaintiff seeks a declaration of his rights under a statute.”). 53 Nootsie Ltd. v. Williamson County Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex.1996). 54 Exxon Corp. v. Pluff, 94 S.W.3d 22, 27 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2002, pet. denied); Cadle Co. v. Lobingier, 50 S.W.3d 662, 669–70 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied); Brunson v. Woolsey, 63 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). 55 Nobles v. Marcus, 533 S.W.2d 923, 927 (Tex.1976) (defrauded party only can bring suit to set aside deed obtained by fraud). 56 Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. [SOS] v. City of Dripping Springs, 304 S.W.3d 871, 878 (Tex. App. – Austin 2010, pet. denied).

20 legal right belonging to the plaintiff no cause of action can accrue to his benefit.”57

The court has no jurisdiction over a claim made by a plaintiff who lacks standing

to assert it.58

In cases analogous to this one, the courts of appeals have declined to

recognize that a third party has standing to challenge a city’s decision to enter into

a development agreement with a neighboring property owner. In Save Our Springs

Alliance, Inc. [SOS] v. City of Dripping Springs, 304 S.W.3d 871 (Tex. App. –

Austin 2010, pet. denied), for example, SOS sought various declarations to

invalidate development agreements between the city and private property owners.

This Court held that because neither SOS nor its members had an interest in the

properties that were the subject of the development agreements, SOS lacked

standing.59

Similarly, in Schechter v. Wildwood Developers, LLC, 214 S.W.3d 117

(Tex. App. – El Paso 2006, no pet.), plaintiff sued the city for a declaration that the

city’s approval of a subdivision plat was void because it did not comply with the

city’s ordinances. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that construction of the planned

subdivision as depicted on the challenged plat would cause a decrease in his

57 Nobles, 533 S.W.2d at 927. 58 Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012). 59 SOS, 304 S.W.3d at 882.

21 property values. The court held that none of plaintiff’s complaints about his

neighbor’s property were based on or related to plaintiff’s rights, status, or legal

relationship under a statute, ordinance, contract or franchise.60 Therefore, the trial

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims.61

Here, Becky is in the same position as the plaintiffs in SOS and Schechter.

Like the plaintiffs in those cases, Becky seeks various declarations regarding

Milestone’s property – property to which Becky has not alleged any ownership

interest. At most, Becky alleges that the city’s actions in relation to Milestone’s

property will result in a decrease in value of Becky’s property. This was the

standing argument considered and rejected by the court in Schechter.62

In Stop the Ordinances Please v. City of New Braunfels, 306 S.W.3d 919

(Tex. App. – Austin 2010, no pet.), plaintiffs, an association of business owners

who rented inner tubes and beverage coolers, challenged four city ordinances: (1)

an ordinance regulating volume drinking devices (the “beer bong” ordinance); (2)

an ordinance regulating five-ounce containers (the “jello shot” ordinance); (3) an

ordinance regulating the consumption of alcohol in public parks (the “parks”

ordinance); and (4) an ordinance regulating coolers and containers exceeding

60 Schechter v. Wildwood Developers, LLC, 214 S.W.3d 117, 121-22 (Tex. App. – El Paso 2006, no pet.). 61 Id. 62 See id.

22 sixteen quarts (the “cooler” ordinance). Of those four ordinances, this Court held

that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the first three because those ordinances

did not impose any direct restrictions on the plaintiffs and because plaintiffs did

not plead facts demonstrating injury from the challenged restrictions: “Although

[plaintiffs] broadly complain of lost revenues they ‘attribute’ to the ordinances

collectively, these bare conclusions are insufficient to affirmatively demonstrate

their standing.”63 The Court did, however, hold that plaintiffs had standing to

challenge the cooler ordinance because plaintiffs had alleged that they purchased

coolers to rent to customers and that the city’s ordinance rendered those coolers

valueless.

Here, the terms of the Agreement only apply to the development of the

Milestone property. Like the business owners’ challenges to the beer bong, shot

glass, and parks ordinances in Stop the Ordinances Please, Becky lacks standing to

challenge the validity of the Agreement because Becky has not pled facts

demonstrating the Agreement imposes any direct restriction or regulatory burden

on the Becky tract. Nor has Becky sufficiently pled facts demonstrating injury

from the Agreement. Although Becky broadly complains of a hypothetical loss of

property value that it attributes to the Agreement with Milestone, this bare

conclusion is insufficient to affirmatively demonstrate standing. Unlike the

63 Stop the Ordinances Please v. City of New Braunfels, 306 S.W.3d 919, 929-30 (Tex. App. – Austin 2010, no pet.).

23 business owners’ challenge to the cooler ordinance in Stop the Ordinance Please,

nothing in the language of the Agreement regulates Becky’s property in any way.

Regarding the issue of damages, Becky’s assertion that but for the

Agreement, the Old Mill Road extension to the Becky tract would be built by now

defies logic. First, the reasons that the Becky tract is landlocked are geography

and the Cedar Park real estate market, not city council action. Further, as

discussed above, the city’s decision regarding whether to require construction of a

road is discretionary. Becky does not allege that Milestone had an approved plat

on file prior to the date of the Agreement that required road construction (it did

not). So in reality, without the agreement, there would be no dedication of right-

of-way from Lakeline Boulevard to the Becky tract, there would be no Milestone

plat on file, and the Milestone tract would be just like the Becky tract – a vacant

piece of land.

City of Laredo v. Rio Grande H2O Guardian, No. 04-10-00872-CV, 2011

WL 3122205 (Tex. App. – San Antonio Jul. 27, 2011, no pet.) is thus

distinguishable because Becky has not alleged any actual harm. In City of Laredo,

an association challenged a city’s decision to rezone a piece of property from R-1

(Single-Family Residential) to M-1 (Light Manufacturing). The court of appeals

held that the plaintiff association had standing because its members were nearby

property owners who alleged they would suffer various environmental injuries as a

24 result of the changed use.64 Here, although Becky is a nearby property owner, that

is where the similarity ends. The injury that Becky has alleged is that the

Agreement made Becky’s property less valuable because it did not require

Milestone to construct Phase II of Old Mill Road. This does not meet the

“concrete and particularized injury” requirement for standing.65 If anything, the

Agreement would have made Becky’s property more valuable by providing for the

construction of Phase I of Old Mill Road and providing for the public right-of-way

connecting to Becky’s property.

Because Becky has failed to allege a particularized interest in Milestone’s

property or a concrete injury resulting from the Agreement, the trial court properly

dismissed Becky’s claims against the city for want of jurisdiction.

IV. Becky’s claims were not ripe because it never submitted a completed plat application to the city for review. [Appellant’s Br. pp. 24-25]

A case is not ripe when its resolution depends on events that have not yet

occurred, and ripeness is a threshold issue that implicates subject matter

jurisdiction.66 A plaintiff must demonstrate a concrete injury in order for a

justiciable controversy to exist and to avoid premature adjudication of factually

64 City of Laredo v. Rio Grande H2O Guardian, No. 04-10-00872-CV, 2011 WL 3122205, at *4-5 (Tex. App. – San Antonio Jul. 27, 2011, no pet.) 65 See SOS, 304 S.W.3d at 878. 66 Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 851-853 (Tex. 2000).

25 undeveloped claims. Therefore, a plea to the jurisdiction is an appropriate vehicle

to challenge the non-justiciability of a claim due to a lack of ripeness.67

A case that is almost directly on point is City of El Paso v. Maddox, 276

S.W.3d 66 (Tex. App. – El Paso 2008, pet. denied). In that case, plaintiff was a

developer who owned a tract of landlocked property. Plaintiff bought the property

with the understanding that the city would require under its subdivision regulations

the construction of a road to plaintiff’s property across neighboring development.

Instead, the city amended its subdivision ordinance to delete the requirement that

subdivisions such as the one adjacent to plaintiff’s property construct public streets

to provide access to the neighboring property. Plaintiff sued the city for a

regulatory taking, even though plaintiff never had submitted a subdivision

application or any other type of development plan for plaintiff’s own property and,

therefore, the city never had made a final decision with respect to plaintiff’s

property. The court of appeals held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s claims on the basis of ripeness:

We conclude that the City has not been given an opportunity to make a final decision on Appellees' access to its property and Appellees have not presented evidence establishing that submitting a development plan or seeking a variance would have been futile. Accordingly,

67 Id.

26 we reverse the order of the trial court denying the City's plea to the jurisdiction[.]68

“Although a claim is not required to be ripe at the time of filing, if a party cannot

demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the claim will soon ripen, the case must

be dismissed.”69

Here, although Becky has made some attempt to ripen its claims, nothing

significant has changed since plaintiff filed its original petition in May 2014. The

fact is, the city has not taken a final action on the merits of Becky’s application.

Any final action that city staff may ultimately recommend to the Planning and

Zoning Commission will depend on whether plaintiff submits the required

revisions to the city and what those revisions contain. Any final action that the

Commission may take will depend on the votes of the commissioners acting as a

legislative body. Becky’s fears about what the city may or may not require after

plaintiff has addressed the comments provided by the city planning staff, at which

68 City of El Paso v. Maddox, 276 S.W.3d 66, 75 (Tex. App. – El Paso 2008, pet. denied); see also City of Corinth v. NuRock Dev., Inc., 293 S.W.3d 360, 369-70 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (holding developer’s request for injunctive relief not ripe to prevent city from “arbitrarily and capriciously applying ordinances and variances” as to developer’s property); Coble v. City of Mansfield, 134 S.W.3d 449, 458-59 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (holding developer’s claim for damages not ripe because developer had not completed subdivision process and city had not made final decision as to applicability of roadway ordinance to developer’s property). 69 Robinson v. Parker, 353 S.W.3d 753, 755 (Tex. 2011).

27 point the planning department will be able to complete its review process, are still

entirely speculative.

In sum, the Court lacks jurisdiction over this lawsuit because the threatened

harm claimed by plaintiff - that it may be required to construct a portion of a road

– turns on events that have not occurred and may never occur in the future.

V. Becky’s claims are moot. [Appellant’s Br. at 25-28]

The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Becky’s claims against

the city based on the doctrines of governmental immunity, standing, and ripeness.

The city also has asserted that the trial court lacked jurisdiction based on the

doctrine of mootness pursuant to Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. [SOS] v. City of

Austin, 149 S.W.3d 674 (Tex. App. – Austin 2004, no pet.). Here, because the

City Council validly approved the Agreement,70 any claim by Becky that the City

Council acted without authority is moot.

PRAYER

For these reasons, Appellees, the City of Cedar Park, Stephen Thomas, Matt

Powell, Mitch Fuller, Lyle Grimes, Lowell Moore, Jon Lux, and Don Tracy,

respectfully request that the Court of Appeals affirm the decision of the trial court

and for such other relief, at law or in equity, to which Appellees shall show

themselves justly entitled.

70 CR 59-71 (Minutes of September 12, 2013 Cedar Park City Council Meeting).

28 Respectfully submitted,

BICKERSTAFF HEATH DELGADO ACOSTA LLP 3711 South MoPac Expressway Building One, Suite 300 Austin, Texas 78746 (512) 472-8021 Telephone (512) 320-5638 Facsimile

Cobby A. Caputo State Bar No. 03784650 ccaputo@bickerstaff.com

By: /s/ Bradley B. Young Bradley B. Young State Bar No. 24028245 byoung@bickerstaff.com

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

29 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been served via electronic filing service provider, email, facsimile, and/or Certified Mail Return Receipt Requested to all parties of record on this the 29th day of July, 2015.

Elizabeth G. Bloch Husch Blackwell LLP 111 Congress Avenue, Suite 1400 Austin, Texas 78701-4093 (512) 472-5456 (512) 479-1101 (FAX) Heidi.bloch@huschblackwell.com

Leonard B. Smith P.O. Box 684633 Austin, Texas 78768 (512) 914-3732 (512) 532-6446 (FAX) lsmith@leonardsmithlaw.com

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

/s/ Bradley B. Young Bradley B. Young State Bar No. 24028245 byoung@bickerstaff.com

30 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), I certify that this

Brief has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than 14-point for

text and 12-point for footnotes. I also certify that this response brief complies with

the word count limitations contained in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure

9.4(i)(2) because, excluding contents identified in Rule 9.4(i)(1), it contains 6039

words. I relied on the computer-generated word count of Microsoft Word, which

is the software used to prepare this brief.

/s/ Bradley B. Young Bradley B. Young State Bar No. 24028245 byoung@bickerstaff.com

A. Unified Development Agreement (pp 9-23 of the clerk’s record)

B. City of Cedar Park Code of Ordinances Section 16.02.005

32 APPENDIX A UNIFIED DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT

THIS lJNIFIED DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT (this "Agreement'') is entered into to be effective as of October 7, 2013 (the "Effective Date"), by and between .MJLESTONE COMMUNITY BU1LDERS, LLC, a Texas limited liability company ("Milestone"), and the CITY OF CEllAR PARK, TEXAS (the "City"). Milestone and the City are referred to hereinafter individuaHy as a "P:uty" and collectively as the "Parties."

RECITALS

A. Milestone has submitted to. and is processing with, the City, the following applications relating to that certain real property, located in Williamson County, Texas and within the boundaries of the City, as described on Exhibit "A", attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference (the "Property"): (i) a subdivision plat pursuant to \Vhich the Property and adjacent 8.408-acre commercial tract will be subdivided into four (4) lots (City Case No. FP-13-004), referred to herein as the "Plat;" and (ii) two (2) site plans of the Property, referred to herein as the "Site Plans," pursuant to which Milestone will constmct, in two (2) distinct phases of approximately 62 units (City Case No. SD-13-000 19) and 141 units (City Case No. SD-13-00026), respectively, a total of approximately two hundred three (203) townhome units. The condominium project to be constmcted on the Property pursuant to the Site Plans is referred to herein as the "Project"

B. In connection with the Project, LAKELINE FUND, LTD., a Texas limited partnership ("Lakeline Fund"), has contractually agreed with Milestone that it win dedicate right-of-way to the City, and Milestone will design, permit and construct and contribute to the cost of various on-site and off-site transpmtation improvements that benefit the Project and adjacent/nearby properties (the "Tr.ansportafion Improvements").

C. The Patties now desire to enter into this Agreement, subject to the tenns and conditions set forth hereinbelow, to provide for unified development of the Project on the Propexiy and the funding and development of the Transportation Improvements in c01mection therewith.

AGREEMENT

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the mutual covenants hereinafter contained, and of other good and valuable consideration the receipt, sufficiency and adequacy of which the Parties mutua!ly acknowledge, Milestone hereby declares that, upon its acquisition of the Property, the Prope1ty shall be subject to the following covenants, conditions, and restrictions, which shall nm with the Property and bind aU Parties and successors in interest, and the Parties hereby agree to the following:

l. Unified Develomnent. For purposes of review, modification, or approval of the Site Plans by the City, the Property will be constructed as a unified development, regardless ofthe Propmiy being comprised of two (2) lots upon recordation of the Plat in the Official Public Records of Williamson County, Texas. A current copy of the Plat is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". Any proposed modifications to the Property or any portion of either lot therein will be construed as a modification to a single site, requiring review of the Property in accordance with the provisions of the City's Code of Ordinances and this Agreement. This section applies to, but is not limited to, drainage, detention and/or water quality inliastructure relating to the Prope1ty.

2. Ri2:ht~of-Way Dedication. Milestone covenants and agrees with the City that it will enforce the tenns of its purchase contract with Lakeline Fund so as to cause to be dedicated the City, to be owned, operated and maintained by the City upon completion and acceptance by the City, the right-of-way for the extension of Old Mill Road, said right·of-way measuring fi·om si>..1:y-four feet (64') to seventy feet (70') in width and twelve hundred ten linear feet (121 0'), as more particularly depicted on Exhibit "C

The foregoing dedication may be made either via recording the applicable subdivision plat or by separate dedication and/or easement instrument. A wos93672.9! Exhibit_ 9 3. Old Mill Road Extension.. Within thirty (30) days after the latter to occur of recordation of the Plat in the Official Public Records of Williamson County, Texas, and approval of both Site Plans, Milestone shall commence and diligently pursue to completion the design, permitting and construction of<'Phase 1" of the Old Mill Road Extension in compliance with ali applicable govemmental requirements pursuant to construction plans approved by the City (collectively, the "Phase 1 Improvements"). The Phase 1 Improvements are more patticu!arly described on Exhibit "C-1', a'ltached hereto and incorporated herein by reference and shall, in any event, be constructed per the "residential collector" standard as set forth in the City's Code of Ordinances. The City shall use all reasonable efforts to expeditiously approve the plans and specifications for the Phase 1 Improvements; however, approval of such plan and specifications shall not be a condition precedent to Milestone's construction of the Project, which shall be permitted to proceed pending construction of the Old Mill Road Extension, except that the Phase 1 Improvements shall be completed and accepted by the City prior to issuance of the last certificate of occupancy for the phase of the Project submitted under City Case No. SD- I 3-00019 and the 1st building permit for the phase ofthe Project submitted under City Case No. SD-13-00026. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Milestone shall have no obligation to design, permit, construct or fund, in whole or part, any utilities to be located \•lithin the Old Mill Road Extension, including, but not limited to, wastewater, electric, gas, or telecommunications facilities, signal facilities, and landscape improvements along the Old Mill Road Extension (regardless of whether they may be required under any existing or subsequently enacted ordinance), except that Milestone shall design, permit, and construct that portion of the twelve inch (12") water line to be located within the Old Mill Road Extension, as set forth in Exhibit "C-1, (the "12" Water Line"), which serves the phase of the Project submitted under City Case No. SD-13-00019.

The City shall be responsible for the construction costs and inspection fees relating to the 12" Water Line, ' up to a total maximum contribution by the City not to exceed $87,000 by ten percent (1 0%) or more, which amount shall be payable to Milestone in installments on a draw basis as the project proceeds. The City shall process Milestone's applications for payment in more than two (2) weeks fi·om the date of submittaL

Notwithstanding the foregoing, or any provision herein to the contrary, the City confirms and agrees that, with respect to tum/deceleration lanes, Milestone shall only be obligated to construct turn/deceleration lanes as shown on the Site Plan.

4. Stub-Out to Lot 121, Riviera Subdivision. Milestone covenants and agrees that it will construct the private drive within the Property so as to stub out at the boundaty line ofthe Property and Lot 121, Riviera Springs Subdivision, a subdivision in Williamson County, Texas, according to the map or plat thereof, recorded in Cabinet B, Slides 167-169, Plat Records ofWiHiamson County, Texas ("Lot 121"). Such stub-out may include a laydown curb and any adjacent fence must be gated at the stub-out In no event, however, shall Milestone be obligated to dedicate any property or construct any improvements out of or on Lot 121.

5. Confirmation Regarding Cross-Connection to Retirement Village. The City confinns and agrees that a cross~connection to the retirement village properly located adjacent to the Property will not be required.

6. Traffic SignaL As a condition precedent to the City's approval of the Site Plans, Milestone shall post fiscal surety in the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($25,000.00) to fund a portion ofthe estimated cost of the design, permitting and construction of one (1) traffic signal at the intersection of Old Mill Road and Lakeline Boulevard. Traffic Signal will be installed by City once intersection meets signal warrants and remainder of funds are available. ' 7. Traffic Impact Analysis Not Required. The City confinns and agrees with Milestone that in no event shall a traffic impact analysis be required as a condition to or in connection with construction and development of the Transportation Improvements, the Old Mill Road Extension, or the Project.

8. Detention Facility. In consideration of t11e dedication of rigM-of-way for the Old Mill Road Extension and Milestone's design, permitting and construction of Phase 1 thereof, the City covenants and agrees to {W0593672.9} 10 accept and approve, the water quality and detention facility located on Lot 15, Block C, THE RESERVE AT BRUSHY CREEK, SECTION 1, a subdivision in Williamson County, Texas, according to the map or plat thereof recorded under Document No. 2012028430 in the Official Public Records of Williamson County, Texas, upon Milestone having: (i) exercised commercially reasonable efforts to revegetate the top of pond walls along Breakaway Rd.; and (ii) revegetated the portions of the pond along Brushy Creek Rd. fi·om top of cliff to top of slope, such revegatation to include top soil and soil retention blanket.

9. Construction Access: Sales Office. Milestone's construction of a compacted base roadway providing for all-weather access prior to the issuance of a building permit for any condominium unit within the Property shall, upon the City's approval, be deemed to satisfY the City's requirement for construction of an ali- weather access road prior to the issuance of a building permit for vertical construction. Milestone shall also be pennitted to set up and maintain a sales trailer in the location shown on Exhibit "D", attached hereto, provided that Milestone constructs the parking area and re1ated improvements as shown on Exhibit "D".

10. Limitation on Milestone's Obligation to Construct Right-of-Wa_y. The City acknowledges and agrees that, except as expressly set f01th in this Agreement, Milestone shall have no obligation whatsoever to dedicate or construct any street, road, tum lane improvements or other right-of-way within or serving the Property, nor any irnprovements related thereto.

11. Automatic Tennination Provision; Representations. Notwithstanding any provision herein to the contra1y, in the event that, for any reason, Milestone does not ultimately acquire the Property, then this Agreement and ali rights and obligations of the Parties hereunder shali be null and void and of no fiuther effect.

12. Default: Remedies. If one party to this Agreement believes the other party has defaulted in the pe1fonnance of any condition, term, or obligation owed to that pmty under this Agreement, such party shall after discovery of said default, give written notice of the default to the other p

13. Separate Status. None of the terms or provisions of this Agreement shaH be deemed to create a partnership between or among the Parties in their respective businesses or othe1wise, nor shall it cause them to be considered joint ventures or members of any joint enterprise.

14. Constr~1ction and Interpretation. The captions preceding the text of each article and sectio11 of this Agreement are included only for convenience of reference. Captions shall be disregarded in the constmction and interpretation of this Agreement. Capitalized tenns are also selected only for convenience of refere11ce and do not necessarily hove any connection to the meaning that might uLherwise be attached to such term in a context outside of this Agreement This Agreement may be executed in several counterparts; each of which shall be deemed an original. The signatures to this Agreement may be executed and notarized on separate pages, and when attached to this Agreement shaH constitute one complete document

15. Assignabilit); by Milestone. Milestone shall be authorized to assign or transfer its rights, duties and obligations under this Agreement to an affiliate of Milestone under common ownership and control without the consent of the City. Milestone may also assign its rights, duties and obligations under this Agreement to any other owners of all or pmtions of the Properly with written consent of the City. The City covenants and agrees to execute any estoppel ce1tificates (in a fonn reasonably acceptable to the City) required by such financial lenders regarding the status of this Agreement.

16. Com~tsLAgr_eement. This Agreement represents the complete agreement of the Parties with respect to the subject matter and supersedes all prior written and oral matters related to this Agreement Any amendment to this Agreement must be in writing and signed by the Pmties or pem1itted assignees.

{W0593672.9} 11 17. Notice. Any notice or demand, which any Party is required to or may desire to serve upon another, must be in writing, and shall be sufficiently served if (i) personally delivered, (ii) sent by facsimile, (iii) sent by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, or (iv) sent by commercial overnight carrier, and addressed to:

Milestone: Milestone Community Builders, LLC 9 J 11 Jollyville Road, Suite Ill Austin, Texas 78759 Attention: Ganett S. Martin, President Telephone: (512) 686-4986 Email:garrett@mymiiestone.com

With a copy to: Armbrust & Brown, PLLC 100 Congress Avenue, Suite 1300 Austin, Texas 78701 Attention: Joshua D. Bemstein Telephone: (512) 435-2379 Facsimile: (512) 435~2360 Email: jbernstein@abaustin.com

City of Cedar Park, Texas 450 Cypress Creek Road, Building One Cedar Park, Texas 78613 Attention: City Manager Telephone: (512) 258-4121 Facsimile: (512) 250-8602

With a copy to: City of Cedar Park, Texas 450 Cypress Creek Road, Building One Cedar Park, Texas 78613 Attention: City Attorney Telephone: (512) 401-5004 Facsimile: (512) 401-5005

or such other address or addresses which any Party may be notified in \:Vriting by any other Party to this Agreement. Such notice shall be deemed to have been served (a) four (4) business days after the date such notice is deposited and stamped by the U.S. Postal Service, except when lost, destroyed, improperly addressed or delayed by the U.S. Postal Service, or (b) upon receipt in the event of personal service, or (c) the first business day after the date of deposit with an overnight courier, except when lost, destroyed, improperly addressed or delayed by the courier, or (d) the date of receipt by facsimile (as reflected by electronic confirmation); provided, however, that should such notice pertain to the change of address to either of the Parties hereto, such notice shall be deemed to have been served upon receipt thereof by the party to whom such notice is given ..

18. Force Majeure. The Parties agree that the obligations of each party shall be subject to force majeure events such as natura! calamity, fire or strike.

19. Forum Selection. This Agreement and the relationship among the Patties shall be governed and interpreted under the laws of Texas without regard to any conflict of laws provision. Venue for any suit arising out of or related to this Agreement shall be exclusively the appropriate cou1t in Williamson County, Texas,

fW0593672.91 12 20. Re12resentation of Authoriry. The City represents and warrants to Milestone that City is duly authorized and empo1vered to enter into this Agreement Milestone represents and warrants to the City that it has the requisite authority to enter into this Agreement and is a proper party to this Agreement.

2L $ignature WmJ.]lnty Clause. The signatories to this Agreement represent and warrant that they have the authority to execute this Agreement on behalf of the City and Milestone, respectively.

22. Severability. This Agreement is entered into in accordance with applicable law as understood by Milestone and the City. In the event any part, provision or paragraph hereof shall become unenforceable by reason of judicial decree or determination, the Parties hereto mutually agree to the extent possible to ensure that all other provisions of this Agreement, including the intent ofthis Agreement, be honored and perf01med.

23. Fmther Assurances. The Pmties each agree that at any time after execution of this Agreement, they will, upon request of the other, execute and deliver such further documents and do such further acts and things as may be reasonably necessmy or desirable to effectuate the terms of this Agreement.

24. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts, each of \vhich shall be deemed an original, and all of which together shall be construed as one and the same instrument.

[SIGNATURE PAGE FOLLOWS]

{W0593672.9} 13 EXECUTED to be effective as of the Effective Date.

MILESTONE COMMUNITY BUILDERS, LLC, a Texas limited liability company

By:_

THE CITY OF CEDAR PARK, TEXAS

{W0593672.9} 14 EXHffiiT "A" PROPERTY

Page 1 of4 :'1~$~1 ;;)} '\( LmufSurveyors} Inc. !!!)"··' 8333 Cross (['urt:_,fl}rff-•t :f )iustin, 'I'ezys 78754 '.;~ Ciffu:-et 512.374.9722 '1·4.~ .'112./173.9743

METES AND BOUNDS DESCRJPTJON

BEING 29.134 ACRES OF CANl), SURVEYED BY BASEUNE LAND SURVEYORS lNC., EirfH3S PUND TWO, LTD BY INSTRUMENT OF RECORD !N VOLUME 1581, PAGE 520 Of THE DEED RECORDS OF WlLLIAMSON COUNTY, TEXAS; AND TRACT Fetm l.miN(i 0.441 OF ONE ACRE OUT OF A 1.081 ACRE TRA(Yf OPLAND CONVEYED TO PROPERTIES FUND T\\"0, l:.m HY lNSTRU.!viENT OF RECORD IN DOC. NO. 2008004670 OF THE Off!CJAL PU13LJC RECORDS OF WJLUA\\·fSON COUNTY, TEXAS, AND BEING MORE COJ\·1l'LETBL Y DI~SCRlntUJ BY METES AND BOUNDS AS FOLLO\VS:

COMMDNCJNG l'lt a 1/2 inch iron roebar found for tl>e smllhwcst C<)nler (lf :;Hid 26.001 acre Irae!, !he southeast comer of Lot 2, Bind' A, Cnspi\H, S~:-ction Tv,:o, n subdivision of record ln Cabinet AA, Slide.s 289-290 uf th;; Plat Records of \Vi!liam~ou County, Tt:X

THENCE Norlh 20¢50'54" West (n~cord - North 20"50'47'' W<.--sl), along the west line of tlle 26.001 at!'e Jmct and the em;t Hne of Lot 2, Blo::k A, Caspha, Section Two, n disumce (lf l 09.S9 f~1ct to a l/2 inch iron rehar set with pla5tic CllJ} which n.:i line of the 26.001 acre tract and 1he easl line of Lo1 2, Block A, Caspita, Section l\V<1, ~n

{W0593672.9} 15 Page2 of4

·n !ENCE North ?.0"50'54" '\l/{:st (record · North 20c50'47" West), conthming flkmg The west lin\\ of il1c 26:00 I acre tmc.t and the nast line pf L, for a tntal distance of 613.97 feel to a Ji2 inch iron rebar found for the northwest comer of the- 26.0{1 J ncre !r<~c!, !he !JOr(h~,:ii:s( comer of Lot 1, Blod: /\, Caspita, Sec:-liOI) Two, f\'JilHnmson County, Texns, from w1Jich n :5/8 inch iron rebat' i(nmct fhr tmd angle poini in tlJc north line DfLot 1, Block A, Caspila, Section T>No and !he sm1th line of said Lot 2, Lodge J>t Lakeline VH1age, SectiOJi H, bears South 69"2&'W" West a distance nf 194.65 fi;d (record~ South 69"28'10" West a distaJlceofl94.65 f~;-et);

'fl!ENG!.~ Norlll 72"34'24" E~s\ (r~;I;onl • North 12"36'.5 1" East), along th~ norlh linc {lf !he 26.001 acre tract and the soutllline of Lot 2, Lodge al Lalu;linc Vilbgc, Section ll, n distam;e of 239.97 fe-el (r<:cord- 240.07 l'i;et) to

TH£NCH al1mg the nMh and cast liMS M the 0.30 of one acre, tract and the southerly line <:>fsaid remainder of a 237.31i acre tract the following three {3) courses:

J. North 64"57'32" E<~st H dislunce of765.82 feet (recn!'d- Nor!h 66"(}!}'()5" Et1S\ a dls!Mcc of7.U5.77 feet) to :a 112 Inch iron i't:llHr R11md;

:Z. N(lrth 72"00'5,1'' Em;( n distance of210.58 feet (re-t(Jfd- North 73'T2.'40" Ea£t a distance ;__lf 2 HL75 feet) to <1 J/2 inch imn rebar set witl1 plastic cap which reads "HASEIJNE TNC" for the northv.asl corner of the 0.30 of OM ncre 1ruct;

J. South 20"38'04" f-flSi a tlishi1Hl~1 of 6,64 feet (record - South 19(>41 '05"' Enst 11 dista11te of 6.64 feet) to an iron rebar found fnr the southcnsl ct\mcr oft he 0.30 of one acre tract, t11c l\Oi1he-llst con1cr (Jf the- 26.00 I acre !ract, ;:md being the common norllJcrly comer of' Lots !33 and 134, Riviera Sp1>fngs Subdivision, a subdivision of record in C.abinet B, Slides !67-169

THENCE South 20"18'04'' East (rec(JJ'd- SOtHll 20"52'50" East), along the east Jine of1lm 26JJOJ ~e-re l.wc1 and the we.s( line of $aid Riviem Springs SuhdJviskm, n dlstJHlCe of97S.14 feel (record - 975.92 feet) t{} a 1/2 inch iron l'ebnl' found lor the southeast comer of the 2\.i.OO f acre tract, the !KHiheilsl comer of said 1.08 I ncrc tract, and being in the West lint:- tif l

{W0593672.9) 16 Pagc3 of <1

THENCE South 22"{)3'51" East (r<:cord - So~tlh 17"56'29" Bast}, along the e.asl line of the LOin acre tl'aci l:lnd (fu~ wt.:;t line t•f Riviera Springs Subdivision, a dislnnce of 70.32 feet (record - 70.00 teet) ion l f2 inch iron rebnr found fbr lht: S(lU!heast comer of 1.08 l ac1·e tract, the I)(Jl'!het come!' of sal(J Hl.349 Mre lr

THJ:!NCB S9ni1J 20°40'1 9" E~st (record- Soutlt2W'52'5()" East), ll!Ong the cast line ofthe I0.349 acre tract und the west line of Rivien! Springs Subdivision, a distanc.e of 594.36 iL"E:Ilo Po J/2 in~;h iron retmr f-ound lor fl!1d angle poim in the e.ust line \)f the l 0.3•19 aero tract, nnd being the common southel'ly comer of J..,ots ll3 and ll4, Riviera Springs Subdivision, nnd .fllso being the bclng Hm common northerly comer of Lois 175 ~md J76, Rivicm Springs Subdivision No.2, a subdivision of re~OI'ct ln Cnhliwt B. Slide 2 f 0 of ihe Plat Records of Willlpmson Counly, Tcxns;

THENCE South 21"'12'07" East (record- Smllh 20"52'50" Eas0, along the east line of the i0.349 acre ~l'~c( ~JHI the west line of said Riviera Springs Subdivision No. 2, a dis!anco of 531.34 fed to a !12 inch iron rebar found for tl1e llOllthefiSl oft he JD.3ri9 nero tract, the northeast corner ofl..Qr i, Bkn-:k 13, Lllkdim~ Commons Subdivision, 3 subdivision of record in Cabincr BB, Slides i l2~1l4 of the: Plat Records of Williamson Cmmly, Texas and Doc. No. 200:5 Hl f 156 ofthe Offici~! Public Rcct)rf Lot !81, Riviera Springs Subdivision No. 2, fmm which " 11?. im~h iron wbar found for an angle polm in the east line of snid Col J, Bh>et: B, Lniclinc Commons Subdivision Md belng the soulhwcs! comer of Lot 184, Riviera Springs Subdivlslon No.2, bears South 21 "00'2.:2" East a distance <)f 3!7,(i9 fee\ (Nl.:Ord - South 20"59'04" Eas.f a dislance of31 7.66 feet);

THENCE SNlth 69"00'31" W<::st (r<,c-ord - South 69,61'09" West), alon,g the south lim\ of the 10349 acre tract ;.mrl the nm1l1llne oft.o1 l.. Blocl\ B, Lakc!int\ Commons Subdivision, a f curv;1ture ln the west line of Lot 1, Block B, L~keline CommOilS Subdivision and the n

THBNCIJ along the west line of the l 0_349 ncr;;. !met t~nd the !lO!'lh~

I. North 38"41'53" \Vest a distnnc~ 1)f 702,26 l~t! {record ~ North 3il"'3il 1 5~Y' West a distance of700.68li..•d) to a l/2 inch iron rchar fuund nx a point ofcnrvaiurc;

2. Along a tangential curve ii' Jhe leH, h~wing a radius of 1045.00 feet (rewrd- !045.00 feet), an are length of9.'l1 f<:ct. a delta angle of00"30'!7", 1:md hilving a chord which bnars North 38"':>7'02" \Vest a distnncc of 9.21 feet to a calculated point at the inter.;;ectiM of s<1id 2KJni11g pilrcc! iinll adopted by !he City of Cedar Pl.1r-k (:ity Council in Ordinanc-e Z07·04- 01-22-12.C of the City of Ce{lar Park Code of Ordinances with the west Hue of !hi> lOJ49 :~err; tr

{W0593672.9} 17 Pagc4 of4

1rac!, b.;flrs along n l<~ngcn!iul cun•c to the left, having a mdiu;; of 1045.00 feet (r.::conl - 1045.00 feet), an arc length of364.55 feet, H Norlh 49°!! '49" West a distance of362.?l fee(;

THENCE North 48"'46'49" East, crossing through the l 0.349 acre tract and along the zoning parcel line mloptcd by tl1c City of Cedar Park City Goundl in OrdinmW<: ZQ7-0+0l-22-l2.C of the City of Cedar Park Code of Ordinance~, n di:;t

THENCE North l9"05'43n \Ve,o;t, continuing through the 10.349 :wr-c tra~:l, crossing through the 1.\)Sl

THENCE continuing thr,)ug,h the 26.001 <'ICP.: !rae! along the z.oning pared line adopted hy the City u! Cedar Park City Council in Ordinance Z07-04-0 l-22-I:U:: of the City of Cedar Park CDdc of Ordinances the following four (4) CO\lTSes;

!. Soulh 83" 17'52" West a distance of rn.% fee( tCHll/2 inch iron rebarsd with plastic cap \Vhich rends .,BASELiNE 1NC";

2, Notih 206 11 130" We)it .t~4ismnceof2l6.73 feet to <1112 inch iroJJ rcbar set with plastic cnJ> whk:h r.,:'lldS "BASELINE INC";

3. South 67"3.5'44" Wes! fl distance of 677.69 feel to a 112 inch iron reba!' set with plastic Cl:lj/ w·hich reads '~BASEUN6 INC.";

4. S<)Uih S4'-'l0'3B" \Vt.1st:; dist~tnC{! of96.20 feet to the POINT OF DEGlNNlNG.

This parcel contains 29.1 R4 ncres ofJattd, more or l::ss, out ofihe Rachel Saul Survey, Abstract No. 551 :md !ht~ Richard Duty Survey, Ahstract No. 183, both in \Vlll1<~mson Ct;1mty, Tt;XHs,

Bearing Basis: Texas State Planf!. Coordlmw.~ S)'s!cm, Ccniml Zone, NAD 83/93 HARN.

/ ~· J-(} friLl ~ ~ ~-:!.4tf11Z11<.. J. SCOTT LAS\VELL REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL LAND SURVEYOR STATE OF TEXAS NO. 5583

{W0593672.9} 18 EXHIDIT "B'; FINAL PLAT

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{W0593672.9} 21 EXHIBIT "C'> OLD MILL ROAD EXTENSION

OLD MILL ROAD EXTENSION

REl!IDWJW. COWi:CTOfl I 1--------------~-----~~·--------------------4

{W0593672.9} 22 DEPICTION OF SALES TRAILER PARKING LOCATION

TEMPORARY SAU:S TRAIU:R EXHIBIT

I !.Al

I SCAl.t: 1"'::::.50' Y!W1U;:VA£t'tnrr

{W0593672.9} 23 APPENDIXB City of Cedar Park Code of Ordinances Current through Part 1 of Supplement No. 25

This Code of Ordinances contains all ordinances deemed appropriate to be included as enacted through Ordinance C046-14-05-08-C1 adopted 5/8/14.

CHAPTER 16 TRANSPORTATION REGULATIONS

ARTICLE 16.02 RIGHT-OF-WAY

ARTICLE 16.02 RIGHT-OF-WAY

Sec. 16.02.005 Dedication of right-of-way

(a) If the director of planning determines that all or a portion of the right-of-way is needed to accommodate additional traffic expected to be generated by the proposed development, right-of- way shall be dedicated in accordance with the following standards:

(1) For a roadway subject to reserved right-of-way under which is internal to a proposed subdivision or development project, a total right-of-way width of up to one hundred fifty (150) feet shall be dedicated.

(2) For an existing or proposed roadway subject to reserved right-of-way which abuts a proposed subdivision or development project, up to fifty percent (50%) of the total right-of-way requirement (measured from the centerline established according to this section) shall be dedicated. Ifthe total right-of-way width specified in the roadway plan equals or exceeds one hundred-fifty (150) feet, no more than seventy-five (75) feet of reserved right-of-way width is required to be dedicated.

(b) Additional dedication of right-of-way may be required for streets not subject to reserved right-of-way where the streets do not meet the standards set forth in the Transportation Criteria Manual or are necessary to accommodate traffic generated by the proposed development.

(c) With the approval of the director of planning, dedication required at one stage of the development process may be deferred until a later stage, including but not limited to building permit, provided that all dedication requirements are completed prior to the release of the subsequent application. (d) In addition to the dedication of right-of-way, the city may require the construction of a roadway improvement or may assess a fee instead of requiring construction of a roadway improvement to offset the traffic effects generated by a proposed development.

(Ordinance C003-06-0 1-26-3C, sec. 2, adopted 1126/06)