Beaulieu v. National Mobility Elder Care Incorporated

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: June 27, 2024
• Docket: 2:23-cv-00428
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Thaddeus Joseph Beaulieu, No. CV-23-00428-PHX-GMS

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 National Mobility Elder Care, Incorporated, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 16 Pending before this Court is Defendant National Mobility Elder Care, Inc.’s Motion 17 to Dismiss (Doc. 28). For the reasons set forth below the motion is granted and Plaintiff’s 18 complaint is dismissed in its entirety with leave to amend within 30 days. Should Plaintiff 19 not appropriately file an amended complaint within thirty days of the date of this Order, 20 the Clerk of Court is directed to terminate this matter. 21 I. Background 22 On March 22, 2020, the Plaintiff signed a contract with the Defendant, after having 23 been informed by Defendant that he had completed the application process. The Contract 24 stated that Plaintiff would be an independent contractor working for the Defendant. 25 (Doc. 1-1 at ¶ I. D) as a “Driver Companion.” Plaintiff believed he would be providing 26 driving services for the elderly. Plaintiff was obliged to watch certain online training 27 videos prior to providing service. He was told by Defendant that he could do so at his 28 leisure. He completed the training videos approximately two months later on May 13. 1 Prior to that time, however, in light of the pandemic, and the stay-at home orders of the 2 Illinois Governor, Plaintiff decided not to accept any appointments to provide driving 3 services to the elderly. Thereafter, Defendant terminated the contract on May 26, 2020. In 4 doing so, Defendant informed Plaintiff that it had “decided to not move forward with the 5 application.” Plaintiff brings causes of action for breach of contract, negligent 6 misrepresentation, and fraud. 7 II. Analysis 8 Integral to Plaintiff’s only discernibly viable breach and misrepresentation claims is 9 the allegation that, contrary to the express language of the contract, he was Defendant’s 10 employee and not an independent contractor. This result, he alleges, is mandated by Illinois 11 law due to the control that the Defendant exercised over the performance of the function 12 he was contracted to perform. 820 ILCS 185/10. Nevertheless, to survive a motion to 13 dismiss, a complaint must plead sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is “plausible 14 on its face.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 570 (2007) see also Aschcroft 15 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). The contract’s requirement that Plaintiff take one 16 call for service a month and that he complete some training before doing so, is simply 17 insufficient to make it plausible that Plaintiff was Defendant’s employee under either 18 Illinois or Arizona law. Thus, Plaintiff has alleged no control exercised over his function 19 sufficient to make it even plausible that he was an employee to Plaintiff rather than his 20 independent contractor. 21 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant misrepresented to him in the contract that he 22 was an independent contractor as opposed to an employee. As Plaintiff has alleged 23 insufficient facts to make it plausible that he was Defendant’s employee as opposed to 24 being an independent contractor, he has not stated sufficient facts to make it plausible 25 that Defendant made a false statement to him in a business transaction when it 26 represented as much. A misrepresentation is a necessary element of the tort of negligent 27 misrepresentation. In re Arizona Theranos, Inc., Litigation, 308 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1055 28 (D. Ariz. 2018) (holding that a false statement in a business transaction is an element of 1 the claim of negligent misrepresentation). Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged one here. 2 Plaintiff also asserts two counts of fraudulent statement (or possibly statements 3 of negligent misrepresentation) against the Defendant. The first apparently being that 4 Plaintiff had completed all the requirements to qualify as a Driver Companion, the second 5 being that Plaintiff had decided not to move forward with the application when Defendant 6 terminated his contract. Regardless of which of these claims Plaintiff wishes to state, he 7 falls short. 8 To state a cause of action for fraud, there are a number of elements. Among them, 9 are that there be a fraudulent statement, that it be material, that the speaker of the statement 10 intend that it be relied on by the Plaintiff, that the Plaintiff be ignorant of the statement’s 11 falsity and relies on its truth, and that it cause a consequent and proximate inquiry to the 12 Plaintiff. Arnold & Assocs. Inc. v. Misys Healthcare Sys. A Div. of Misys, PLC, 275 F. 13 Supp. 2d 1013, 1027 (D. Ariz. 2003) (citing Nielson v. Flashberg, 101 Ariz. 335, 338-39, 14 (1966). 15 To the extent that Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s first alleged fraudulent (or 16 misrepresentational) statement that “he had completed the Defendant’s application 17 process,” caused him damage by getting him to sign the contract, Plaintiff has not offered 18 any facts to suggest that the statement was false or a misrepresentation. Nor has Plaintiff 19 offered any plausible damage that he suffered by signing the contract under the false 20 pretense that he had finished the application process. 21 As it pertains to the second alleged fraudulent statement made by Defendant in 22 terminating the contract with the Plaintiff that Plaintiff “had decided to not move forward 23 with your Application,” (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ V. C, V. D.5-1), there are no sufficient or plausible 24 facts that allege that the statement is false or material, that Plaintiff relied on it and was 25 ignorant of its falsity, and that the statement itself caused the Plaintiff any injury. 26 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT 27 1. Defendant National Mobility Eldercare, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 28) 28 is GRANTED. 1 2. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Doc. 1-1) is DISMISSED in its entirety || with leave to amend. 3 3. Plaintiff shall have thirty days from the date of this Order in which to file a 4|| Second Amended Complaint with the Clerk of Court. 5 4, If Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order, the Clerk of Court is directed to 6 || terminate this matter. 7 Dated this 27th day of June, 2024. ) 9 A Whacrsay Sooo) 10 Chief United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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