Order filed September 11, 2025. 2025 IL App (5th) 240623 Motion to publish granted October 10, 2025. NO. 5-24-0623
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
STEVEN BECKHAM, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Madison County. ) v. ) No. 19-L-381 ) DONALD PETERMANN, ) Honorable ) Christopher P. Threlkeld, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding ______________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE McHANEY delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Barberis and Vaughan concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 This case involves a motor vehicle accident which occurred because Donald Petermann
(Petermann) did not properly secure furniture on a trailer being pulled by his vehicle. The furniture
items fell into the path of a van being driven by Steven Beckham (Beckham). When Beckham
slowed down to avoid hitting the furniture, he was rear-ended by a semi-trailer truck (hereafter
“semi”). The trial court granted Beckham’s summary judgment motion on the issue of liability.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Petermann. From the denial of his posttrial motion, Beckham
timely appealed. On appeal, Beckham claims that he was prejudiced by the improper introduction
of extraneous information during voir dire and that the jury was improperly instructed. He also
claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
(judgment n.o.v.) or alternative motion for a new trial. For the following reasons, we affirm.
1 ¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 The motor vehicle accident occurred on February 3, 2018, on Interstate 270 in Madison
County. Furniture items became dislodged from a trailer being pulled by Petermann’s vehicle and
spilled onto the highway. When Beckham slowed down to avoid hitting those items, he was rear-
ended by a semi. Petermann did not see this impact and denied that it occurred.
¶4 Before trial, Beckham filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability.
On February 6, 2024, the trial court entered a written order ruling on various motions in limine and
objections to portions of the evidence deposition of plaintiff’s medical expert. Included in this
order, was the following sentence: “Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to
liability.” At the jury trial, before voir dire, the court and counsel discussed the proper wording of
the statement of the case to be read to the venire. Petermann argued that the court’s prior summary
judgment ruling on liability did not automatically make him liable for damages. He contended that
the jury should have the option to find that Beckham’s claimed injuries/damages were not
proximately caused by his negligence. Beckham responded that the court should now grant
summary judgment on the issue of “causation of injuries,” and the jury should only be instructed
to consider the amount of damages to be awarded. The trial court clarified its previous ruling on
liability as follows:
“So what I did at our final pretrial was I ruled that the accident was caused by
[Petermann], that the chain reaction of the load spilling onto the road caused the accident.
I have not gotten into the issue of damages on that, so the issue of damages is still for
determination by the jury.
So what we are going to do is defendant—it’s found that [Petermann] is liable and
negligent for causing the accident and that the jury will be required to decide the nature
2 and extent of the damage. [Petermann] disputes the nature and extent of the damages
caused by the accident.”
The statement of the case that was read to the venire included the following: “[Petermann] denies
the nature, extent, and duration of injuries claimed by [Beckham]. As the party bringing the
lawsuit, [Beckham] has the burden of proof.”
¶5 Before voir dire began, Beckham’s attorney asked the trial court to excuse prospective
juror number 15 (hereafter “juror 15”) because she knew Beckham, and he therefore presumed
that Petermann would want juror 15 removed for cause, because she would likely favor Beckham.
Beckham’s attorney failed to tell the court that juror 15 was the sister of Beckham’s ex-wife,
against whom Beckham had recently prevailed in a “very horrible custody battle.” The trial court
denied the request to excuse juror 15 at that time.
¶6 During voir dire, the trial court asked if any prospective jurors knew the parties and/or their
attorneys. The following colloquy occurred in the presence of the venire:
“THE COURT: Anybody else know the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s counsel? So
[juror 15], what is your relationship to the plaintiff—you know him. Do you see him often?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR 15: I don’t see him often, no, but my opinion of him is
not that great, so it’s probably not best if I am on the jury.
THE COURT: So would you say for that reason you’re predisposed to disbelieve
what [he] has to say?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR 15: Probably. I don’t want to be like that, but I mean, I
can’t—just from what I know from myself, I don’t—I can’t trust what he says.”
Sometime later, prospective juror number 14 (hereafter “juror 14”) asked to speak with the judge
in private. Outside the presence of the venire, juror 14 told the court that he might be influenced
3 by what juror 15 said. In response to further inquiry by the court, juror 14 stated that if he was
chosen, he would follow the court’s instructions. Ultimately, the trial court struck both juror 14
and juror 15 for cause.
¶7 Beckham’s attorney made a motion to dismiss the entire “array” 1 because of the statements
of juror 15, asserting: “[S]ince she’s said that I wouldn’t believe anything [Beckham] says, since
she’s already commented to the whole array as to his credibility, I think the whole array has been
poisoned.” Petermann objected to the request, arguing that juror 15’s statements were her personal
opinions. The trial court denied Beckham’s request.
¶8 During opening statement, Petermann’s attorney informed the jury that though the trial
court ruled that Petermann’s negligence caused the impact between his van and the semi, Beckham
had the burden to prove that the accident caused him injuries. Petermann testified at trial that he
did not see the impact between Beckham’s van and the semi. He observed Beckham and his
passenger walking around the scene of the accident, and Beckham did not appear to be injured.
¶9 Petermann testified that Beckham said he was not hurt, and Beckham’s passenger smirked
and motioned to his back. Then, both Beckham and his passenger complained that their backs hurt,
which Petermann testified seemed “fake.” Petermann testified that he thought their behavior was
suspicious and did not believe either individual was injured. The following colloquy occurred:
“Q. Do you think that they were pretending to be hurt, or were they walking in
already hurt? Which is it? Tell the jury.
A. When they got out of the van, I heard giggling, and they come to the back
of the van and stood in front of me. And I asked them if they were both all right, and
1 Counsel used interchangeably the words “array” and “panel.” We deduce he meant the entire venire. 4 they said yes. And then the passenger motioned oh, my back, and then right away the
driver said the same thing.
Q. So your position is there’s nothing wrong with these gentlemen?
A. They seemed—they said that they were fine, so yeah.”
¶ 10 Beckham next called Dr. Thomas Lee, his medical expert, who testified that he was an
orthopedist but could no longer perform surgeries. Dr. Lee stated that Beckham continued to work
in a heavy physical labor job, and that he did so without difficulty, so he never provided Beckham
with a work restriction. However, he speculated that one day Beckham could need neck and lower
back surgeries. Before any surgery, Dr. Lee explained that an injured individual should attempt
more conservative treatments, including medications and physical therapy. However, he never
prescribed medication or physical therapy for Beckham. Beckham denied any neck pain at his first
appointment and did not report neck pain on the date of his last treatment with Dr. Lee. Dr. Lee
acknowledged that he last saw Beckham in 2019 and did not know what his current medical
condition was. He stated that each condition that was visible on Beckham’s MRI test was a
condition that could be caused by natural aging. Dr. Lee also opined that the disc protrusion in
Beckham’s neck and the herniations in his lower back were caused by the rear-end collision in
February of 2018. Dr. Lee further opined that Beckham would require future surgical treatment.
¶ 11 Beckham testified and began by explaining that he was involved in a custody battle with
the mother of his children and that juror 15 was related to the children’s mother. He then turned to
the accident, testifying that the truck that struck him was traveling 70 miles per hour, and at the
time, he was traveling only 20 miles per hour. He stated that the damage to his van was substantial
and described the van as “crushed up like a soda can.”
5 ¶ 12 On cross-examination, Beckham testified that since the accident he continued to work as a
floor installer. He agreed that the work was hard on his body, and that it was common for him to
have pulled muscles and soreness because of the physical demands of the job. After testifying that
pulled muscles and soreness were commonplace, Beckham was impeached both with his
deposition testimony, and from Dr. Lee’s notes, where Beckham denied ever experiencing muscle
soreness due to his job. Beckham admitted that he did not immediately seek medical care following
the accident, but he later had back pain and went to an emergency room. He refused pain
medication because he was concerned about addiction due to a family history but was then
impeached with his own medical records which documented his use of pain medication. Beckham
testified that his right knee was also injured in the accident and was treated by Dr. Lee. He admitted
that Dr. Lee’s medical records contained no reference to a knee injury complaint and documented
a normal physical examination. Beckham confirmed that he did not follow the emergency room
discharge instructions to follow up with his primary care physician and instead went to a
chiropractor. Although he received chiropractic treatment and was discharged from further care,
Beckham testified that he continued to have “extreme” and “excruciating” pain. He was impeached
with chiropractic records revealing that he was asymptomatic at discharge.
¶ 13 Before Beckham began treatment with Dr. Lee, he testified that he had ongoing neck pain.
He was impeached with medical records from a July 2018 visit to St. Anthony’s Health Center in
Alton, documenting that he did not complain of neck pain and had a normal physical examination.
Beckham complained of knee pain to Dr. Lee which he related to the accident as “[b]oth my knees
did strike a blow to the dash.” He then identified medical records from treatment he received in
February 2018, three days after the accident, when he was seen by an orthopedist named Dr. Pate.
At that time, Beckham only complained of left knee pain and was also given a neck examination,
6 which was normal. He confirmed that when he began treatment with Dr. Lee later in 2018, he only
complained of severe neck pain. However, the “pain diagram” Beckham filled out at Dr. Lee’s
office listed no neck, shoulder, elbow, or knee pain.
¶ 14 On June 3, 2019, Beckham had an appointment at St. Anthony’s Health Center for a mass
on his right leg. When providing his medical history, Beckham made no other medical complaints,
and the examination of his neck on that date was normal. On August 12, 2019, Beckham returned
to St. Anthony’s Health Center complaining of a broken foot due to a fall. He made no other
medical complaints, and his musculoskeletal examination was normal. On August 15, 2019,
Beckham was seen at St. Louis University Hospital for the same broken foot. The injury report
stated that he had been racing bikes when the injury occurred. During cross-examination, Beckham
denied that his injury involved racing and testified that a heavy object fell on his foot. The health
history for this appointment did not reference any of the injuries Beckham attributed to the semi
collision. On August 29, 2019, Beckham returned to the orthopedic clinic at St. Louis University
Hospital, where he reported that he had no other orthopedic complaints, and his physical
examination was normal.
¶ 15 Beckham next testified about his lost income claim, and said that, due to his injuries, he
had to hire additional workers for his flooring business. He could not produce any payroll
documents to substantiate any income loss because these additional employees were paid in cash.
¶ 16 At the close of evidence, Petermann’s request for a directed verdict was denied. After
hearing closing arguments and receiving the court’s instructions, the jury returned Verdict Form
C, finding in favor of Petermann.
¶ 17 Beckham filed a postjudgment motion arguing that the jury pool was tainted; that although
the trial court determined that Petermann was liable for the accident, the jury must have
7 reconsidered liability in reaching its determination not to award him damages; and that the trial
court should have used a different verdict form. The trial court denied the postjudgment motion,
and Beckham timely appealed.
¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 19 A. Jury Instructions and Verdict Form
¶ 20 Beckham argues on appeal that the trial court’s pretrial summary judgment ruling on
liability against Petermann precluded the jury from finding that Beckham sustained no injuries
resulting from the accident. He contends that because liability was directed in his favor, the jury
should not have been allowed to decide whether the accident was the proximate cause of any of
his injuries. In essence, Beckham argues that the jury was required to award monetary damages.
We disagree.
¶ 21 “To prevail in a negligence action, a plaintiff’s complaint must set forth facts establishing
the existence of (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, and
(3) an injury proximately caused by that breach.” Coole v. Central Area Recycling, 384 Ill. App.
3d 390, 396 (2008) (quoting Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 430 (2006)).
“[W]hether the breach [of the duty of due care owed by the defendant] was the proximate cause of
the plaintiff’s injuries [is a] factual matter[ ] for the jury to decide.” Marshall, 222 Ill. 2d at 430
(citing Espinoza v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 165 Ill. 2d 107, 114 (1995)); see also Peach v.
McGovern, 2019 IL 123156, ¶ 53 (“The issue of whether an automobile accident has proximately
caused any injury is uniquely a question of fact for the jury to decide.” (citing Redmond v. Socha,
216 Ill. 2d 622, 644-45 (2005))).
¶ 22 The trial court’s clarification of its summary judgment liability ruling against Petermann
established that the court’s ruling was limited to the fact that Petermann breached a duty he owed
8 to Beckham. The trial court’s ruling did not include a finding that Petermann’s breach of that duty
was a proximate cause of any claimed injury to Beckham. Though the trial court ruled that
Petermann’s negligence caused the rear-end collision to Beckham’s van, it was left to the jury to
determine first, whether the rear-end collision resulted in any damages and second, the value of
any such damages. Even if “a defendant’s liability is established, a plaintiff must prove actual
damages before he can recover.” Cancio v. White, 297 Ill. App. 3d 422, 427 (1998) (the mere fact
that the accident occurred as a result of defendant’s negligence does not, in any way, establish that
plaintiff sustained physical injuries (citing Jeffrey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 37 Ill. App. 2d
327, 336 (1962))).
¶ 23 The issue of whether the rear-end collision was the proximate cause of Beckham’s claimed
injuries was repeatedly argued throughout the trial. We find it significant that during one of the
numerous arguments concerning this issue, Beckham’s attorney stated that the jury could disregard
the testimony of Beckham’s doctor and could “choose to determine that because of his work and
because of the way he is, that he walk[ed] into Dr. Lee’s office not damaged *** [and] they can
enter a zero verdict.” We find that there is ample evidence in the record to support the conclusion
that this is exactly what the jury chose to determine.
¶ 24 B. Jury Instructions
¶ 25 Beckham next argues that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury. Specifically, he
contends that the instructions should not have included the word “negligence” but instead should
have included the word “liable.” He also contends that because of the trial court’s summary
judgment ruling on the issue of liability, the jury should not have been instructed that it needed to
decide if the “negligence of the defendant proximately caused the injury.” Finally, Beckham argues
9 that the trial court erred in giving Verdict Form C, instead of Verdict Form A, which would have
given the jury the option to enter a zero for each damage element.
¶ 26 Jury instructions are important implements to communicate the accurate principles of law
to a jury based on the evidence presented. People v. Nash, 2012 IL App (1st) 093233, ¶ 26. The
instructions assist the jury in reaching a conclusion based on the law and evidence. Id. To prevail
on a claim that the jury instructions provided were erroneous, the reviewing court must determine
whether, when “taken as a whole, the instructions fairly, fully, and comprehensively apprised the
jury of the relevant legal principles.” Schultz v. Northeast Illinois Regulation Commuter R.R.
Corp., 201 Ill. 2d 260, 273-74 (2002). Additionally, “[a] reviewing court ordinarily will not reverse
a trial court for giving faulty instructions unless they clearly misled the jury and resulted in
prejudice to the appellant.” Id. at 274.
¶ 27 Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil, No. 1.02 allows the trial court to instruct the jury
that the court previously found that the defendant was either negligent, liable, or “other finding.”
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 1.02 (1995) (hereafter IPI Civil 1.02). Beckham asked
the trial court to instruct the jury: “The Court has found the defendant Donald Petermann was
liable, so that is not an issue you will need to decide.” Petermann argued that one of the alternate
words should be used. Ultimately, the jury was instructed that: “The Court has found the defendant
Donald Petermann was negligent, so that is not an issue you will need to decide.”
¶ 28 The notes on use of IPI Civil 1.02 state:
“This instruction should be used when *** summary judgment on an issue has been
granted in favor of plaintiff. In the first sentence, the term ‘liable’ should be used only
when the court has found as a matter of law that all of the elements of the cause of action
10 have been proved and the only issue remaining is damages.” IPI Civil 1.02 (1995), Notes
on Use, at 14-15.
As stated supra, the trial court ruled that Petermann’s negligence caused the accident. However,
the trial court did not rule that Beckham suffered injuries as a result of that accident. Therefore, it
remained Beckham’s burden to prove “all of the elements of the cause of action.” Id. Accordingly,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in using the word “negligence” instead of the word
“liable” in IPI Civil. 1.02.
¶ 29 Beckham next argues that the trial court erred when it gave Petermann’s tendered Illinois
Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 20.01 (1995) (hereafter IPI Civil 20.01). Beckham did not
tender an alternate version.
¶ 30 A party is entitled to have the jury instructed in a way that presents the issues, the applicable
principles of law, and his theory of the case. Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill. 2d 483, 505
(2002). The trial court has the discretion to determine which instructions should be provided.
Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co., 231 Ill. 2d 516, 549 (2008). On appeal, we must determine if the
instructions fairly and comprehensively informed the jury of the applicable law and issues to be
decided. Schultz, 201 Ill. 2d at 273-74. An instructional error warrants a new trial only if the error
results in “serious prejudice to a party’s right to a fair trial.” Heastie v. Roberts, 226 Ill. 2d 515,
543 (2007).
¶ 31 To preserve a claim of instructional error, the party opposing the instruction must both
(1) object when the instruction is offered and (2) submit an alternate version of the instruction.
Baumrucker v. Express Cab Dispatch, Inc., 2017 IL App (1st) 161278, ¶ 63.
¶ 32 Here, Beckham’s attorney objected to Petermann’s submitted “issues instruction,” stating:
“I don’t want the issues instruction to be given at all because the Court found the defendant liable.
11 I’m objecting to Defendant’s Number 8, for the record.” The trial court recognized Beckham’s
concern with the instruction but stated that it would be given over his objection. Petermann’s
tendered IPI Civil No. 20.01 stated: “The plaintiff claims that the negligence of the defendant was
the proximate cause of plaintiff’s alleged injuries. The defendant denies that his negligence
proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries, and denies the nature, extent and duration of plaintiff’s
alleged injuries.”
¶ 33 We note that although Beckham objected to this instruction, he opted not to present an
alternative issues instruction. Accordingly, he waived the right to present this issue on appeal.
Baumrucker, 2017 IL App (1st) 161278, ¶ 63. However, even if Beckham had presented the
required alternative instruction, we find that his claim is meritless. The introduction to section
20.00 of the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil—which includes IPI Civil No. 20.01—
recommends providing juries with applicable issues instructions. The introduction states:
“An issue instruction tells the jury what points are in controversy between the
parties and thereby simplifies their task of applying the law to the facts—a task made more
difficult in many instances after jurors have participated in several types of cases.
The committee recommends that such an instruction be given; if tendered, the court
has the duty to give it.” Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, 20.00, Intro. 1 (1995) (citing
Goertz v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co., 19 Ill. App. 2d 261, 270 (1958)).
Consistent with our analysis, supra, we conclude that the issues in this case were clearly
summarized in this instruction and that the jury was fairly and comprehensively informed of the
applicable law. Schultz, 201 Ill. 2d at 273-74.
¶ 34 Finally, Beckham claims that the trial court should have given Verdict Form A instead of
Verdict Form C. We disagree. The focus of Beckham’s argument is that the title of Illinois Pattern
12 Jury Instructions (Civil) Verdict Form C, is “Contributory Negligence More Than 50%.” He argues
that this verdict form was improper because the trial court previously entered judgment as to
causation, and thus, contributory negligence was inapplicable. Secondly, he contends that this
verdict form can only be used in a case where contributory negligence is over 50%. The Illinois
Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, provides instructions for use of verdict forms in negligence cases
in Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil) B45.01 (1995). The instructions for Verdict Form C
provide: “If you find for defendant’s name and against plaintiff’s name, or if you find that
plaintiff’s contributory negligence was more than 50% of the total proximate cause of the injury
or damage for which recovery is sought, then you should use Verdict Form C.” (Emphasis added.)
Id. Verdict Form C is appropriate for cases where the plaintiff’s contributory negligence is more
than 50%. It is also the correct verdict form “[i]f you find for defendant’s name and against
plaintiff’s name ***.” See Orzel v. Szewczyk, 391 Ill. App. 3d 283, 289-90 (2009) (finding that the
trial court committed no error in using Verdict Form C after striking a contributory negligence
affirmative defense). Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving
Verdict Form C. Id. at 289 (citing La Salle Bank, N.A. v. C/HCA Development Corp., 384 Ill. App.
3d 806, 813 (2008)).
¶ 35 C. New Trial Because Prospective Juror Expressed Negative Opinion of Beckham
¶ 36 Beckham next argues that because the trial court questioned juror 15 and extracted
“prejudicial information” about her relationship with Beckham in the presence of the venire, the
trial court should have granted Beckham’s subsequent request to declare a mistrial and “dismiss
the entire panel.” Beckham’s attorney did not use the word “mistrial.” However, his request to
“strike the panel and start over” can be construed as such.
13 ¶ 37 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 234 provides the general structure of a court’s and the parties’
voir dire examination of prospective jurors:
“The court shall conduct the voir dire examination of prospective jurors by putting
to them questions it thinks appropriate touching upon their qualifications to serve as jurors
in the case on trial. The court may permit the parties to submit additional questions to it for
further inquiry if it thinks they are appropriate, and shall permit the parties to supplement
the examination by such direct inquiry as the court deems proper for a reasonable period
of time depending upon the length of examination by the court, the complexity of the case,
and the nature and extent of the damages.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 234 (eff. May 1, 1997).
“[T]he purpose of voir dire is to assure the selection of an impartial panel of jurors free from
prejudice or bias and provide counsel an intelligent basis on which to exercise any challenges.”
People v. Walls, 2022 IL App (1st) 200167, ¶ 36 (citing People v. Metcalfe, 202 Ill. 2d 544, 552
(2002); see also Limer v. Casassa, 273 Ill. App. 3d 300, 302 (1995)). The trial court maintains the
discretion to determine the scope and extent of examination by the parties’ attorneys. Limer, 273
Ill. App. 3d at 302. “The scope and extent of the examination of prospective jurors rest in the
discretion of the trial court, and an abuse of that discretion will be found only if a review of the
record discloses that the trial judge’s conduct thwarted the selection of an impartial jury.” Id. On
appeal, we will review the questions and procedures used by the trial court to determine if there is
a reasonable certainty that any bias or prejudice would have been discovered. Id.
¶ 38 We note that, for some inexplicable reason, Beckham’s attorneys failed to inform the trial
court about the nature of their client’s relationship with juror 15, whose sister was Beckham’s ex-
wife and a party to a contentious child custody case in which Beckham had prevailed. This
omission by his attorneys created the very issue about which Beckham now complains. Equally
14 inexplicable is why counsel simply did not ask the trial court to question juror 15 in chambers or
at a sidebar, so that if she did blurt out something prejudicial, it would not have been heard by
another prospective juror.
¶ 39 Beckham argues that the responses juror 15 made to the trial court’s voir dire questions
amounted to extraneous information, which poisoned the entire venire. As extraneous information
is presumptively prejudicial, the party need only show “that the information relates directly to
something at issue in the case and that it may have influenced the verdict.” People v. Collins, 351
Ill. App. 3d 175, 179 (2004) (citing People v. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274, 341 (1992); Birch v.
Township of Drummer, 139 Ill. App. 3d 397, 409 (1985)). Accordingly, because the actual effect
of the conduct on the minds of the jurors cannot be proved, the standard to be applied is whether
the information involved “ ‘ “such a probability that prejudice will result that it is [to be] deemed
inherently lacking in due process.” ’ ” People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 458 (1998) (quoting
People v. Holmes, 69 Ill. 2d 507, 514 (1978), quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1965)).
However, “[t]he safeguards of juror impartiality, such as voir dire and protective instructions from
the trial judge, are not infallible; it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or
influence that might theoretically affect their vote.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982).
¶ 40 Beckham argues that this case is similar to Thornton v. Garcini, 364 Ill. App. 3d 612
(2006). Thornton was a medical malpractice case involving the death of a premature infant. After
the jury was selected, members of the seated jury received and reviewed newspaper articles about
premature births, the development of the child, and the likelihood of survival at 23 weeks of
gestation. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial because the defendant
physician could not establish that the jurors were not prejudiced or improperly influenced by the
articles. Id. at 618. We first note that Thornton is inapposite. Here, no jurors had been selected
15 when juror 15 made her statements. Juror 15 simply stated her personal opinion. We find that her
personal opinion does not reach the level of improper “extraneous information.” As noted by the
United States Supreme Court: “it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or
influence that might theoretically affect their vote.” Smith, 455 U.S. at 217. We conclude that juror
15’s personal opinion regarding Beckham’s trustworthiness was not presumptively prejudicial.
¶ 41 We note that Beckham complains that he did not have the opportunity to refute juror 15’s
stated bias: “Plaintiff could not refute the attack on his credibility from Juror 15. He could not call
Juror 15 in his case to explore these opinions and basis thereof.” However, juror 15 made her
statements at the beginning of voir dire before Beckham’s attorneys began questioning prospective
jurors. Thus, counsel had an opportunity to ascertain whether any other juror would be influenced
by juror 15’s statements. Beckham’s attorneys chose not to do so.
¶ 42 D. Judgment n.o.v. and Motion for New Trial
¶ 43 Beckham’s final argument is that he was entitled to either a judgment n.o.v. or a new trial.
“Judgment notwithstanding the verdict should not be entered unless the evidence, when viewed in
the light most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary
verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.” Holton v. Memorial Hospital, 176 Ill. 2d 95, 109
(1997); Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510 (1967). “Judgment
notwithstanding the verdict is not appropriate if ‘reasonable minds might differ as to inferences or
conclusions to be drawn from the facts presented.’ ” McClure v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp.,
188 Ill. 2d 102, 131-32 (1999) (quoting Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineering, 166 Ill. 2d 337,
351 (1995)). Stated another way, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict should not be entered if
“there is any evidence, together with reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, demonstrating
a substantial factual dispute, or where the assessment of credibility of the witnesses or the
16 determination regarding conflicting evidence is decisive to the outcome.” Maple v. Gustafson, 151
Ill. 2d 445, 454 (1992). As the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
“A trial court cannot reweigh the evidence and set aside a verdict merely because the jury
could have drawn different inferences or conclusions, or because the court feels that other
results are more reasonable. [Citations.] Likewise, the appellate court should not usurp the
function of the jury and substitute its judgment on questions of fact fairly submitted, tried,
and determined from the evidence which did not greatly preponderate either way.
[Citations.]” Id. at 452-53.
On appeal, we review a decision on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on a de novo
basis. Thornton v. Garcini, 237 Ill. 2d 100, 107 (2010) (citing McClure, 188 Ill. 2d at 132).
¶ 44 In contrast to a judgment n.o.v., a trial court may order a new trial, if, after weighing the
evidence, the court determines that the verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 454 (citing Mizowek v. De Franco, 64 Ill. 2d 303, 310 (1976)). “ ‘A verdict
is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or
where the findings of the jury are unreasonable, arbitrary and not based upon any of the
evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Villa v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 202 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 1089 (1990)). On
appeal from a denial of a motion for a new trial, we will not reverse that decision unless we find
that the trial court abused its discretion. Id. at 455.
¶ 45 In Illinois, courts have determined that the amount of damages to be assessed is a question
of fact for the jury to determine. Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 36-37 (2003) (citing Lee v.
Chicago Transit Authority, 152 Ill. 2d 432, 470 (1992); Baird v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R.R. Co., 63 Ill. 2d 463, 472-73 (1976)). Upon review of a damages award, we must give the jury’s
decision great weight. Id. at 37. The individualized nature of personal injury cases “makes it
17 impossible to establish a precise formula to determine whether a particular award is excessive or
not.” Id. Moreover, a trial judge may not reweigh evidence if he or she would have arrived at a
different verdict. Id. (citing Drews v. Gobel Freight Lines, Inc., 144 Ill. 2d 84, 97 (1991)). “Indeed,
a court reviewing a jury’s assessment of damages should not interfere unless a proven element of
damages was ignored, the verdict resulted from passion or prejudice, or the award bears no
reasonable relationship to the loss suffered.” Id. (citing Gill v. Foster, 157 Ill. 2d 304, 315 (1993)).
When reviewing a question as to the sufficiency of damages, the court must consider the entire
record. Stanford v. City of Flora, 2018 IL App (5th) 160115, ¶ 27 (citing Hastings v. Gulledge,
272 Ill. App. 3d 861, 864 (1995)).
¶ 46 Here, the trial court clarified that the issue of damages was a matter for the jury to decide.
The jury heard Petermann’s testimony that Beckham and his passenger appeared uninjured until
the passenger pointed toward his back, after which they both claimed to have back pain. While
Petermann opted not to utilize an independent medical examiner or other medical expert to counter
the testimony of Dr. Lee, we find that the record is replete with evidence to support the jury’s
finding in favor of Petermann. Beckham testified that because of the rear-end collision, his vehicle
“was completely totaled. I mean, the whole, like I said, the windows were completely blown out.
It took the rear end up through the back floorboard in the inside and crushed it up like a soda can.”
The jury was provided with this photograph of Beckham’s damaged van:
18 A picture is wo1i h a thousand words. Clearly, Beckham's van was not "crnshed up like a soda
can. " From this picture, the jmy could reasonably infer that Beckham's testimony regarding his
claimed injuries was also greatly exaggerated, if not totally fabricated. Beckham was repeatedly
impeached regarding his claimed injuries and the absence of documents of the injuries in his
medical records. Additionally, multiple medical examinations documented "no1mal" results with
no limitations, which contradicted Beckham' s subj ective complaints. Fmi her, Beckham provided
no documentation to suppo1i his claim of lost wages/business income.
,i 47 After viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Beckham, we do not find that the
evidence so ove1w helmingly favored him that the zero damages verdict should be ove1i mned.
Holton, 176 Ill. 2d at 109; Pedrick, 37 Ill. 2d at 510. We conclude that the trial comi did not abuse
its discretion in denying Beckham's motion for judgment n.o.v. or alternate motion for a new trial.
We will not reweigh the evidence or set aside this jmy's verdict because the jmy could have
19 reached a different conclusion. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 452. We do not find that the jury’s verdict
was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. at 454 (citing Mizowek, 64 Ill. 2d at 310).
¶ 48 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 49 For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s ruling to deny Beckham’s motions for judgment
n.o.v. and alternate motion for new trial is affirmed.
¶ 50 Affirmed.
20 ______________________________________________________________________________
Beckham, Steven v. Petermann, Donald, 2025 IL App (5th) 240623 ______________________________________________________________________________
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison County, No. 19-L-381, Honorable Christopher P. Threlkeld, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Joshua R. Evans of Jerseyville and Edward W. Unsell of for East Alton for Steven Beckham Appellant: ______________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Adam S. Johnson, James T. Opel, of Edwardsville, for Donald for Petermann Appellee: ______________________________________________________________________________