Beaupre v. Berryhill

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: January 21, 2020
• Docket: 2:18-cv-02032
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

6 * * *

7 LINDA BEAUPRE, Case No. 2:18-cv-02032-JCM-BNW

8 Plaintiff, ORDER 9 v.

10 NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 11 Defendant. 12 13 14 This case involves review of an administrative action by the Commissioner of Social 15 Security (“Commissioner”) denying Linda Beaupre’s (Plaintiff’s) application for disability 16 insurance benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. The court reviewed 17 Plaintiff’s Motion for Reversal and/or Remand (ECF No. 12), filed February 27, 2019, and 18 Defendant’s Cross Motion to Affirm and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reversal (ECF Nos. 19 13, 14), filed March 25, 2019. Plaintiff did not reply. 20 This matter was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge on May 3, 2019, for a report 21 of findings and recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C) and Local Rule IB 1-4. The 22 undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation on January 10, 2020. (ECF No. 16.) On 23 January 17, 2020, following the consent of both parties, this case was referred to the undersigned 24 for all further proceedings. (ECF No. 18.) In light of the parties’ consent, the court will vacate its 25 Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 16) and enter this order. 26 I. BACKGROUND 27 A. Procedural History 1 In 2014, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security 2 income under Titles II and XVI of the Act, alleging an onset date of July 31, 2012. AR1 238-45. 3 The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s claims initially and upon reconsideration. AR 154-73. A 4 hearing was then held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on July 10, 2017. AR 35-76. 5 On September 18, 2017, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled. AR 12-34. 6 Plaintiff requested that the Appeals Council review the ALJ’s decision, and the Appeals Council 7 denied this request on August 29, 2018, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final 8 decision. AR 1-6. On October 22, 2018, Plaintiff commenced this action for judicial review under 9 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g). (See ECF No. 1.) 10 B. The ALJ Decision 11 The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 12 404.1520 and 416.920. 13 At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity 14 since July 31, 2012. AR 17. 15 At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 16 fibromyalgia, migraines, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, and depressive disorder. 17 Id. 18 At step three, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of 19 impairments that met or medically equaled an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpt. P, 20 App. 1 (the listings). AR 18. 21 Next, the ALJ determined the Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (RFC). AR 20. As is 22 relevant for purposes of this decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to “interact 23 occasionally with coworkers and supervisors, but no joint projects.” Id. 24 At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform past relevant work. AR 26. 25 At step five, and with the assistance of the vocational expert, the ALJ found that there 26 were jobs existing in significant numbers that someone with Plaintiff’s vocational profile could 27 1 perform. AR 67-68. The ALJ therefore found Plaintiff “not disabled” as defined in the Act. AR 2 26-27. 3 II. DISCUSSION 4 A. Standard of Review 5 Administrative decisions in social security disability benefits cases are reviewed under 42 6 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Akopyan v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 2002). Section 405(g) 7 states: Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 8 made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action . . . brought in 9 the district court of the United States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides. 10 11 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The court may enter “upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a 12 judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, 13 with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” Id. The Ninth Circuit reviews a decision 14 affirming, modifying, or reversing a decision of the Commissioner de novo. See Batson v. 15 Commissioner, 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). 16 The Commissioner’s findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 17 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 18 2006). However, the Commissioner’s findings may be set aside if they are based on legal error or 19 not supported by substantial evidence. See Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 20 2005); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit defines 21 substantial evidence as “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such 22 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 23 Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 24 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). In determining whether the Commissioner’s findings are 25 supported by substantial evidence, the court “must review the administrative record as a whole, 26 weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s 27 conclusion.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Smolen v. Chater, 80 1 Under the substantial evidence test, findings must be upheld if supported by inferences 2 reasonably drawn from the record. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. When the evidence will support 3 more than one rational interpretation, the court must defer to the Commissioner’s interpretation. 4 See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005); Flaten v. Sec’y of Health and Human 5 Serv., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995). Consequently, the issue before the court is not whether 6 the Commissioner could reasonably have reached a different conclusion, but whether the final 7 decision is supported by substantial evidence. It is incumbent on the ALJ to make specific 8 findings so that the court does not speculate as to the basis of the findings when determining if the 9 Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Mere cursory findings of fact 10 without explicit statements as to what portions of the evidence were accepted or rejected are 11 insufficient. Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 634 (9th Cir. 1981). The ALJ’s findings “should 12 be as comprehensive and analytical as feasible and, where appropriate, should include a statement 13 of subordinate factual foundations on which the ultimate factual conclusions are based . . . .” Id. 14 (citing Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931 15 (1975).). 16 B. Disability Evaluation Process 17 The individual seeking disability benefits has the initial burden of proving disability. 18 Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 182 (9th Cir. 1995). To meet this burden, the individual must 19 demonstrate the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 20 determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected . . . to last for a continuous 21 period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). More specifically, the individual 22 must provide “specific medical evidence” in support of her claim for disability. 20 C.F.R. § 23 404.1514. If the individual establishes an inability to perform her prior work, then the burden 24 shifts to the Commissioner to show that the individual can perform other substantial gainful work 25 that exists in the national economy. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721. 26 The ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process in determining whether an 27 individual is disabled. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 1 a determination will be made, and no further evaluation is required. See 20 C.F.R. § 2 404.1520(a)(4); Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003). Step one requires the ALJ to 3 determine whether the individual is engaged in substantial gainful activity (SGA). 20 C.F.R. § 4 404.1520(b). SGA is defined as work activity that is both substantial and gainful; it involves 5 doing significant physical or mental activities usually for pay or profit. Id. § 404.1572(a)-(b). If 6 the individual is engaged in SGA, then a finding of “not disabled” is made. See Barnhart, 540 7 U.S. at 24. If the individual is not engaged in SGA, then the analysis proceeds to step two. See id. 8 Step two addresses whether the individual has a medically determinable impairment that is severe 9 or a combination of impairments that significantly limits her from performing basic work 10 activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). An impairment or combination of impairments is not severe 11 when medical and other evidence establishes only a slight abnormality or a combination of slight 12 abnormalities that would have no more than a minimal effect on the individual’s ability to work. 13 Id. § 404.1521; see also SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 (Oct. 25, 2017); SSR 85-28, 1985 WL 14 56856 (Jan. 1, 1985).2 If the individual does not have a severe medically determinable impairment 15 or combination of impairments, then a finding of “not disabled” is made. If the individual has a 16 severe medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments, then the analysis 17 proceeds to step three. 18 Step three requires the ALJ to determine whether the individual’s impairment or 19 combination of impairments meet or medically equal the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526. If the 21 individual’s impairment or combination of impairments meet or equal the criteria of a listing and 22 the duration requirement (20 C.F.R. § 404.1509), then a finding of disabled is made. 20 C.F.R. § 23 404.1520(h). If the individual’s impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or 24 25 26 2 SSRs constitute the SSA’s official interpretation of the statute and regulations. See Bray v. 27 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 2009); see also 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1). They are entitled to some deference if they are consistent with the Social Security 1 equal the criteria of a listing or meet the duration requirement, then the analysis proceeds to step 2 four. 3 Before moving to step four, however, the ALJ must first determine the individual’s 4 residual functional capacity (RFC), which is a function-by-function assessment of the individual’s 5 ability to do physical and mental work-related activities on a sustained basis despite limitations 6 from impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); see also SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 7 1996). In making this finding, the ALJ must consider all the relevant evidence, such as all 8 symptoms and “the extent to which the symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with 9 the objective medical evidence and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); see also SSR 16- 10 3p, 2017 WL 5180304 (Oct. 25, 2017). To the extent that statements about the intensity, 11 persistence, or functionally limiting effects of pain or other symptoms are not substantiated by 12 objective medical evidence, the ALJ must make a finding on the credibility of the individual’s 13 statements based on a consideration of the entire case record. The ALJ must also consider opinion 14 evidence in accordance with the requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.927. 15 Step four requires the ALJ to determine whether the individual has the RFC to perform 16 her past relevant work (PRW). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). PRW means work performed either 17 as the individual actually performed it or as it is generally performed in the national economy 18 within the last 15 years or 15 years before the date that disability must be established. See 20 19 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(b), 404.1565(a). In addition, the work must have lasted long enough for the 20 individual to learn the job and perform a SGA. Id. §§ 404.1560(b), 404.1565(a). If the individual 21 has the RFC to perform her past work, then a finding of “not disabled” is made. Id. § 22 404.1560(b)(3). If the individual is unable to perform any PRW or does not have any PRW, then 23 the analysis proceeds to step five. 24 The fifth and final step requires the ALJ to determine whether the individual can do any 25 other work considering her RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). 26 If she can do other work, then a finding of “not disabled” is made. Although the individual 27 generally continues to have the burden of proving disability at this step, a limited burden of going 1 providing evidence that demonstrates that other work exists in significant numbers in the national 2 economy that the individual can do. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141-42. 3 C. Analysis 4 1. Medical Opinion Evidence 5 i. Drs. Hill and Brode’s Opinions 6 Plaintiff faults the ALJ for rejecting Drs. Hill and Brode’s opinions regarding the 7 disabling nature of Plaintiff’s conditions. (ECF No. 13 at 7-11.) Drs. Hill and Brode were both 8 non-examining state agency doctors who reviewed Plaintiff’s file. AR 90, 125. Both of these 9 doctors opined that Plaintiff could perform simple work that does not “require prolonged contact 10 with the public.” See AR 90, 125. Plaintiff faults the ALJ for rejecting this opinion without 11 explaining why it was rejected. (ECF No. 12 at 9 (“The ALJ’s silent rejection of the opinions of 12 Drs. Hill and Brode constitutes legal error.”).) 13 ii. The ALJ’s Decision 14 The ALJ gave Drs. Hill and Brode’s opinions both “some weight” but found that the 15 record supported a finding of greater limitations that those found by Drs. Hill and Brode. AR 25. 16 The ALJ neither discussed nor rejected their finding that Plaintiff could not have prolonged 17 contact with the public. Id. In the ALJ’s RFC assessment, he made a somewhat different finding, 18 namely that Plaintiff could only interact occasionally with coworkers and supervisors. Id. at 20. 19 However, elsewhere in his decision, he noted that his RFC limited the Plaintiff to “occasional 20 interaction with others.” Id. at 24. Further, in the hypothetical that that the ALJ posed to the VE 21 and relied on, he stated Plaintiff could only have occasional contact with the public and 22 coworkers. AR 71. 23 iv. Whether the ALJ Erred 24 Again, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by improperly rejecting the opinions of Drs. Hill 25 and Brode that Plaintiff could not have prolonged contact with the public. Plaintiff is correct that 26 an ALJ may not reject a doctor’s opinion without any explanation. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 27 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Where an ALJ does not explicitly reject a medical opinion or set forth 1 the ALJ did not reject Drs. Hill and Brode’s opinion that Plaintiff should have limited contact 2 with the public. As noted above, the ALJ’s RFC assessment only limited Plaintiff to occasional 3 contact with coworkers and supervisors, but the ALJ explicitly interpreted his RFC assessment to 4 mean Plaintiff should also only have occasional contact with the public. AR 24, 71. And even if 5 the ALJ did err by not including an express limitation to occasional contact with the public in his 6 RFC, this error was harmless, as he included this limitation in the hypothetical he posed to the VE 7 and relied on.3 AR 71. 8 2. Vocational Expert Testimony 9 i. Plaintiff’s Arguments 10 Plaintiff faults the ALJ for relying on the VE’s testimony regarding jobs Plaintiff can 11 perform. The VE testified that someone who has the same limitations as Plaintiff could be a credit 12 authorizer, surveillance system monitor, and addresser. AR 34-36. Plaintiff argues that she cannot 13 do any of these jobs. According to Plaintiff, she cannot be a credit authorizer or a surveillance 14 system monitor because the level of communication required for these jobs exceeds Plaintiff’s 15 limitations. (ECF No. 12 at 17.) Regarding the credit authorizer position, Plaintiff explains that 16 according to the DOT, the job involves “frequent” talking, including interviewing and conferring 17 with customers. (Id. at 15.) Regarding the surveillance system monitor position, Plaintiff explains 18 that according to the DOT, this position also involves frequent talking and a temperament fit for 19 “dealing with people.” (Id. at 16.) As the ALJ limited Plaintiff to occasional interactions with the 20 public and coworkers in his hypothetical (AR 71), Plaintiff argues that there is an inconsistency 21 between the VE’s testimony that Plaintiff can perform these jobs and the DOT’s requirements for 22

23 3 The first time the ALJ presented the hypothetical to the VE, he limited Plaintiff to occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors. AR 69. After this hypothetical was given, the VE said that 24 Plaintiff could be an addresser. AR 70. Then, the VE asked the ALJ to repeat what the limitation was on 25 interacting with “the public and coworkers.” AR 71. The ALJ replied the limitation was “occasional.” Id. In response, the VE said the Plaintiff could be a credit authorizer and surveillance system monitor. AR 71- 26 72. Thus, Plaintiff was technically only limited to occasional contact with coworkers and supervisors (and not the public) when the VE testified she could be an addresser. However, this fact is not material to the 27 court’s decision, as Plaintiff is not arguing that she cannot be an addresser due to her social limitations. Rather, as discussed in more detail below, she argues she cannot be an addresser because the position is 1 each. (ECF No. 12 at 14-17.) 2 Plaintiff further explains that an ALJ has a duty to explore conflicts between the VE’s 3 testimony and DOT. (Id. at 15.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ must ask the VE to explain any 4 conflicts and then determine whether the VE’s explanation is reasonable such that the ALJ should 5 accept the VE’s testimony. (Id.) 6 Plaintiff also argues she cannot be an addresser because this occupation is obsolete. (ECF 7 No. 12 at 17.) The DOT states that 102,000 addresser positions exist and that an addresser, 8 “[a]ddresses by hand or typewriter, envelopes, cards, advertising literature, packages, and similar 9 items for mailing. May sort mail.” DOT 209.587-010, 1991 WL 671797. Citing this definition 10 and a published Social Security Administration study from 2011 that states, “[i]t is doubtful that 11 these jobs, as described in the DOT, currently exist in significant numbers” in the national 12 economy, Plaintiff reasons that the addresser position is clearly outdated. (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff 13 concludes that no reasonable person would believe that 102,000 addresser positions exist and 14 accordingly, the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at 14 (citing Revels 15 v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Substantial evidence means more than a mere 16 scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 17 accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”). 18 ii. Commissioner’s Arguments 19 The Commissioner responds by arguing that the ALJ properly relied on the VE’s 20 testimony. (ECF No. 13 at 7, 13.) This is so, according to the Commissioner, because there are no 21 conflicts between the VE’s testimony and the DOT. (Id. at 7-10.) Regarding the credit authorizer 22 and surveillance system monitor positions, the Commissioner argues that “the ALJ included in his 23 hypothetical a limitation to occasional interaction with people, and nothing in the DOT 24 description requires more than this level of interaction.” (Id. at 9.) The Commissioner further 25 argues that because the position descriptions in the DOT do not conflict with the VE’s testimony, 26 the ALJ was entitled to rely on the VE’s testimony. (Id. at 9-10.) 27 Regarding the addresser position, the Commissioner argues that courts have rejected the 1 published Ninth Circuit opinions holding that the addresser position is outdated. 2 iii. When an ALJ May Rely on a VE’s Testimony 3 Before an ALJ can rely on a VE’s testimony, SR 00-4p requires the ALJ to ask the VE 4 whether his testimony is consistent with the DOT. See also Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 5 1152 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding the ALJ may not rely on a VE’s testimony “without first inquiring 6 whether the testimony conflicts with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.”). As the Ninth 7 Circuit explained: 8 SSR 00–4p unambiguously provides that “[w]hen a [vocational expert] . . . 9 provides evidence about the requirements of a job or occupation, the adjudicator has an affirmative responsibility to ask about any possible conflict between that 10 [vocational expert] . . . evidence and information provided in the [Dictionary of Occupational Titles ].” SSR 00–4p further provides that the adjudicator “will ask” 11 the vocational expert “if the evidence he or she has provided” is consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and obtain a reasonable explanation for any 12 apparent conflict. 13 Id. at 1152-53 (emphasis in original). 14 The ALJ may rely on the VE’s testimony “‘even if it is inconsistent with the job 15 descriptions set forth in the Dictionary[.]’” Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 16 1995) (quoting Conn v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 51 F.3d 607, 610 (6th Cir. 17 1995)). However, in the event there is a conflict (or an apparent conflict) between the VE’s 18 testimony and the DOT, the ALJ must determine whether the VE’s explanation regarding why the 19 plaintiff can still perform a certain occupation is reasonable and provide a basis for relying on the 20 VE’s testimony rather than on the DOT. SSR 00-4p; Lamear, 865 F.3d at 1206 (“When there is 21 an apparent conflict between the vocational expert’s testimony and the DOT—for example, 22 expert testimony that a claimant can perform an occupation involving DOT requirements that 23 appear more than the claimant can handle—the ALJ is required to reconcile this inconsistency.”); 24 see also Moore v. Colvin, 769 F.3d 987, 990 (8th Cir. 2014) (“The ALJ is not absolved of this 25 duty [to reconcile conflicts] merely because the VE responds ‘yes’ when asked if h[is] testimony 26 is consistent with the DOT.”). 27 1 If the ALJ does not pursue this line of inquiry to reconcile discrepancies between a VE’s 2 testimony and the DOT, the court cannot determine whether substantial evidence supports the 3 ALJ’s step-five findings relating to whether the plaintiff can perform jobs that exist in significant 4 numbers in the economy. Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1152-53. Accordingly, the ALJ errs when (1) he 5 does not ask if the VE’s testimony is consistent with the DOT and (2) when he does ask but there 6 is no explanation for a conflict in the record. See id. at 1154 n.19; see also Tommasetti v. Astrue, 7 533 F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 2008). 8 Here, the ALJ did not ask the VE whether his testimony was consistent with the DOT. See 9 AR 36-76. And the court cannot conclude that this error was harmless, given the apparent conflict 10 that exists between the Plaintiff’s social limitations (to occasional contact with others) and the job 11 descriptions for credit authorizer and surveillance system monitor. See Credit Authorizer, DOT 12 205.367-014, 1991 WL 671715 (position description includes interviewing and conferring with 13 customers and frequent talking); Surveillance System Monitor, DOT 379.367–010, 1991 WL 14 673244 (position description involves frequent talking). As such, the court cannot determine 15 whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s step-five finding that Plaintiff can perform the 16 jobs of credit authorizer and surveillance system monitor, given Plaintiff’s social limitations. 17 Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1153-54, n. 19 (because the ALJ did not ask the VE whether there was a 18 conflict between his testimony and the DOT, and there was an apparent conflict, the court could 19 not determine if substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s step-five finding that the plaintiff could 20 do other work). Accordingly, the court will order that this case be remanded for the ALJ to 21 explore the apparent conflicts between the Plaintiff’s social limitations and the positions of credit 22 authorizer and surveillance system monitor. 23 Whether Plaintiff can perform the job of addresser is a more difficult question, as there is 24 no controlling Ninth Circuit precedent addressing whether the position of “addresser” is 25 obsolete.4 Accordingly, the question becomes whether substantial evidence exists that the 26 27 4 Plaintiff concedes this point. (ECF No. 12 at 12 (“The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals does not 1 addresser position exists in significant numbers in the economy. See Revels, 874 F.3d at 654 2 (“Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such 3 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”). Here, 4 the court holds that a reasonable mind would not accept the VE’s testimony and the DOT’s data 5 from 1991 as adequate to support the conclusion that 102,000 addresser jobs exist in the United 6 States. See Farias v. Colvin, 519 F. App’x 439, 440 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a reasonable 7 mind would not accept the VE’s testimony regarding the existing number of dance hall hostess 8 positions); Skinner v. Berryhill, No. CV 17-3795-PLA, 2018 WL 1631275, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9 2, 2018) (“As other courts have found, common sense (bolstered here by the information 10 presented in the Study and on the SSA website itself), casts doubt on the reliability and credibility 11 of the VE’s testimony and on the ALJ’s reliance on that testimony to conclude that the occupation 12 of ‘addresser’ currently exists in significant numbers.”). Accordingly, the court will order that this 13 case be remanded for the ALJ to determine the availability of the “addresser” position in today’s 14 marketplace and, if warranted, the availability of other (non-obsolete) occupations existing in the 15 national and/or regional economy that Plaintiff can still perform. 16 III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 17 IT IS THEREFORE ORDRED that the court’s Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 18 16) is VACATED. 19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Reversal and/or Remand (ECF 20 No. 12) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. It is GRANTED to the extent this case 21 is remanded for further proceedings and DENIED in all other respects. 22 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case be REMANDED for further proceedings for 23 the ALJ to explore (1) the apparent conflicts between the Plaintiff’s social limitations and the 24 positions of credit authorizer and surveillance system monitor and (2) the availability of the 25 “addresser” position in today’s marketplace and, if warranted, the availability of other (non- 26 obsolete) occupations existing in the national and/or regional economy that Plaintiff can still 27 perform. 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commissioner’s Cross Motion to Affirm and 2 || Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Reversal (ECF Nos. 13, 14) is DENIED. 3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that that the Clerk of Court must enter judgment in favor of 4 || Plaintiff and against Defendant. 5 6 DATED: January 21, 2020 7 8 Kx pr La WOE BRENDA WEKSLER 9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28