Beauregard Ex Rel. Estate of Beauregard v. Continental Tire North America, Inc.

435 F. App'x 877
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedJuly 26, 2011
Docket10-13162
StatusUnpublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 435 F. App'x 877 (Beauregard Ex Rel. Estate of Beauregard v. Continental Tire North America, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Beauregard Ex Rel. Estate of Beauregard v. Continental Tire North America, Inc., 435 F. App'x 877 (11th Cir. 2011).

Opinion

HILL, Circuit Judge:

Adam B. Beauregard, as the personal representative of Sarah Dawn Beauregard’s estate, brought this wrongful death action against Continental Tire North America, Inc. (“Continental”) under the district court’s diversity jurisdiction. Beauregard alleged that Continental was negligent in the design, manufacture, testing, marketing, and/or selling of a tire that “experienced a catastrophic tread and belt separation” resulting in an accident in which Sarah Dawn Beauregard was eject *879 ed from the vehicle on which the tire was mounted and was killed.

Continental filed a motion for summary-judgment, asserting that Beauregard had not created a triable issue of fact with respect to the alleged defect in the tire. After a hearing, the district court agreed and granted summary judgment for Continental. Beauregard filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, but the district court reaffirmed its prior holding. We agree.

I.

The following facts are undisputed. Continental manufactured the allegedly defective tire in 1994, some eleven years and seven months before the accident. The tire’s ownership, maintenance, use and storage history are largely unknown for the ten-year period between its manufacture and its purchase by decedent’s father. The decedent’s father purchased the tire and three others, which were lying in a neighbor’s Florida yard, in 2004 or 2005. He mounted the tires on his Jeep even though Jeep recommends installation of smaller size tires. He modified the Jeep to accommodate the larger tires by installing after-market “lift kits” that raise the body off the frame. Experts who examined the tire following the accident found evidence of a previous puncture in the tire; evidence that it had “bead” damage, possibly from having been mounted and remounted on different rims; and evidence of improper inflation (though the experts disagreed as to whether the tire had a history of being overinflated or under inflated). 2

II.

To prevail on his claim, Beauregard must first demonstrate the existence of a design or manufacturing defect present in the tire when it left Continental’s manufacturing plant. See West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., 336 So.2d 80, 86 (Fla. 1976). The only evidence Beauregard offered in this regard was the opinion of his tire failure expert. The district court held this testimony insufficient as a matter of law to create a triable issue of fact as to the existence of such a defect. We agree.

Plaintiffs tire failure expert was Robert C. Ochs, who the district court found to be a well-qualified tire engineer who worked for Michelin Tire Corporation for twenty-five years before becoming a consulting engineer. Ochs examined the tire, prepared a Rule 26(a)(2)(B) expert report and gave a deposition in this case. He concluded that the tire failed when the upper and lower belts separated. In his deposition, however, he testified that “the mere fact that a tire sustained a tread belt separation in and of itself does not mean that [the] tire was defectively designed or manufactured.”

As to the tire’s design, Ochs testified that he had “no opinions” as to the tire’s design because he had not been furnished with sufficient documentation to form such an opinion. Nonetheless, he speculated that the tire’s design might be defective as the result of the presence of two short sections of cord or string that he found between the upper and lower belts of the tire. He thought that these cords might have introduced stress on the belts. He conceded, however, that neither of these cords was in the specific area of the tire *880 where he determined the belts separated. 3 Furthermore, he conducted no tests to support his speculation that the cords might have caused stress on the belts. 4

The district court held that this evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to create a triable issue of fact as to the presence of a design defect in the tire, and we agree.

As to the issue of a manufacturing defect, Ochs testified that belt separation is a “fatigue failure” that could be caused by using aged chemical compounds to create the belts, improper bonding between the belts, and/or from contamination that would cause a stress riser between the belts. When questioned, however, he admitted that he had no information as to the chemical compounds used to create the belts. He admitted that “all tires experience some loss of adhesion during them lifetime” and estimated the tire had between 30,000 and 40,000 miles on it at the time of the accident.

As to improper bonding, Ochs testified that the tire had “liner pattern marks” on it, which are evidence of manufacturing defects. He admitted, however, that the marks were not at the point of tread separation on the tire and that he had no evidence to support his opinion that such marks had probably been there prior to the accident. Furthermore, where there were such liner marks, there was no tread separation on the tire. 5

The district court held that this opinion was predicated on “impermissible speculation and conjecture” and was, therefore, insufficient as a matter of law to create a triable issue of fact regarding the existence of a manufacturing defect in the tire. We agree.

Finally, Beauregard relies on Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So.2d 1140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), to argue that he is entitled under Florida law to an inference of design or manufacturing defect under the circumstances of this case even if his expert’s opinion does not raise such an inference. Under Cassisi, an inference of defect is permissible when the plaintiff can prove a malfunction that occurs during normal operation of the product. Id. at 1151. We have explained that where a “product malfunctions that would not malfunction but for the defect,” a plaintiff is entitled to such an inference. Worsham v. A.H. Robins Co., 734 F.2d 676, 683 (11th Cir.1984). The Cassisi inference has been used to permit a defect claim to go to the jury in tire failure cases. See, e.g., Derosier v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 819 So.2d 143 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

The district court rejected this argument, however, because Beauregard was unable to adduce sufficient evidence that there was a “malfunction” or that, if there was, that it occurred during “normal operation” of the tire. See Cassisi, 396 So.2d at 1151. While Ochs testified that absent evidence of impact damage or signs of under inflation, a tread belt detachment “would be the result of a problem in the tire itself [meaning] a manufacturing or design defect,” he admitted that such a detachment could be the result of abuse of the tire, such as improper storage conditions and exposure to extreme temperatures.

*881

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435 F. App'x 877, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/beauregard-ex-rel-estate-of-beauregard-v-continental-tire-north-america-ca11-2011.