Beck Distributing Corp. v. United States

67 Cust. Ct. 358, 1971 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2245
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedNovember 24, 1971
DocketC.D. 4298
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 67 Cust. Ct. 358 (Beck Distributing Corp. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Beck Distributing Corp. v. United States, 67 Cust. Ct. 358, 1971 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2245 (cusc 1971).

Opinion

Rao, Judge:

The entry covered by the protest herein includes merchandise described as automobile parts, motorcycle parts, electric storage batteries, automobile electric light bulbs, and helmets. Duty was assessed on many of these items under paragraph 369 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified by the Sixth Protocol of Supplementary Concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 91 Treas. Dec. 150, T.D. 54108, which covers, inter alia, automobiles, motorcycles, and parts thereof. The protest contests the liquidation and assessment of duties “at 10%% or 15% apparently under Par. 369 or at other rates on certain engine parts.” It is claimed that the merchandise is properly dutiable at 8% per centum ad valorem under paragraph 353 or paragraph 372 [of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified by the Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 86 Treas. Dec. 121, T.D. 52739].

Defendant has moved to dismiss the protest on the ground that there are over 25 different categories of automobile parts classified under paragraph 369 on this entry, including flasher lenses, taillight lenses, tank caps, brake linings, shock absorbers and footrests, and that there is no way of knowing which of these parts are intended to be covered by the words “engine parts.”

[360]*360It is well settled that a protest is sufficient if it distinctly and specifically sets out the reasons for the objection to the collector’s action so that the collector may know what is in the mind of the protestant and, if proper, can take such action as is necessary to make corrections. American Mail Line, Ltd. v. United States, 34 CCPA 1, C.A.D. 335 (1946); United States v. Sheldon & Co., 5 Ct. Cust. Appls. 427, T.D. 34946 (1914).

In U. Fujita & Co. et al. v. United States, 26 CCPA 63, T.D. 49611 (1938), the protest objected to the collector’s assessment of duty on utensils and hollow and flatware, claimed to be dutiable under various provisions of the tariff act. The protest did not state under which paragraphs of the tariff act the goods were assessed for duty. The invoice and entry covered a variety of articles, none of which were described as utensils of hollow or flatware.

The court stated that there was nothing in the protest itself which would direct the attention of the collector to the imported articles intended to be covered thereby, nor was there any description in the invoice and entry which, taken together with the protest, would have given the collector the necessary information. The protest was therefore held insufficient.

In the instant case, the collector’s attention is directed to the merchandise assessed under paragraph 369 and it is claimed that engine parts are dutiable under paragraph 353 or paragraph 372. The invoices describe the merchandise more particularly. Obviously, some of the items, such as flasher lenses, are not engine parts.

There has been considerable litigation as to the classification of parts of internal-combustion engines, and it has been held that where the articles are parts of engines which have substantial non-automotive uses, they are not classifiable as parts of automobiles, but as parts of engines. However, where the engines are dedicated to use with automobiles, their parts are classifiable as parts of automobiles. United States v. Ford Motor Co., 51 CCPA 22, C.A.D. 831 (1963) [cylinder blocks, connecting rod assemblies, camshafts, crankshafts, bearing caps, connecting rod forgings, and tappet assemblies]; Davies, Turner & Co. v. United States, 41 Cust. Ct. 306, Abstract 62130 (1958) [carburetors and parts]; Warehousing Service, Inc. v. United States, 56 Cust. Ct. 260, C.D. 2635 (1966) [pistons and cylinder assemblies); Warehousing Service, Inc. v. United States, 56 Cust. Ct. 320, C.D. 2643 (1966) [insert bearings]; Johnson Motors, Inc., et al. v. United States, 61 Cust. Ct. 318, C.D. 3623, 292 F. Supp. 1018 (1968) [carburetors and parts].

The protest herein clearly raises this issue.

In the Ford Motor Co. case, the court pointed out (p. 26):

[361]*361* * * One with a modest degree of familiarity with internal combustion engines and automobiles upon examining such parts as cylinder blocks, connecting rod assemblies, camshafts, crankshafts, bearing caps, connecting rod forgings and tappet assemblies, whether or not versed in mechanical nomenclature, would, it seems to us, readily recognize them as parts of engines rather than parts of automobiles. The parts are integral, constituent or component parts of internal combustion engines. Their utility is in the building and assembling of the engine which may or may not be incorporated into an automobile. They are dedicated to the engine before the engine finds its ultimate use in the automobile or one of several industrial machines.

In view of the previous litigation and the tariff provisions for parts of automobiles and for parts of internal-combustion engines, carburetor type, classifying officers, who must have a degree of familiarity with internal-combustion engines and parts and with automobiles and parts, could not have been perplexed by the claim as to “engine parts” in the protest herein.

A motion to dismiss certain other protests involving the same claims and covering a similar variety of parts has been denied by order of the court, dated September 28, 1971. Beck Distributing Corp. v. United States, Court No. 66/75113.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the instant protest is denied.

At the trial, plaintiff limited its claim to three kinds of carburetors, three kinds of main bearing sets, one piston and liner kit, two kinds of pistons, and one voltage regulator, which articles were used with one or another of the following internal-combustion engines of the carburetor type: Volkswagen 40 horsepower, Volkswagen 36 horsepower, Porsche 1500 cc., Volvo 445, and Volvo Penta Marine.

The issue is thus narrowed to whether these items were properly classified under paragraph 369, as modified, as automobile parts, or are dutiable under paragraph 353 or paragraph 372, as modified, as parts of internal-combustion engines, carburetor type.

The pertinent provisions of the tariff act, as modified, are as follows:

Classified under:
Par. 369, as modified by T.D. 54108:
[Par. 369(b)] All other automobiles * * *.
Par. 369 (c) Parts (except tires and inner tubes and except parts wholly or in chief value of glass), finished or unfinished, not specially provided for, for any of the articles described in item 369(a) or 369 (b) in this Part- 10% % ad val.
[362]*362Claimed under (alternatively) : '
Par. 353, as modified by T.D. 52739:
Par. 353 Articles having as an essential feature an electrical element or device, such as electric motors, fans, locomotives, portable tools, furnaces, heaters, ovens, ranges, washing machines, refrigerators, and signs, finished or unfinished, wholly or in chief value of metal, 'and not specially provided for:
íjí sfs ífs
Internal-combustion engines, carburetor type— 8% % ad val.

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Bluebook (online)
67 Cust. Ct. 358, 1971 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2245, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/beck-distributing-corp-v-united-states-cusc-1971.