Beatty v. General Accident Fire Life & Accident Assurance Corp.

182 So. 2d 112, 1966 La. App. LEXIS 5420
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJanuary 10, 1966
DocketNo. 2027
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 182 So. 2d 112 (Beatty v. General Accident Fire Life & Accident Assurance Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Beatty v. General Accident Fire Life & Accident Assurance Corp., 182 So. 2d 112, 1966 La. App. LEXIS 5420 (La. Ct. App. 1966).

Opinions

YARRUT, Judge.

Plaintiffs-appellants are the respective fathers appearing on behalf of themselves and their respective children, of tender age, who were injured in a highway collision between an automobile driven by Plaintiff Beatty, and a motor dump-truck driven by one Daigle. The children were guests in Beatty’s automobile at the time of the accident.

Defendant is the liability insurer of Plaintiff Beatty who, jointly with Jordan, brought this direct action against Beatty’s insurer only (not against Daigle or the [113]*113owner of the dump-truck) under LSA-R.S. 22:655.

Beatty in his joint petition with Jordan alleged his negligence, in causing the collision, as follows:

(a) He failed to keep a proper lookout.
(b) He failed to keep his vehicle under proper control. .
(c) He failed to maneuver his vehicle properly under the circumstances.
(d) He was driving at an excessive speed under the circumstances.
(e) He failed to keep a proper distance behind the vehicle in front of him.
(f) He failed to apply his brakes timely.

Defendant insurer, first admitting it was Beatty’s insurer, generally denied all allegations of the joint petition; and specially denied that Beatty was guilty of any negligence that caused the accident; and charged the accident was due solely to Daigle’s negligence in driving his truck across the highway, without warning, into the path of Beatty’s automobile, putting Beatty in a position of peril, from which he could not extricate himself to avoid the collision.

The accident occurred in July, 1961, about 9:30 p. m. on Airline Highway, near Moisant Airport.

In support of his self-incriminating allegations, Beatty testified that he was traveling the Airline Highway in the direction of Baton Rouge at an excessive rate of speed, and that he didn’t see the dump-truck until he was 30 to 40 feet behind it; that, because of his high acceleration, he was unable to avoid the accident and ran into the rear of the dump-truck; as a result of which his car was totally demolished, and the dump-truck was pushed off the shoulder of the road down the embankment.

On cross-examination Beatty testified:

“Q. Didn’t you tell me that you were clear, the road was clear ahead of you and all of a sudden this truck pulled in from the left side?
“A. All of a sudden I said I seen this truck in front of my lane of traffic, if I remember correctly, he was in my lane and I was traveling in, or on the line of the other lane.
“Q. Are you suggesting now that you were driving your automobile without looking ahead?
“A. I’m driving and looking ahead.
“Q. And didn’t you tell me that all of a sudden this car appeared from your left?
“A. All of sudden it appeared in front of me. Here is this dump truck (indicating), and I didn’t notice no lights on the dump truck, you understand, and so all of a sudden here is this dump truck in front of me and that’s what I told you.
“Q. And in that emergency all you could do was slap on your brakes, isn’t that right, or could you do anything else but apply your brakes, Mr. Beatty?
“A. I applied my brakes.
“Q. Was there anything else that you could do?
“A. No, I don’t see what else I could do.
“Q. I’m asking you, I mean, you did all you could do, is that right?
“A. You mean to prevent the accident?
“Q. I asked you if there was anything else you could do when you •saw this truck ahead of you except apply your brakes as hard as you could?
“A. I applied them all I could.”

[114]*114Daigle, driver of the dump-truck, testified he stopped at the intersection of a gravel road and the Airline Highway in obedience to a “Stop” sign; looked in both directions, saw no traffic coming, so entered the highway and was almost immediately struck by Beatty’s car. His view of the highway was clear and unobstructed. Significant is the distance Daigle testified he traveled on the highway prior to the collision. He testified he had traveled about one-half block and then estimated the distance as the length of the courtroom in which he was sitting as “a block or a little bit more.” The length of the courtroom was only 35 feet. It is apparent from Daigle’s testimony that he had traveled on the highway only a short distance, say ten or fifteen feet prior to the collision, per this cross-examination:

“Q. Did you come to a full and complete stop at the Airline Highway?
“A. Yes, sir.
* * * * * *
“Q. And from that point to the point where you were hit how far had you traveled?
“A. About half a block.
“Q. About half a block?
“A. Yes.
“Q. You were hit just then?
“A. After I got across the highway. I had my turn signals and all on to make my turn.
“Q. You were just as you crossed the — ■
“A. About half a block.
“Q. How far are you talking about, a half a block, how far are you from the back of this Courtroom with relationship to a block, what part of a block is that, a whole block or what? .
“A. I imagine it was about a block.
“Q. From where you are to the back of the Courtroom is about a block?
“A. A block or a little bit more.
“BY THE COURT:
That’s about thirty-five feet back to that wall from where you are sitting?”

Beatty produced his wife and mother of his child who testified she objected to her husband taking the children with him on the night in question, because he had been drinking and presumably was intoxicated. Upon objection by Defendant, the court refused to let her testify because no allegation of intoxication was made in the joint petition.

The attempt to introduce this evidence accentuates the motive of Beatty and his wife to prove his negligence to effect recovery from Defendant insurer in behalf of their minor child, even to the extent of establishing a criminal act on his part in driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated (LSA-R.S. 14:98).

The trial judge in dismissing Plaintiff’s suit thoroughly discussed the issues in his “Reasons for Judgment” from which we quote:

“The case was tried and after trial, reopened by the Court for additional testimony.
“On the original trial the only two factual witnesses were Beatty and Captain Ebeir of the State Police. The only evidence of negligence was Beatty’s testimony that he did not know how fast he was traveling, except that he was exceeding the.

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182 So. 2d 112, 1966 La. App. LEXIS 5420, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/beatty-v-general-accident-fire-life-accident-assurance-corp-lactapp-1966.