Beaumont, S. L. & W. Ry. Co. v. Moore

174 S.W. 844, 1915 Tex. App. LEXIS 252
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJanuary 22, 1915
DocketNo. 6612.
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 174 S.W. 844 (Beaumont, S. L. & W. Ry. Co. v. Moore) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Beaumont, S. L. & W. Ry. Co. v. Moore, 174 S.W. 844, 1915 Tex. App. LEXIS 252 (Tex. Ct. App. 1915).

Opinion

PLEASANTS, C. J.

This is a suit to recover damages, brought by the appellee against the appellant.

Plaintiff’s amended petition, upon which the case was tried, alleges, in substance, that in February, 1911, he entered into a contract with the Bradford-Hicks Lumber Company by which said company purchased from plaintiff the timber upon a tract of 153 acres of land in Liberty county, and agreed to pay plaintiff therefor the sum of $7 per 1,000 feet, delivered on board defendant’s cars on Bradford’s spur of defendant’s railway in Liberty county, and said logs of timber, when so delivered, were to be transported by defendant over its railway to the sawmill of said lumber company at Dyers-dale, in Harris county. It is further alleged that in fulfillment of said contract plaintiff, during all the time between June 9 and September 27, 1911, had sufficient logs to have made delivery thereof in accordance with his said contract to the amount of 15,000 feet per day, exclusive of Sundays, but that, because of the failure and refusal of defendant to furnish sufficient cars at said spur to transport plaintiff’s logs, and the failure to promptly transport the cars after they were loaded, plaintiff was greatly hindered and delayed and caused much expense in making delivery of logs under his said contract.' It is alleged that there were 78 days in all, excluding Sundays, between June 9, 1911, and September 27, 1911; that plaintiff would have loaded and shipped 15,000 feet per day, except for the fact alleged that defendant on said days negligently, carelessly, and deliberately failed and refused to furnish cars “whereby plaintiff could and would have transported 15,000 feet of logs per day under his contract with the Bradford-Hicks Lumber Company.” The measure of damages is alleged as follows:

“Now, plaintiff shows that, by reason of the failure and refusal of said defendant company to furnish him cars as aforesaid on the dates hereinbefore set forth, and by reason of the refusal and failure of the defendant company to remove and transport the cars of logs loaded by plaintiff, and ready for shipment to Dyers-dale, Tex., on the dates hereinbefore set forth, the plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of $4,095, that being the value of plaintiff’s time, and the expenses of the plaintiff during the said 78 days hereinbefore set forth while the plaintiff was waiting for defendant company to furnish cars and remove loaded cars as above set forth.
“Plaintiff further shows that, had said defendant company furnished him cars and removed said loaded cars during said 78 days, he would have and could have realized out of his contract the amount above set forth, to wit, $4,-095, more than plaintiff has and did realize out of said contract with Bradford-Hicks Lumber Company, more particularly setting forth the items of damage suffered by plaintiff as mentioned in this sixth paragraph. The plaintiff says that his actual expenses during the 78 days mentioned were $594; that the value of his time was $565; and plaintiff says that he had, during said time, 24 head of oxen, 4 head of mules, 4 well-equipped log wagons, with all other equipment necessary for logging work and hauling work, by which plaintiff would and could have realized out of during the said 7$ days, but for defendant company’s failure and refusal to remove cars and furnish cars as aforesaid, $3,629.50. Plaintiff further shows that the above items of actual expenses were incurred by paying drivers, feed of teams, value of plaintiff’s time as set forth, and that the value of said teams and wagons during said time are reasonable charges and prices. Plaintiff further shows that after deducting his expenses, $594.50, that he was damaged by reason set forth herein in the sum of $4,095.
“Plaintiff now shows the court that during the 78 days the Bradford-Hicks Lumber Company would have received and paid the plaintiff for the logs at least 15,000 feet per day, and that plaintiff, during all of said time, was in a position to deliver said logs, and could have and would have delivered same if he could have gotten cars from defendant company.
“Plaintiff further shows the court that, in order to carry out the contract aforesaid with the Bradford-Hicks Lumber Company, it was not possible for him, during the said 7$ days or any one of said . days, to engage in any other work or utilize the teams or wagons during that time for any purpose whatsoever.”

Damages were laid in the sum of $4,095, and judgment asked in that amount.

In addition to a general demurrer, special exceptions, and general denial, the defendant pleaded, in substance, as follows:

“That Bradford spur, from which the logs were being shipped, was built for the sole and exclusive use and benefit of the Bradford-Hicks Lumber Company, said company assisting in the expense of its construction, and that plaintiff was a total stranger to the contract and agreement between the representatives and officials of the railway company and the representatives and officials of the lumber company with reference to said spur; that the manager for the Bradford-Hicks Lumber Company was vested with the authority to direct the movement of the logs handled from said spur, it being further stipulated that the logs should be moved in sufficient quantities to log the saw mill. If the logs were not moved in sufficient quantities for that purpose, it was provided that notice should be given by the lumber company, and the service would be improved accordingly; furthermore, that plaintiff was' only an agent or employs of the Bradford-Hicks Lumber Company in the matter of loading said logs at Bradford, having no rights in the spur, and no right to demand that cars be placed for his benefit, and no right to ask or require the movement of such logs as were placed any more rapidly than said Bradford-Hicks Lumber Company desired and requested same to be moved.”

The cause was tried in the court below with a jury, and verdict and judgment rendered in favor of plaintiff for the sum of $1,560.

The undisputed evidence establishes the following facts: The spur known as Bradford’s spur, and upon which plaintiff contracted to deliver the logs sold by him to the lumber company and load same on cars to be provided by the lumber company, was constructed under a contract made by appellant and the lumber company some time prior to the contract between the lumber company and plaintiff. The contract under *846 which the spur track was built provided that the lumber company would do the grading and furnish the ties, and that the railroad company would furnish the rails and the labor necessary to complete the track. The spur was built exclusively for the benefit of the lumber company, to facilitate the transportation for it of timber purchased near said spur, and it was expressly agreed that the railroad company would not be required to give any special service on said spur, but that cars taken from said spur would only be taken by the regular local freight trains. Mr. Hall, the superintendent of the railway company at the time the spur was constructed, testified:

“I built the spur known as Bradford’s spur, in Liberty county. It is located about two. miles west of Hardin, between Hardin and San-dune.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
174 S.W. 844, 1915 Tex. App. LEXIS 252, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/beaumont-s-l-w-ry-co-v-moore-texapp-1915.