Bechard v. United States

• Court: United States Court of Federal Claims
• Decided: February 6, 2017
• Docket: 16-1177
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

''brirF[, (].el lln tbt @nrtr! Ststrg @ourt of fclrrst [,\uims FILED No. 16-1177C (Pro Se) FEB - 6 20li (Filed: February 6,2017 | Not for Publication) U.S. COURT OF Keywords: Pro Se Complaint FEDERAL oLAIMS RYAN THOMAS BECHARD, Sovereign Citizen; Subject Matter Jurisdiction; Motion to Transfer; Plaintiff, Frivolous Claims.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

Ryan Thomas Bechqrd, Mondovi, WI, Plaintiff pro se.

Rebecca S. Kruser, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, with whom werc Claudia Burke, Assistant Director, Robert E. Kirschman, .Ir., Director, and, Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attomey General, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

KAPLAN, Judge.

The pro se plaintiff in this case, Ryan Thomas Bechard, filed this action on September 21, 2016. Compl. at l, Docket No. 1. Mr. Bechard's complaint is captioned as a "[v]erified [b]ill in [e]quity for [r]elease of [t]rustee, [a]ccounting, [d]eclaratory, [s]pecial, [s]upplementary and [g]eneral [r]elief." Id. He asserts a number of interrelated causes of action stemming from his beliefthat a corporation was created in his name through his birth certificate and social security number and that this "person-corporation" is "indebted and underwritten by insurance companies ofthe German Empire according to the'Trading With The Enemy Act."'Id. at 13. Mr. Bechard requests certain equitable relief with respect to, among other things, his alleged trustee status. He also seeks a declaratory judgment and money damages based on his allegations of trustee status, asserts a variety oftort claims, and alleges generalized violations of unspecified Constitutional provisions. Cunently before the Court is the govemment's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) ofthe Rules of the Court ofFederal Claims (RCFC), Docket No. 14, as well as a Motion to Transfer that Mr. Bechard filed on October 24. 2016. Docket No. 8. In his motion to transfer, Mr. Bechard asserts that "[a]djudication of matters involving trusts can only be done in exclusive jurisdiction of Equity, which, within a Federal Court, pursuant to the Constitution, can only be before an Article III Judee." Mot. to Transfer at l. Mr. Bechard thus requests that this case be

q013 E5Jo ?01'{ 1,e00 0008 assigned to an Article III judge or transferred to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Id.

For the reasons set forth below, the govemment's motion to dismiss is GRANTED and Mr. Bechard's motion to transfer is DENIED.T BACKGROTJND

The allegations in Mr. Bechard's complaint are difficult to follow, but appear to be grounded on a set ofbeliefs held by members of the so-called "sovereign citizen" movement. See. e.g., Gmvatt v. United States, 100 Fed. CL.279,282-83 & n.1 (201 1) (citing Brvant v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 524 F. Supp. 2d753,758-59 (W.D. Va. 2007)) (describing tenets ofthe sovereign citizen movement); see also Rivera v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 644,64H7 (2012). Thus, the complaint is predicated on the notion that Mr. Bechard is what he terms a "surety debtor and trustee to the 'United States'/ColB [i.e., "certificate of live birth] person-corporation business entity." Compl. at 15. Specifically, Mr. Bechard claims that although he was led to believe that his birth certificate and social security number were "just for informational purposes only, a tax ID number," in reality, "pursuant to the 'Federal Reserve Act', 'Trading With the Enemy Act' and'Emergency Banking Act', [he] was fraudulently set up to be a surety debtor and trustee to tle 'United States'/ColB person-corporation business entity underwritten and indebted by a social insurance policy of the German Empire." Id. Mr. Bechard asserts that he mistakenly "accepted [the] office oftrustee and 'acted as trustee'to an implied trust by use ofthe numbers on [his social security] card to get ajob and open bank accounts." Id. at 15-16.

"From research into this subject," Mr. Bechard also believes that the bottom portion ofhis birth certificate, which allegedly is not included in his Certificate of Live Birth, contains "the corporation and banking information." Id. at 16. He claims, however, that he has only been given the upper portion. Id. Thus, he alleges that during an August 14,2014 t:rp to the Wisconsin Vital Records office in Madison, Wisconsin, he was denied access to his complete original birth certificate. Id. He also describes an order he placed with the Wisconsin Vital Records office to obtain the "long form" of his birth certificate and how the Wisconsin Registrar allegedly told him that this long form could not be provided "because it contains confidential information." Id. at 17.

Furthermore, Mr. Bechard alleges that on October 20,2014, he sent a "Notice of Claim" to the "Office of the Attomey General . . . as prescribed by the Trading With the Enemy Act," which contained his and his family members' birth certificates and social security cards. Id. atlT. Apparently, this package was retumed to him on December 14, 2014.Id. at 1 8. Mr. Bechard also describes his attempts to terminate the supposed trusts and establish himself instead as a beneficiary through the use of Intemal Revenue Service forms. Id. at 18. Mr. Bechard has apparently also requested that the Department of State

I Mr. Bechard has filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court GRANTS that motion solely for purposes of dismissing his complaint. place him on the "Blue List" for "Diplomatic Passports, Diplomatic Immunities photo ID and other minor items." ld. at 18-19.

Based on these allegations, Mr. Bechard seeks to be discharged as trustee on the grounds that the alleged trusteeship and debt were induced by fraud. Id. at 23. He requests an accounting and that he be established as a beneficiary to funds he believes are in this trust. See id. at 13,18,21,26-27. Similarly, Mr. Bechard requests that the "person-corporation estates" ofhis wife, children, and deceased family members be placed "in the proper office ofcestui que trust." Id. at 19-20. Mr. Bechard also requests a cout order commanding Wisconsin's Vital Records Department to deliver his "original ink pen impressed 'Certificate of Live Birth' instruments." Id. at 27. In addition, Mr. Bechard requests money damages relating to tort claims of fraud and libel. Id. at 28. He further asks the Court to order that the Secretary of State place him and his family members on a "diplomatic list" or "Blue List," pursuant to 8 C.F.R. $ 101.3, and that they be provided with "other items, benefits or privileges pertaining to [their] 'non-citizen national' status and 'diplomatic agenVofficer' level immunities and privileges." Id. at 29. Finally, Mr. Bechard requests that a hearing be held as soon as possible "on the grounds ofviolations ofrights under the Constitution," and that the Court award him any other reliefrequired by the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act or any other source of law. Id. at29-30.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

In deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court accepts as true all undisputed facts in the pleadings and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Trusted Integration. Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d I 159, t 163 (Fed. Cir, 201 1). The court may "inquire into jurisdictional facts" to determine whether it has jurisdiction. Rocovich v. United States , 933 F .2d 991 , 993 (Fed. Cir. 1 991 ). It is well established that complaints that are filed by pro se plaintiffs, like this one, are held to "less strhgent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kemer, 404 U.S. 519,520 (1972). Nonetheless, even pro se plaintiffs must persuade the court that jurisdictional requirements have been met. Bemard v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 497, 499,af?d,98 F. App'x 860 (Fed. Cir.2004). Pursuant to the Tucker Act, the United States Court ofFederal Claims has jurisdiction to "render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation ofan executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. $ 1491(a) (2012). The Tucker Act serves as a waiver of sovereign immunity and ajurisdictional grant, but it does not create a substantive cause of action, Jan's Helicopter Serv.. Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299,1306 (Fed. Cir.2008). A plaintilf, therefore, must establish that "a separate sowce of substantive law . . . creates the right to money damages." Id. (quoting Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167 , ll72 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc in relevant part)). The primary relief Mr. Bechard seeks in his complaint is equitable in nature. Indeed, the premise of the complaint is that it is a "Bill in Equity," which seeks an order releasing him and his family members as trustees of supposed trusts, ordering an accounting, forming a constructive trust, and directing the Wisconsin registrar and the Secretary of State to take certain actions. The Court of Federal Claims, however, lacks jurisdiction to grant such equitable relief absent a "concurrent colorable claim for monetary recovery." Wheeler v. United States, 1l F.3d 156, 159 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting Bobula v. U.S. Deo't of Justice,970 F.2d 854, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); see also James v. Caldera, 159 F.3d 573, 580 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that the "Court of Federal Claims has no power to grant affirmative non-monetary relief unless it is tied and subordinate to a money judgmenf' (quotation omitted)).

In this case, Mr. Bechard has not made a colorable claim for monetary damages because he has failed to identify any money-mandating statute that can serve as the basis for such a claim. Further, his generic claims ofunspecified constitutional violations are insufficient because this Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate claims based on provisions of the Constitution that are not money-mandating. See. e.g., LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that due process clauses and equal protection clause do not provide a "suffrcient basis for jurisdiction because they do not mandate payment of money by the govemment"). And his defamation and libel claims are beyond this Court's jurisdiction because "[t]he plain language of the Tucker Act excludes from the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction claims sounding in tort." Rick's Mushroom Serv.. Inc. v. United States,521 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir.2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. $ la91(aX1). In short, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the claims set forth in Mr. Bechard's complaint. For that reason, the government's motion to dismiss pursuant to RCFC l2(bXl) must be GRANTED. II. Motion to Transfer

Mr. Bechard, as noted, filed a motion to transfer this case, "by the authority in 28 U.S.C. $ 1631 and RCFC rule 40.1." See Mot. to Transfer at I (emphasis omitted). Specifically, he requests that this case be assigned to an Article III judge or transferred to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Id.

Section 1631 of Title 28 states that "[w]henever a civil action is filed in a court as defined in section 610 of this title . . . and that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest ofjustice, transfer such action . . . to any other such court in which the action . . . could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed." The Federal Circuit has held that the "in the interest ofjustice" factor relates "to claims which are nonfrivolous and as such should be decided on the merits." Galloway Farms. Inc. v. United States, 834 F.2d 998, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citing Zinser Constr. Co. v. United States,753F.2d 1053, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). The Court declines to transfer this case to the Federal Circuit or to any other federal court. First, a transfer to the Federal Circuit would clearly be improper, as that court is an appellate tribunal and lacks jurisdiction to hear original cases like the one Mr. Bechard has brought here. See 28 U.S.C. 91295. Second, the Court declines to transfer the case to a district court because Mr. Bechard's claims "lack[] an arguable basis either in law or in fact" and are therefore frivolous. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,325 (1989). Indeed, Mr. Bechard filed similar claims in the United States District Court for the Westem District of Wisconsin; and that court concluded that he had failed to "articulate a non-frivolous cause of action or claim for relief over which this court has jurisdiction." Bechard v. Rios, No. I4-CV-867-WMC, 2014 WL 7366226, at * I (W.D. Wis. Dec. 24,2014). Other courts have also held that complaints based on "sovereign citizen" theories are "nonsensical" and "frivolous." Gravatt, 100 Fed. Cl. at 288; see also Troxelle v. United States, No. 10-312 C, 2010 WL 3982349, at *5 n.9 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 6, 2010) (declining to transfer plaintiffs claims that his birth certificate and registration with the Social Security Administration constitute a taking of the use of his name by the United States because such claims were frivolous and lacked any basis in law or in fact).

Finally, as noted, Mr. Bechard's Motion to Transfer also references RCFC 40.1. This Rule addresses the intemal transfer ofcases between judges ofthe Court of Federal Claims. It does not allow the ChiefJudge to assign ajudge from an Article III court to this case, as Mr. Bechard apparently desires.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of the foregoing, the govemment's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED without prejudice. The plaintiffls Motion to Transfer is DENIED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly. Each party shall bear its own costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ELAINE D. KAPLAN Judge