Beaty v. Ford Motor Company

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedFebruary 10, 2023
Docket3:17-cv-05201
StatusUnknown

This text of Beaty v. Ford Motor Company (Beaty v. Ford Motor Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Beaty v. Ford Motor Company, (W.D. Wash. 2023).

Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 4 AT TACOMA 5 JACOB BEATY; and JESSICA 6 BEATY, 7 Plaintiffs, C17-5201 TSZ 8 v. ORDER 9 FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant. 10

11 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on plaintiffs’ motion, docket no. 284, for 12 a certification, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), to allow an interlocutory appeal of (i) the 13 Order entered July 8, 2021, docket no. 243, denying plaintiffs’ motion for class 14 certification, docket no. 68, and granting defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony of 15 plaintiffs’ expert Thomas L. Read, Ph.D., docket no. 131; and (ii) the Minute Orders 16 entered May 26, 2022, and September 30, 2022, docket nos. 264 and 268, respectively, 17 granting in part defendant’s motion for summary judgment, docket no. 257, as to three of 18 plaintiffs’ theories of damages. In their motion, plaintiffs cited Johnson v. Nissan North 19 America, Inc., No. 17-cv-517, 2022 WL 2869528 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2022), which was 20 decided after this Court denied class certification and ruled that Dr. Read had “not 21 employed any reliable methodology” to support his opinion that the panoramic sunroofs 22 (“PSRs”) in the Ford vehicles at issue suffered from a common defect. See Order at 18 1 (docket no. 243). With respect to PSRs in certain Nissan models, the court in Johnson 2 reached a different conclusion with respect to Dr. Read’s testimony. See 2022 WL 3 2869528, at *11–12. In Johnson, Judge William H. Orrick ruled that Dr. Read’s opinions

4 were “sufficiently well explained in his report that any [reliability] issues . . . go to 5 weight and are for the jury to assess.” Id. at *11. In advance of and during a virtual 6 status conference conducted on February 3, 2023, the Court provided notice to the parties 7 that it was inclined to sua sponte reconsider its earlier exclusion of Dr. Read in light of 8 the Johnson decision, and the parties were provided an opportunity to submit briefs on

9 the subject. See Minutes (docket no. 292); see Def.’s Supp. Br. (docket no. 303); Pls.’ 10 Supp. Br. (docket no. 304). Having now considered all papers filed and the oral 11 arguments presented by counsel at the virtual hearing held on February 9, 2023, the Court 12 enters the following order. 13 Discussion

14 A. Expert Testimony 15 The federal rule governing the testimony of expert witnesses provides: 16 A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: 17 (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help 18 the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 19 (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 20 (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of 21 the case. 22 1 Fed. R. Evid. 702. In 2000, Rule 702 was amended in response to Daubert v. Merrell 2 Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and its progeny. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 3 advisory committee note to 2000 amendment.1 Daubert articulated several factors2 to

4 consider in assessing the reliability of scientific expert testimony, but those factors are 5 neither exclusive nor dispositive, and they have not been “codified” in Rule 702. Id. 6 Based on jurisprudence pre- and post-dating Daubert, the 2000 advisory committee 7 outlined the following considerations: 8 (1) Whether experts are “proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of research they have conducted independent of the 9 litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying.” 10 (2) Whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted 11 premise to an unfounded conclusion. (3) Whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious alternative 12 explanations. 13 (4) Whether the expert “is being as careful as he would be in his regular professional work outside his paid litigation consulting.” 14 15

16 1 During oral argument, defendant’s attorney referenced proposed amendments to Rule 702, 17 which might take effect in December of 2023, but they are not yet in force, and the Court considers them only to the extent that they are consistent with current case law. See Sardis v. 18 Overhead Door Corp., 10 F.4th 268, 283–84 (4th Cir. 2021); In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merchant Discount Antitrust Litig., No. 05-MD-1720, 2022 WL 15053250, at *4 n.9 19 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2022). 2 The factors outlined by the Daubert Court are (1) whether the expert’s theory or technique can 20 be or has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the theory or technique when applied; 21 (4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation; and (5) whether the theory or technique has been generally accepted in the scientific community. 22 509 U.S. at 593–94. 1 (5) Whether the field of expertise claimed by the expert is known to reach reliable results for the type of opinion the expert would give. 2 Id. (citations omitted). 3 As the 2000 advisory committee observed, “the caselaw after Daubert shows that 4 the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule,” and “the trial 5 court’s role as gatekeeper is not intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary 6 system.” Id. (citing United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land Situated in Leflore Cnty., Miss., 7 80 F.3d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1996)); see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (“Vigorous cross- 8 examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of 9 proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible 10 evidence.”). The 2000 advisory committee further noted that, in some cases, an expert 11 may “educate the factfinder about general principles, without ever attempting to apply 12 these principles to the specific facts of the case. For example, experts might instruct the 13 factfinder on the principles of thermodynamics, or bloodclotting, or on how financial 14 markets respond to corporate reports, without ever knowing about or trying to tie their 15 testimony into the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee note to 2000 16 amendment. According to the advisory committee, the 2000 amendment “does not alter 17 the venerable practice of using expert testimony to educate the factfinder on general 18 principles,” and, for such “generalized testimony, Rule 702 simply requires that: (1) the 19 expert be qualified; (2) the testimony address a subject matter on which the factfinder can 20 be assisted by an expert; (3) the testimony be reliable; and (4) the testimony ‘fit’ the facts 21 of the case.” Id. 22 1 1. The Qualifications of Thomas L. Read, Ph.D. 2 Dr. Read has a bachelor of science degree in metallurgy from the University of 3 Pennsylvania, a master’s degree in materials science from Stanford University, and a

4 Ph.D. in materials science and engineering from Stanford University. See Read Report 5 (Feb. 22, 2019) at ¶ 5 & App. A (docket no. 76-53).

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Beaty v. Ford Motor Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/beaty-v-ford-motor-company-wawd-2023.