Becker v. Williamson

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedApril 27, 2020
Docket3:16-cv-05315
StatusUnknown

This text of Becker v. Williamson (Becker v. Williamson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Becker v. Williamson, (W.D. Wash. 2020).

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 ASHER J. BECKER, CASE NO. 3:16-cv-05315-RBL-JRC 11 Plaintiff, ORDER FOR SUPPLEMENTAL 12 v. BRIEFING 13 KERRI MCTARSNEY, et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 This matter under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is before the undersigned on referral by the District 17 Court. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment (Dkts. 199, 211), and upon 18 review of their cross-motions and the remainder of the record, the undersigned has determined 19 that supplemental briefing is necessary before issuing a report and recommendation on this 20 matter. 21 DISCUSSION 22 After the Court granted defendants’ summary judgment motion and dismissed plaintiff’s 23 claims with prejudice, the Ninth Circuit reversed the matter in part and remanded for further 24 1 consideration. See Dkts. 170, 189. The remand was for further proceedings regarding plaintiff’s 2 claims against Joe Williamson for retaliation, for related retaliation claims against defendants 3 Kerri McTarsney and Dale Caldwell, and for plaintiff’s supplemental, state law claims. See Dkt. 4 189, at 4; see also Asher James Becker v. Brent Carney et al., No. 18-35373, at 1–2 (9th Cir.

5 May 29, 2019). The remand was based on additional evidence—another prisoner’s testimony— 6 that appeared to the Ninth Circuit to corroborate plaintiff’s claims against Williamson. Dkt. 189, 7 at 4. 8 The remand order was silent as to this Court’s ruling that Washington’s Dead Man’s 9 Statute would apply and would bar plaintiff’s testimony about transactions with and statements 10 made by now-deceased defendant Williamson. See Dkts. 162, at 13; 189. However the Court’s 11 judgment regarding the retaliation claims against Williamson was reversed, so that the Court’s 12 findings about the Dead Man’s Statute are no longer the law of the case. See United States v. 13 Houser, 804 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1986) (“when matters are decided by an appellate court, its 14 rulings, unless reversed by it or a superior court, bind the lower court.” (Emphasis added.)).

15 Even if the Court found that the Ninth Circuit’s silence regarding applicability of the Dead 16 Man’s Statute meant that this Court’s prior ruling was undisturbed (and hence law of the case), 17 the Court is not bound to follow its prior decisions if upon reconsideration, those decisions are 18 clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1489 19 (9th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (footnote and internal quotation omitted), overruled on other grounds 20 by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). 21 The undersigned has given this matter further consideration and at this time, intends to 22 recommend that the Washington Dead Man’s Statute (RCW 5.60.030) does not bar any 23 particular testimony in this proceeding relevant to plaintiff’s § 1983 retaliation claim against

24 1 Williamson. A state evidentiary rule such as the Dead Man’s Statute applies in federal court 2 only where state law supplies the rule of decision. See Fed. R. Evid. 601. Section 1983—not 3 state law—supplies the rule of decision relevant to this claim, so that Washington’s Dead Man’s 4 Statute appears to be irrelevant to the claim. Accord Longoria by Longira v. Wilson, 730 F.2d

5 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1984) (Texas Dead Man’s statute did not apply in § 1983 action); Savarese v. 6 Agrissi, 883 F.2d 1194, 1200 n.10 (3d Cir. 1989). 7 Defendant has moved for summary judgment dismissal of the remaining claims. See Dkt. 8 Defendants’ arguments are primarily directed toward the effect of the other prisoner’s testimony 9 and are premised on the assumption that the Court will again rule that the Dead Man’s Statute 10 bars plaintiff’s own statements related to the claim against Williamson. See Dkt. 199, at 7. 11 Therefore, the Court will offer the parties the opportunity to submit supplemental briefing 12 regarding defendants’ summary judgment arguments about the claims against Williamson for 13 retaliation. 14 DIRECTIONS TO PARTIES AND THE CLERK

15 The parties’ supplemental briefing shall comply with the following rules: 16 (1) The parties shall not address any matters other than whether the Court should grant 17 summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against Joe Williamson for retaliation. 18 (2) The parties may file one brief each, not to exceed six pages. Defendants’ brief is due 19 on or before May 12, 2020, and plaintiff’s brief is due on or before May 26, 2020. 20 The Court will not consider briefing that does not comply with these requirements, 21 including briefing that is not timely filed, exceeds the page limits, or addresses other issues. 22 23

24 1 The Clerk shall update the docket to reflect the supplemental briefing deadlines and to re- 2 note the pending summary judgment motions (Dkts. 199, 211) for consideration on May 26, 3 2020. 4 Dated this 27th day of April, 2020.

6 A 7 J. Richard Creatura 8 United States Magistrate Judge

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Related

Lindh v. Murphy
521 U.S. 320 (Supreme Court, 1997)
United States v. Michael Paul Houser
804 F.2d 565 (Ninth Circuit, 1986)
Patrick James Jeffries v. Tana Wood, Superintendent
114 F.3d 1484 (Ninth Circuit, 1997)
Savarese v. Agriss
883 F.2d 1194 (Third Circuit, 1989)

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Bluebook (online)
Becker v. Williamson, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/becker-v-williamson-wawd-2020.