The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY July 9, 2026
2026 COA 57
No. 25CA0227, Bechtholdt v. Extraction Oil & Gas, Inc. — Real Property — Quiet Title; Civil Procedure — Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties
Keith v. Kinney, 961 P.2d 516 (Colo. App. 1997), held that a
quiet title claim that was not resolved by a district court as to all
parties was improperly certified as final under C.R.C.P. 54(b). This
case presents a similar issue but one not addressed in Kinney: the
propriety of a district court’s certification and entry of final
judgment resolving certain claims pursuant to Rule 54(b) while the
plaintiff’s quiet title claim remains unresolved. Under the
circumstances, a division of the court of appeals concludes that the
district court erred by certifying and entering a final judgment on
plaintiff’s mineral trespass and unjust enrichment claims (as well
as remedial requests for accounting and restitution) because
resolution of those claims directly affects what relief, if any, plaintiff or others alleging an interest in the subject property may obtain
under plaintiff’s quiet title claim. Likewise, the quiet title action
must be resolved as to all parties because plaintiff’s secondary
claims — such as civil theft and fraud — are “incapable of final
resolution” for purposes of Rule 54(b) certification, Corinthian Hill
Metro. Dist. v. Keen, 812 P.2d 721, 722 (Colo. App. 1991), as
plaintiff alleges entitlement to monies involving the same subject
property at issue in the quiet title action. Based on the division’s
conclusions, the appeal is dismissed without prejudice. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2026 COA 57
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0227 Weld County District Court No. 23CV30558 Honorable Shannon D. Lyons, Judge
Robert D. Bechtholdt, as Personal Representative for the Estate of Betty J. Bechtholdt,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Extraction Oil & Gas, Inc., Ventana Property Owners’ Association, Ronald P. Wagner, Tammie M. Wagner, Jon David Hergert, Hereti Corporation, Inc., TLC Directional Drilling, Inc., Matthew T. Hergert, Hergert Milling, Inc., Matthew T. Hergert Trust, and C. David Hergert,
Defendants-Appellees.
APPEAL DISMISSED
Division III Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON Martinez* and Berger*, JJ., concur
Announced July 9, 2026
Practus, LLP, John Cardinal Parks, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP, Jennifer Allen, Maxwell Hamilton, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee Extraction Oil & Gas, Inc.
Witwer, Oldenburg, Barry & Groom, LLP, Patrick M. Groom, Francis L. Kailey, Greeley, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee Ventana Property Owners’ Association
Fisherbroyles, LLP, Frank Porada, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees Ronald P. Wagner and Tammie M. Wagner Garnett Powell Maximon Barlow & Farbes, Stanley L. Garnett, Robert L. Barlow, David Chipman, Kristin L. Arthur, and Kate Leisner, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees Jon David Hergert, Hereti Corporation, Inc., TLC Directional Drilling, Inc., Matthew T. Hergert, and Matthew T. Hergert Trust
Keller Law, LLC, Jenna H. Keller, Jacy T. Rock, Teresa M. Abel, Craig, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees Hergert Milling, Inc. and C. David Hergert
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 This case requires us to address an issue similar to the one
decided in Keith v. Kinney, 961 P.2d 516, 519 (Colo. App. 1997).
That case held that a quiet title action is not an appropriate claim
to be certified as final under C.R.C.P. 54(b) when the district court
has not resolved all the parties’ rights to the subject property.
Kinney dealt solely with a quiet title claim. This case presents a
situation in which the district court certified and entered a final
judgment resolving other claims (or requests for remedial relief)
pursuant to Rule 54(b) but left unresolved the quiet title claim. For
many of the same reasons Kinney determined that Rule 54(b)
certification was inappropriate there, we conclude that the
unresolved quiet title claim and the other claims (or requests for
relief) in this litigation are not separable from the certified claims.
1 ¶2 Plaintiff, Betty J. Bechtholdt (Betty),1 through Robert D.
Bechtholdt (Robert),2 as personal representative for her estate,
appeals the district court’s dismissal of the estate’s mineral
trespass and unjust enrichment claims and requests for an
accounting and for restitution against defendants Extraction Oil &
Gas, Inc. (Extraction), Ventana Property Owners’ Association
(Ventana POA), and lot owners Tammie M. Wagner and Ronald P.
Wagner (the Wagners), based on the court’s certification of its order
on those claims under Rule 54(b). Betty also appeals the district
court’s denial of her motion to reconsider.
¶3 Given the complex title history of the property — much of it
disputed by the parties — we conclude that the district court erred
by certifying its order as final and appealable under Rule 54(b).
This is because many of the estate’s claims addressed in the
1 At the time this appeal was filed, Betty was alive. During this appeal, Betty died and Robert filed a motion to substitute Betty’s estate as the real party in interest. Even though Robert is now the real party in interest, we refer to Betty throughout, as it was her arguments that sought and obtained C.R.C.P. 54(b) certification of the orders at issue. 2 We refer to individuals by their first names in this opinion because
many of the parties share the same last names. We intend no disrespect in doing so.
2 certification are inextricably linked with pending claims not resolved
by the court. As a result, we conclude that the court’s certification
order does not satisfy the first two of the factors from Harding Glass
Co. v. Jones, 640 P.2d 1123, 1125 n.2 (Colo. 1982) — that is, the
order does not dispose of an entire claim for relief, and the
decisions may not be final as to the certified claims. Because of our
disposition, we need not address the third Harding Glass factor.
¶4 Therefore, we dismiss the appeal without prejudice for lack of
jurisdiction and do not address any other arguments raised. See
Goodall v. Gentry-Cunningham, 2024 CO 52, ¶¶ 11-12.
I. Background
¶5 Like many property disputes, this case involves a long and
winding history. Because we are not resolving any issues in this
appeal on the merits, this background is solely for purposes of our
Rule 54(b) analysis. The district court is not bound by any of our
statements of the facts. Although there are four parcels of land
discussed and the surface and mineral rights were separately titled,
the parties’ dispute largely centers around the mineral rights being
exercised underlying what we identify as Parcel 4.
3 ¶6 Dave Hergert (Dave) and Ida Hergert (Ida) owned a family farm
spanning four parcels of land in Weld County. In December 1979,
Dave and Ida created four limited partnerships in which they served
as general partners for four entities, and each of their four children
— Kenneth Hergert, Clarence Hergert (Clarence), Betty, and Loretta
Hergert (Loretta) — was identified as a limited partner in one of the
four entities. Loretta was the limited partner for Hergert Limited
Partnership No. 4 (Partnership 4).3
¶7 In March 1980, Dave and Ida severed the surface and mineral
estates of the four parcels, with four separate deeds recorded with
the Weld County Clerk and Recorder, conveying the surface estate
in each parcel to one of the four limited partnerships. Parcel 4’s
surface estate was conveyed to Partnership 4.
¶8 The mineral estate (Mineral Estate) underlying the four parcels
was conveyed pursuant to a mineral deed, also recorded with the
Weld County Clerk and Recorder. Dave and Ida conveyed a 25%
interest in the Mineral Estate to each of their four children. Based
3 Because the other limited partnerships are not relevant to our
analysis, we do not refer to them.
4 on the property title history, it does not appear that the Mineral
Estate was divided into separate parcels like the surface rights.
¶9 Loretta died in 1990. In the six years following her death,
Loretta’s 25% interest in the Mineral Estate was re-conveyed several
times in various deeds and settlement agreements, some in part,
dealing with the heir to whom Loretta bequeathed her interest in
the Mineral Estate. Her limited partnership interest in Partnership
4 was eventually conveyed to Betty.
¶ 10 In 1996, Partnership 4 was dissolved and surface rights to
Parcel 4 were conveyed to Betty, among others.
¶ 11 In 2000, the owners of Parcel 4 conveyed it (2000 Warranty
Deed) to Ventana Holdings, LLC f/k/a Ventana Development, LLC
(Ventana Holdings). Ventana Holdings developed Parcel 4, divided
it into lots, and sold the lots to dozens of buyers (lot owners), who
are subject to Ventana POA.4 The lot owners entered into oil and
gas leases with Extraction, which began extracting minerals from
Parcel 4. Although Extraction began to extract minerals from Parcel
4 Ventana Holdings was a party to this lawsuit but was dismissed
pursuant to a stipulated dismissal.
5 4, Betty contends that she did not transfer any of her mineral rights
underlying Parcel 4 as part of the 2000 Warranty Deed.
¶ 12 Years later, in 2013, Clarence discovered that the conveyances
involving Loretta’s interests in the Mineral Estate were allegedly
ineffective because Loretta’s mineral interests were not transferred
as part of a probate proceeding. Clarence, as personal
representative for Loretta, opened an ancillary probate proceeding
to address Loretta’s outstanding interest in the Mineral Estate and
entered into another settlement agreement with Loretta’s heir.
Betty alleged that Loretta’s interest in the Mineral Estate was
conveyed to her as part of that probate proceeding. This meant,
according to Betty, that she owned a larger interest in the Mineral
Estate than just her original 25% interest.5 Betty further alleged
that her Mineral Estate interests were then fraudulently conveyed
to Clarence’s children, Jon David Hergert (Jon) and Matthew T.
Hergert (Matthew).6
5 It is not entirely clear from the record the actual percentage of the
Mineral Estate Betty alleged she owned in 2013. 6 Matthew and Jon transferred their purported interests in the
Mineral Estate to other entities, but those entities are not relevant to our analysis.
6 ¶ 13 This convoluted property history gives rise to the parties’
central dispute: whether the 2000 Warranty Deed — in which Betty
and the other owners conveyed Parcel 4 to Ventana Holdings —
included only the owners’ surface rights or also conveyed the
mineral rights underlying Parcel 4.
¶ 14 Based on all this, Betty filed this lawsuit asserting quiet title
and declaratory judgment claims, as well as a request for
accounting against all defendants, which included Clarence, Jon
(and the entity that holds his interest), Matthew (and the entity that
holds his interest), Extraction, Ventana Holdings, Ventana POA, the
lot owners, and various other entities and individuals associated
with oil and gas production on Parcel 4.7 Betty also asserted claims
as follows:
• two counts of fraud against Clarence, Jon (and the entity that
holds his interest), and Matthew (and the entity that holds his
interest);
• civil theft against Clarence;
7 Given the number of named defendants, we list only those
relevant to our C.R.C.P. 54(b) analysis.
7 • disgorgement, unjust enrichment, and a request for the
appointment of a receiver against Jon and Matthew and the
entities that hold their interests;
• unjust enrichment against the lot owners, which includes
Ventana POA; and
• mineral trespass and a request for restitution against
Extraction.
¶ 15 Extraction filed a partial motion to dismiss Betty’s second
amended complaint, seeking dismissal of all claims asserted against
it.
¶ 16 The district court entered an order on May 8, 2025 (May 8
order), dismissing certain claims against Extraction, Ventana POA,
and the Wagners. After denying Betty’s request for reconsideration
on July 24 (July 24 order), Betty requested, and the court certified,
the two orders as final under Rule 54(b).
¶ 17 Betty filed this appeal. Clarence, Jon, and Matthew sought to
be added as appellees and asked to file a brief so that they could
assert arguments against Rule 54(b) certification. Over Betty’s
objections, a motions division of this court authorized those
individuals to be added as parties and ordered them to file a brief.
8 II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 18 “We must determine independently our jurisdiction over an
appeal . . . .” Allison v. Engel, 2017 COA 43, ¶ 22, overruled on
other grounds by, Wolf v. Brenneman, 2024 CO 31, ¶ 18. This
court’s jurisdiction is conferred by statute, and generally we may
only review appeals from final judgments. Wilson v. Kennedy, 2020
COA 122, ¶¶ 5-7. A final judgment “ends the particular action” and
leaves nothing for the district court to do “in order to completely
determine the rights of the parties involved in the proceeding.”
Harding Glass, 640 P.2d at 1125 n.2 (quoting D.H. v. People, 561
P.2d 5, 6 (Colo. 1977)). And generally, “an entire case must be
decided before any ruling in that case can be appealed.” Wilson, ¶ 8
(quoting People v. G.S., 2018 CO 31, ¶ 37).
¶ 19 C.R.C.P. 54(b) is an exception to the general rule and provides
that, when there are multiple claims for relief or multiple parties are
involved, the district court “may direct the entry of a final judgment
as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only
upon an express determination that there is no just reason for
delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.”
9 ¶ 20 A district court’s certification under C.R.C.P. 54(b) is proper
only if “(1) the decision certified is a ruling on an entire claim for
relief; (2) the decision is final in that it ultimately disposes of the
individual claim; and (3) the district court determines expressly that
there is no just reason for delay in entering a final judgment on the
claim.” Allison, ¶ 24; see Harding Glass, 640 P.2d at 1125.
¶ 21 We review de novo whether the Rule 54(b) certification
involved an entire claim for relief and whether the ruling is final and
disposes of the claim.8 Harding Glass, 640 P.2d at 1125.
III. Analysis
¶ 22 The court’s Rule 54(b) certification was improper because the
rulings in the May 8 and July 24 orders are inextricably linked to
other pending claims.
A. The District Court Rulings
¶ 23 In the May 8 order, the district court held that the 2000
Warranty Deed’s language was unambiguous and that Betty and
the other owners conveyed the mineral interests underlying Parcel 4
to Ventana Holdings. Because of the district court’s interpretation,
8 The third factor —that there is no just reason for delay — is not
an issue in this appeal.
10 it ruled in favor of Extraction, Ventana POA, and the Wagners and
dismissed (1) the mineral trespass claim, along with Betty’s
requests for restitution and an accounting against Extraction; and
(2) the unjust enrichment claim, as well as request for accounting,
against the Wagners. The court also dismissed all claims against
Ventana POA under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), reasoning that Betty had not
alleged the entity “holds any mineral interests in Parcel 4, nor that
[the entity] has received any royalty payments from the development
of those mineral interests by Extraction.”
¶ 24 In that same order, however, the district court did not dismiss
Betty’s quiet title and declaratory judgment claims against
Extraction and the Wagners because the court “may need to
determine the scope of the mineral rights conveyed by” Betty “based
on the other actions, agreements, and conveyances detailed in [the]
Second Amended Complaint.” In the July 24 order, the court relied
on the same interpretation of the 2000 Warranty Deed, finding that
Betty “failed to establish” that she was “entitled to reconsideration.”
¶ 25 In Betty’s request for Rule 54(b) certification, she argued that
the mineral trespass and restitution claims against Extraction
“constitute[d] a ruling on an entire claim for relief.” Likewise, she
11 argued that, even though her unjust enrichment claims were only
dismissed against Ventana POA and the Wagners, “the Court’s
ruling was not unique to them,” as its finding that ‘“[Betty] did not
reserve any mineral rights to Parcel 4 in her favor in the 2000
Deed,’ equally applies to the claims” asserted against the other lot
owners.
¶ 26 In opposition to Betty’s request for certification, Clarence, Jon,
and Matthew argued that, although the request appeared “simple”
and “persuasive,” the court’s construction of the 2000 Warranty
Deed involves only “a single part of [Betty’s] chain of mineral title,
even though there is much more of that chain of title at issue.”
Clarence, Jon, and Matthew further argued that, even though
mineral trespass and unjust enrichment might be “distinct claims”
from the quiet title action, “they only serve as a fig leaf to cover the
real issue: the chain of mineral title” to Parcel 4.
B. Entire Claim and Finality
¶ 27 On appeal, Extraction, Ventana POA, and the Wagners9 take
no position on whether the district court properly certified the May
9 Ventana POA and the Wagners filed answer briefs that joined fully
in the arguments raised by Extraction.
12 8 and July 24 orders under Rule 54(b). Instead, they argue that we
should affirm the district court orders because any person
conveying real property through a deed is presumed to have
conveyed the whole of the property right unless a portion was
expressly reserved.
¶ 28 We decline to do so because, as we discuss below, we agree
with Clarence, Jon, and Matthew that the district court improperly
certified its orders as final and appealable under Rule 54(b).
Specifically, the court’s rulings, which we acknowledge resolved
entire claims for relief (or requests for relief as part of those claims)
as framed in the complaint, do not resolve a separate claim within
the meaning of Rule 54(b). Although the definition of a separate
claim may be elusive, it includes the resolution of a single legal
right. Harding Glass, 640 P.2d 1126. The rights involved here,
similar to those in Kinney, are interests in real property. And
Betty’s legal interest in the claims certified by the district court is
not separate and distinct from her legal interests in other pending
claims, including her quiet title claim, meaning an entire claim for
relief within the meaning of Rule 54(b) is not fully resolved because
13 the legal interests in those claims are inextricably linked with other
pending claims that remain unresolved.
¶ 29 Clarence, Jon, and Matthew rely on Kinney, 961 P.2d at 519,
contending that a quiet title action is inappropriate for Rule 54(b)
certification when all parties’ rights have not been fully adjudicated.
Kinney concluded that, “by its nature, the action to quiet title here
must address the interests of all of the parties” in the subject
property and, “therefore, a limited resolution of those interests is
not susceptible to certification under C.R.C.P. 54(b).” Id.
¶ 30 Like in Kinney, the primary issue related to each of Betty’s
claims (or requests for relief) is resolution of the chain of title to the
mineral rights underlying Parcel 4. As Clarence, Jon, and Matthew
argued below and on appeal, although mineral trespass and unjust
enrichment are distinct claims from a quiet title action, those
claims depend on resolution of the court’s adjudicating all parties’
interests to the mineral rights underlying Parcel 4. By only looking
at the 2000 Warranty Deed in isolation when ruling on those
claims, the district court failed to consider what rights Betty (or
other family members) had or did not have at the time of the 2000
14 conveyance.10 Some questions that appear unresolved by the
court’s May 8 and July 24 orders include, but are not limited to the
following:
• What effect, if any, did the settlement agreements and
deeds concerning Loretta’s heir before 2000 have on the
mineral rights underlying Parcel 4?
• If a deed in effect prior to 2000 was deemed invalid by an
ancillary probate proceeding that occurred after the 2000
Warranty Deed, what effect, if any, did that proceeding have
on the ownership of the mineral rights and what Betty could
convey as part of the 2000 Warranty Deed?
• Could Betty convey her percentage of the Mineral Estate —
whatever amount that might have been given as part of the
ancillary probate proceedings — underlying only Parcel 4, or
if the district court’s interpretation of the 2000 Warranty
Deed is accurate, did Betty convey her percentage of the
Mineral Estate as it relates to all four parcels of land?
10 We acknowledge that the court looked at other deeds as part of
its order of dismissal, but it determined only the rights of certain parties — not all parties — with its interpretation of the 2000 Warranty Deed.
15 ¶ 31 We also agree with Clarence, Jon, and Matthew that, given the
complex chain of title for the subject property, the court’s
interpretation of the 2000 Warranty Deed may be necessary to
adjudicate or resolve the mineral trespass and unjust enrichment
claims, and it may inform how the court addresses the requests for
restitution and accounting, all dismissed by the court. But
interpretation of the 2000 Warranty Deed is a single issue of law
that must be decided in context with the entire chain of title. In
other words, mineral trespass, unjust enrichment, and the request
for restitution and accounting are inextricably intertwined with
adjudicating the rights of all parties who claim an interest in Parcel
4 as part of the quiet title action.
¶ 32 Indeed, the court’s own orders, which did not dismiss the
quiet title or declaratory judgment claims against the defendants
(except for Ventana POA), recognized that the court will likely need
to adjudicate the percentages each party might own in the mineral
rights underlying Parcel 4. This is because, we assume, the court
recognized that the Mineral Estate underlies the entire four parcels,
so any person with an interest in the Mineral Estate ostensibly
owns a percentage of the mineral rights underlying Parcel 4. In
16 other words, adjudicating the parties’ rights to the mineral rights
underlying Parcel 4 must be done first, or concurrently with the
quiet title action and the other claims, because of the complex
chain of title and Loretta’s probate proceedings.
¶ 33 Clarence, Jon, and Matthew also argue that the court’s
interpretation of the 2000 Warranty Deed essentially dismissed (or
substantially limited) any relief they may be entitled to under the
quiet title action. As we read their answer to Betty’s complaint,
they assert that Betty did not have any interest of record in the
portion of the Mineral Estate at issue, arguably meaning Betty
could not have conveyed any interest in the Mineral Estate as part
of the 2000 Warranty Deed, which if true, might invalidate the 2000
Warranty Deed and entitle them to affirmative relief, such as an
increase of their percentages in the Mineral Estate. See Kinney,
961 P.2d at 519 (In a quiet title action, “[a] complete adjudication
was to address all competing claims of the parties because a
defendant could obtain affirmative relief even if a request for such
relief was not presented in the form of a counterclaim.”).
¶ 34 Because there are pending claims that are dependent on
underlying matters that have not been resolved by the court,
17 certification under Rule 54(b) was improper. See Corinthian Hill
Metro. Dist. v. Keen, 812 P.2d 721, 722 (Colo. App. 1991) (“Full
adjudication of rights and liabilities of parties regarding an
appealed claim is required before C.R.C.P. 54(b) certification is
proper.”).
¶ 35 Nonetheless, Betty contends that Corporon v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 708 P.2d 1385, 1388-89 (Colo. App. 1985), and Colorado
Community Bank v. Hoffman, 2013 COA 146, ¶ 23, support the
court’s Rule 54(b) certification because those divisions reviewed
orders involving claims that were separate from the quiet title
action. But those cases are distinguishable.
¶ 36 Corporon, 708 P.2d at 1389, dealt with slander, defamation,
wrongful termination, tortious interference with contract, and
outrageous conduct claims. Although the division noted that
slander and defamation claims are distinct from a quiet title action,
Corporon did not involve a quiet title claim. The division adopted a
“pragmatic test” for determining whether “multiple claims” are
separate for purposes of Rule 54(b): Certification is proper if “a
claimant pleads claims for which his possible recoveries are more
18 than one and when a judgment rendered on one of his claims would
not bar a judgment on his other claim(s).” Id.
¶ 37 Under that test, the division determined that the defamation
order was properly certified because it “would not bar [the plaintiff]
from receiving a verdict on the republication claim since each
defamatory statement upon a separate publication is a separate
claim,” nor would it bar recovery on the plaintiff’s other claims
“because each is a complete wrong standing alone.” Id. As we
discussed above, without a determination of all the parties’ rights in
the quiet title action, it is not clear whether Betty is barred from
recovery on her other claims for relief.
¶ 38 Hoffman, ¶ 25, dealt with property interests in a business, not
real property. Even so, the division there determined that the sale
orders requested by the appointed receiver and adopted by the
court were properly certified under Rule 54(b) because the orders
“disposed of all of the subsidiaries’ interests in certain assets, not
just a portion of those interests” and “the operative facts giving rise
to the sale orders, namely, that the subsidiaries were deadlocked,
insolvent, and unable to continue operations, were distinct from the
facts underlying the other claims and counterclaims in the case.”
19 Id. Because Betty’s claims all deal with the same parcel of land and
mineral rights, the court cannot, based on how Betty pled her
claims, adjudicate a portion of this lawsuit without adjudicating the
whole, making this case distinct from Hoffman.
¶ 39 As an extension of Kinney, we conclude that when a plaintiff’s
claims directly impact what relief, if any, the plaintiff and others
claiming an interest in the subject property may obtain as part of a
quiet title action, certification under Rule 54(b) of those claims,
such as mineral trespass and unjust enrichment, as well as
requests for accounting and restitution dealing with the same
property, is improper. Likewise, when the plaintiff’s secondary
claims — such as civil theft or fraud — relate to monies the plaintiff
is purportedly owed involving an alleged property interest in the
quiet title claim, the quiet title claim must be resolved as to all
parties and the secondary claims in this circumstance are
“incapable of final resolution” for purposes of Rule 54(b)
certification. Corinthian, 812 P.2d at 722; see Kinney, 961 P.2d at
519. Thus, the district court erred by certifying the May 8 and July
24 orders as final under Rule 54(b) because resolution of the claims
20 against defendants are “subject to a final determination of” the
quiet title claim. Corinthian, 812 P.2d at 722.
IV. Conclusion
¶ 40 The appeal is dismissed without prejudice.
JUSTICE MARTINEZ and JUDGE BERGER concur.