Beatty v. Cook
This text of Beatty v. Cook (Beatty v. Cook) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TAKANII D. BEATTY :
Petitioner : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-0405
v. : (JUDGE MANNION)
: WARDEN CLAIR DOLL, : Respondent
MEMORANDUM
On March 4, 2021, Petitioner, Takanii D. Beatty, an inmate confined in the York County Prison, York, Pennsylvania, filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. (Doc. 1). He requests the Court lift a parole detainer lodged against him as a result of new criminal charges. Id. Presently before the Court is Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition as moot, claiming Petitioner was subsequently sentenced on April 26, 2021 on the charges contained within the detainer. (Doc. 5). No traverse has been filed. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Respondent’s motion and dismiss the petition as moot. I. Background On March 5, 2018, Petitioner plead guilty to one count of manufacture,
delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver heroin. (Doc. 5- 1 at 3, Criminal Docket for CP-67-CR-7835-2016). He was sentenced to a six-to-twenty-three-month term of imprisonment in the York County Prison,
beginning on April 2, 2018. Id. He was granted parole effective September 1, 2018. On February 27, 2020, Defendant was charged with new criminal charges, alleged to have occurred on December 28, 2019. (Doc. 5-2 at 4).
He was arrested on February 28, 2020 and incarcerated in York County Prison, at which time a 72-hour detainer was lodged against him. Id. On March 3, 2020, the Court granted a Petition for Parole Violation and
a Petition for Permanent Detainer, filed by the York County Adult Probation. Id. On June 11, 2020, Petitioner filed a counseled Motion to Lift and Vacate the Parole Detainer. (Doc. 5-1 at 8, Criminal Docket for CP-67-CR-
7835-2016). Following a hearing and the filing of briefs, the Court denied the motion on August 14, 2020. Id. Petitioner then filed multiple pro se motions and was provided appointed counsel before ultimately retaining Attorney
Ronald Gross. Id. On March 24, 2021, Attorney Gross entered his appearance and filed a Petition to Schedule Parole Violation Hearing. Id.
On April 26, 2021, Petitioner appeared with counsel before the court for a Parole Violation Hearing. (Doc. 5-3 at 1). At the hearing, Petitioner admitted to being in violation of his parole by having police contact and was
sentenced to the unserved balance of 547 days with no chance for reparole. Id. The resentence was ordered effective February 28, 2020, the date he entered York County Prison on his new charges and the initial detainer. Id. The detainer has been lifted as Petitioner is now incarcerated in York County
Prison on his sentence in case CP-67-CR-7835-2016.
II. Discussion
A prisoner may seek federal habeas relief only if he is in custody in violation of the constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. §2254(a); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982); Geschwendt v. Ryan, 967 F.2d 877 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 (1992); Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 902 (1991). The purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is to challenge the legal authority under which a prisoner is held in custody. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S.
90 (1980) (the unique purpose of habeas corpus is to release the applicant for the writ from unlawful confinement); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (basic purpose of the writ is to enable those unlawfully incarcerated
to obtain their freedom); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); United States v. Hollis, 569 F.2d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 1977). The writ supplies the mechanism by which prisoners may challenge the length of their custodial
term. Fields v. Keohane, 954 F.2d 945, 949 (3d Cir. 1992); Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1991). The remedy is to free an inmate from unlawful custody. Generally, a petition for habeas corpus relief becomes moot when a
prisoner is released from custody before the court has addressed the merits of the petition. Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982). The general principle derives from the case or controversy requirement of Article III of the U.S.
Constitution. “This case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate ... the parties must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477–78 (1990). In other words,
“throughout the litigation, the plaintiff must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. at 477. See also Maleng v. Cook, 490
U.S. 488, 491–492 (1989) (habeas petitioner does not remain “in custody” under conviction after the sentence imposed has fully expired merely because of possibility that prior conviction will be used to enhance sentences
imposed for any subsequent crimes of which he is convicted); United States v. Romera–Vilca, 850 F.2d 177, 179 (3d Cir. 1988) (prisoner’s motion to vacate his conviction was not mooted when he was released from custody,
where he faced potential deportation as a collateral consequence of conviction). The doctrine of collateral consequences is a narrow exception to the general mootness rule. The exception arises where a former prisoner can
show that he will suffer some collateral legal consequences if the conviction is allowed to stand. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968); Chong v. Dist. Dir., INS, 264 F.3d 378, 384 (3d Cir. 2001). It is Petitioner’s burden to
demonstrate that collateral consequences exist to avoid having a case dismissed as moot. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); United States v. Kissinger, 309 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2002). The Supreme Court has held that the length of a term of supervised release cannot be reduced “by reason of
excess time served in prison.” United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (2000). Compare United States v. Cottman, 142 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 1998).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Beatty v. Cook, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/beatty-v-cook-pamd-2021.