Beck, Koller & Co. v. Bakelite Corp.

90 F.2d 349, 24 C.C.P.A. 1290, 1937 CCPA LEXIS 136
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals·Decided June 21, 1937·No. Nos. 3816, 3817, 3818, 3819, 3820, 3821, 3822, 3823, and 3824·Published·Cited by 4 cases

Opinion

BlaND, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Patent Appeal No. 3816 — Opposition No. 18,54.5

This is an appeal from the decision of the Commissioner of Patents sustaining the opposition of the Bakelite Corporation to the registration by Beck, Koller & Company, Inc., hereinafter usually referred to as applicant-appellant, in “Class 6, Chemicals, Medicines, and Pharmaceutical Preparations,” of the word “Beckacite” used as a trade-mark on a special type of synthetic resin suitable for use solely in the paint, varnish and lacquer industry. Applicant-appellant’s application for the registration of the trade-mark “Beckacite” calls for its use upon “Synthetic Besins.” A motion to amend was made so as to restrict the registration sought to “oil-soluble varnish and lacquer resins.”

The opposition of the Bakelite Corporation is based upon opposer’s trade-mark “BAKELITE,” No. 75,266, registered September 14,1909, for “condensation products of phenol and formaldehyde, in Class 6, Chemicals, medicines and pharmaceutical preparations.”

This case is the first of a group of nine appeals numbered 3816 to 3824, inclusive, which involve the same parties and, for the most part, the same issues. The record in appeal No. 3816 includes the testimony and exhibits applicable to all cases and also the answers of the applicant-appellant in all cases. The main briefs of the parties are filed in appeal No. 3816 and briefs in the other appeals are filed by the parties so as to explain the differences in the cases and discuss the issues there involved which are not discussed in appeal No. 3816.

There is very little dispute about the facts proven, and the main issue is one of law and involves a determination of whether or not the goods upon which the respective marks were used at certain times were of the same descriptive properties.

Applicant-appellant makes no claim, which is of concern here, to the use of the mark prior to 1924. Since that date, its mark “Becka-cite” has been used in the sale of synthetic phenolic resins which are sold in this country to the manufacturers of varnishes and lacquers. [1292] Applicant-appellant’s synthetic resin is dissolved in oil by the varnish and lacquer manufacturers to produce air-drying varnishes and lacquers, and is a substitute for the natural resins heretofore employed for that purpose.

The opposer-appellee prior to 1924 had manufactured a synthetic resin which was a new article of manufacture in which the opposer-appellee had a monopoly by virtue of certain patents. This resin possessed numerous valuable properties such as becoming solid at ordinary temperatures without lessening in volume. It had good insulating properties and long before 1924 went into general úse in the electrical trades and was molded into various articles of manufacture. It was soluble in oil to only a small extent and was not of the type of resin which is used by the varnish manufacturers in manufacturing the air-drying type of varnish. Artificial heat was normally employed to set and harden the varnish made from opposer’s resin. It was soluble in alcohol.

Later than 1924 and after the applicant-appellant had entered the field, opposer-appellee manufactured a synthetic resin which was soluble in air-drying oils. The exact date of opposer-appellee’s entry into this field is in dispute but since it was subsequent to 1924 we do not regard this matter as of importance. It is conceded that prior to 1924 opposer-appellee supplied consumer customers with spirit varnishes which had a rather limited use owing to the baking-requirement. The weight of the evidence is to the effect that it did not sell to varnish manufacturers a.phenolic resin for use in making paints and varnishes until after applicant-appellant had entered the field. This fact is in dispute. The tribunals below on this question found against the opposer-appellee. On this question opposer-appellee in this court disputes the contention of applicant-appellant that it was the first to market oil-soluble resins in this country and points out the testimony of some, witnesses (which the applicant-appellant claims were interested) to show that it did sell some such resin prior to 1924 and that samples of this resin were sent out to various customers for trial. Certain shipping papers were introduced to show that opposer-appellee’s activities in dealing with this character of resin were increasing gradually in 1925 and grew steadily from that time. The Examiner of Interferences found, which finding was evidently approved by the Commissioner of Patents, that prior to 1924 when the applicant-appellant entered the field, opposer was not selling or dealing in, except in an experimental way, oil-soluble phenolic resins for use in making varnishes and lacquers.

In this opposition, therefore, is presented for decision, first, the question of law as to whether or not at the time applicant-appellant [1293] adopted and first used its mark in tbis country (1924) it used it on goods of tfie same descriptive properties as those upon which op-poser-appellee was then using its mark. Upon this question it is the contention of applicant-appellant that varnishes generally, or varnishes made from non oil-drying resins or resins which were not soluble in oil, are not goods of the same descriptive properties as oil-soluble varnish and lacquer resins. Its argument is chiefly based upon the contention that its product was sold only to the manufacturers of air-drying varnishes and lacquers, and that the goods of the opposer prior to 1924 could not be sold to this class of customers and were for the most part manufactured into molded articles or sold in the form of spirit varnishes (dissolved in alcohol), and that since there was no likelihood of confusion, applicant-appellant should not be deprived of its right of registration and that it should not be held that the goods of the parties were of the same descriptive properties.

The question has been argued at great length as to whether or not after 1924 .the opposer had the right to use its “BAKELITE” trade-mark in entering the restricted field which the applicant-appellant had entered. This was one of the main questions ruled upon by the Examiner of Interferences and by the commissioner. On that subject and on the subject as to the likelihood of confusion the commissioner said:

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Beck, Koller & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 90 F.2d 349, 24 C.C.P.A. 1290, 1937 CCPA LEXIS 136 (ccpa 1937).

90 F.2d 349 (Beck, Koller & Co. v. Bakelite Corp.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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