UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ____________________________ ) MICHAEL BEATTIE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 01-2493 (RWR) ) JO ANNE BARNHART, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) ____________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se plaintiff Michael Beattie brought this action against
the Commissioner of Social Security and five unnamed Social
Security Administration employees alleging, in part, a wrongful
failure to produce documents related to an inadvertent
overpayment to Beattie, and wrongful termination of Beattie’s
social security benefits. Beattie seeks a temporary restraining
order (“TRO”) to preserve the documents and provide benefits.
Because Beattie has failed to demonstrate that he is likely to
suffer irreparable harm without a TRO and no other factors tip
the balance in favor of granting a TRO, his motion will be
denied.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff’s amended complaint seeks, among other things,
documents related to a claim for underlying social security
benefits that were terminated over eight years ago. (See Pl.’s - 2 -
Br. Supporting Mot. for TRO (“Pl.’s Br.”) at 1-2.)1 Beattie
asserts that he has requested from the defendants documents under
the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) and the Privacy Act which
the defendants have failed to search for and provide to him.
(Id.) Beattie claims that he will be unable to pursue his
benefits claim and will suffer stress if the defendants fail to
preserve his records. (Id. at 2-3.) He seeks a TRO that requires
the defendants to conduct an accounting and listing of the
documents, and that enjoins the defendants from destroying
documents sought and from continuing to withhold his social
security benefits. (Pl.’s Mot. for TRO.)
DISCUSSION
The purpose of preliminary equitable relief usually is “‘to
preserve the status quo pending the outcome of litigation.’”
Cobell v. Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 301, 314 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting
Dist. 50, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Int’l Union, United Mine
Workers of Am., 412 F.2d 165, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1969)). The factors
that apply in evaluating requests for a temporary restraining
order are identical to those that apply in evaluating requests for
preliminary injunctions. See Al-Fayed v. C.I.A., 254 F.3d 300,
303 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2001). To obtain preliminary injunctive
relief, the moving party must show that “he is likely to succeed
on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
1 Beattie’s filing was not paginated. Pagination, therefore, has been supplied by the Court. - 3 -
absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of the equities
tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public
interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct.
365, 374 (2008). A court evaluates these factors on a sliding
scale. Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1291
(D.C. Cir. 2009). A trial court has the discretion to grant or
deny a request for a preliminary injunction, Ambach v. Bell, 686
F.2d 974, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1982), but such requests are not granted
lightly. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997).
Injunctive relief “should not be granted unless the movant, by a
clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Id. (emphasis
in original) (quoting 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Fed.
Practice and Procedure § 2948, at 129-30 (2d ed. 1995)).
I. IRREPARABLE HARM
Ordinarily, a threshold requirement in granting temporary
injunctive relief is that the moving party make some showing of
irreparable harm. See CityFed Fin. Corp. v. Office of Thrift
Supervision, 58 F.3d 738, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Despite the
flexibility in weighing the four factors in relation to each
other, courts normally “require the moving party to demonstrate at
least ‘some injury.’” Id. (quoting Population Inst. v. McPherson,
797 F.2d 1062, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1986)); see Sampson v. Murray, 415
U.S. 61, 88 (1974) (stating that “‘[t]he basis for injunctive
relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable harm and
inadequacy of legal remedies’”) (alteration in original) - 4 -
(citation omitted). If a party fails to make a sufficient showing
of irreparable injury, a court may deny a motion for injunctive
relief. CityFed Fin. Corp., 58 F.3d at 747 (stating that because
the moving party made no showing of irreparable injury, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request
for preliminary relief).
An irreparable harm is an imminent injury that is both great
and certain to occur, and for which legal remedies are inadequate.
Wis. Gas Co. v. F.E.R.C., 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(citing Sampson, 415 U.S. at 88). “Bare allegations of what is
likely to occur are of no value since the court must decide
whether the harm will in fact occur.” Id. (emphasis in original).
Thus, to satisfy this prong, the movant must prove either “that
the harm has occurred in the past and is likely to occur again” or
that the harm is “certain to occur in the near future.” Id.
“‘Injunctions . . . will not issue to prevent injuries neither
extant nor presently threatened, but only merely “feared.”’”
Comm. in Solidarity With People of El Sal. (CISPES) v. Sessions,
929 F.2d 742, 745-46 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (alteration in original)
(citation omitted).
Beattie complains that he will suffer stress unless the
defendants are enjoined from destroying his records. He cites to
no authority that such stress is a harm appropriate to remedy by
injunctive relief. He also wants the defendants to conduct an
accounting of documents sought in his purported FOIA and Privacy - 5 -
Act requests and to produce a list of these documents, but he has
not demonstrated how an accounting or a list of documents will
prevent him from suffering imminent, irreparable harm. In
addition, he seeks to enjoin the defendants from destroying any
documents within the subject matter of his requests. Beattie,
however, has not demonstrated that the defendants previously have
destroyed any documents related to his pending benefits claim.
Rather, he states that the relevant documents are “in the
possession of both the local social security office and the
regional social security office.” (Pl.’s Br. at 2.) Similarly,
Beattie has not proven that the defendants have threatened to
destroy documents in the near future. He merely alleges that
“[t]here is a distinct possibility that the agency will destroy
documents that are the subject of [his] request.” (Pl.’s Br.
Supporting Mot. to Expedite at 2.) These feared possibilities
fall short of the imminent threat of injury required to grant a
TRO.
Beattie’s request to enjoin the defendants from continuing to
withhold his social security benefits is equally deficient. He
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ____________________________ ) MICHAEL BEATTIE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 01-2493 (RWR) ) JO ANNE BARNHART, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) ____________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se plaintiff Michael Beattie brought this action against
the Commissioner of Social Security and five unnamed Social
Security Administration employees alleging, in part, a wrongful
failure to produce documents related to an inadvertent
overpayment to Beattie, and wrongful termination of Beattie’s
social security benefits. Beattie seeks a temporary restraining
order (“TRO”) to preserve the documents and provide benefits.
Because Beattie has failed to demonstrate that he is likely to
suffer irreparable harm without a TRO and no other factors tip
the balance in favor of granting a TRO, his motion will be
denied.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff’s amended complaint seeks, among other things,
documents related to a claim for underlying social security
benefits that were terminated over eight years ago. (See Pl.’s - 2 -
Br. Supporting Mot. for TRO (“Pl.’s Br.”) at 1-2.)1 Beattie
asserts that he has requested from the defendants documents under
the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) and the Privacy Act which
the defendants have failed to search for and provide to him.
(Id.) Beattie claims that he will be unable to pursue his
benefits claim and will suffer stress if the defendants fail to
preserve his records. (Id. at 2-3.) He seeks a TRO that requires
the defendants to conduct an accounting and listing of the
documents, and that enjoins the defendants from destroying
documents sought and from continuing to withhold his social
security benefits. (Pl.’s Mot. for TRO.)
DISCUSSION
The purpose of preliminary equitable relief usually is “‘to
preserve the status quo pending the outcome of litigation.’”
Cobell v. Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 301, 314 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting
Dist. 50, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Int’l Union, United Mine
Workers of Am., 412 F.2d 165, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1969)). The factors
that apply in evaluating requests for a temporary restraining
order are identical to those that apply in evaluating requests for
preliminary injunctions. See Al-Fayed v. C.I.A., 254 F.3d 300,
303 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2001). To obtain preliminary injunctive
relief, the moving party must show that “he is likely to succeed
on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
1 Beattie’s filing was not paginated. Pagination, therefore, has been supplied by the Court. - 3 -
absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of the equities
tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public
interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct.
365, 374 (2008). A court evaluates these factors on a sliding
scale. Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1291
(D.C. Cir. 2009). A trial court has the discretion to grant or
deny a request for a preliminary injunction, Ambach v. Bell, 686
F.2d 974, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1982), but such requests are not granted
lightly. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997).
Injunctive relief “should not be granted unless the movant, by a
clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Id. (emphasis
in original) (quoting 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Fed.
Practice and Procedure § 2948, at 129-30 (2d ed. 1995)).
I. IRREPARABLE HARM
Ordinarily, a threshold requirement in granting temporary
injunctive relief is that the moving party make some showing of
irreparable harm. See CityFed Fin. Corp. v. Office of Thrift
Supervision, 58 F.3d 738, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Despite the
flexibility in weighing the four factors in relation to each
other, courts normally “require the moving party to demonstrate at
least ‘some injury.’” Id. (quoting Population Inst. v. McPherson,
797 F.2d 1062, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1986)); see Sampson v. Murray, 415
U.S. 61, 88 (1974) (stating that “‘[t]he basis for injunctive
relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable harm and
inadequacy of legal remedies’”) (alteration in original) - 4 -
(citation omitted). If a party fails to make a sufficient showing
of irreparable injury, a court may deny a motion for injunctive
relief. CityFed Fin. Corp., 58 F.3d at 747 (stating that because
the moving party made no showing of irreparable injury, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request
for preliminary relief).
An irreparable harm is an imminent injury that is both great
and certain to occur, and for which legal remedies are inadequate.
Wis. Gas Co. v. F.E.R.C., 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(citing Sampson, 415 U.S. at 88). “Bare allegations of what is
likely to occur are of no value since the court must decide
whether the harm will in fact occur.” Id. (emphasis in original).
Thus, to satisfy this prong, the movant must prove either “that
the harm has occurred in the past and is likely to occur again” or
that the harm is “certain to occur in the near future.” Id.
“‘Injunctions . . . will not issue to prevent injuries neither
extant nor presently threatened, but only merely “feared.”’”
Comm. in Solidarity With People of El Sal. (CISPES) v. Sessions,
929 F.2d 742, 745-46 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (alteration in original)
(citation omitted).
Beattie complains that he will suffer stress unless the
defendants are enjoined from destroying his records. He cites to
no authority that such stress is a harm appropriate to remedy by
injunctive relief. He also wants the defendants to conduct an
accounting of documents sought in his purported FOIA and Privacy - 5 -
Act requests and to produce a list of these documents, but he has
not demonstrated how an accounting or a list of documents will
prevent him from suffering imminent, irreparable harm. In
addition, he seeks to enjoin the defendants from destroying any
documents within the subject matter of his requests. Beattie,
however, has not demonstrated that the defendants previously have
destroyed any documents related to his pending benefits claim.
Rather, he states that the relevant documents are “in the
possession of both the local social security office and the
regional social security office.” (Pl.’s Br. at 2.) Similarly,
Beattie has not proven that the defendants have threatened to
destroy documents in the near future. He merely alleges that
“[t]here is a distinct possibility that the agency will destroy
documents that are the subject of [his] request.” (Pl.’s Br.
Supporting Mot. to Expedite at 2.) These feared possibilities
fall short of the imminent threat of injury required to grant a
TRO.
Beattie’s request to enjoin the defendants from continuing to
withhold his social security benefits is equally deficient. He
has failed to demonstrate that he will suffer an imminent injury
that legal remedies cannot redress if a temporary restraining
order is not granted. A TRO, ordinarily issued to preserve the
status quo, is an inappropriate tool for restoring Beattie’s
social security benefits which were terminated by agency decision
over eight years ago. - 6 -
II. OTHER FACTORS
A party seeking a TRO also must demonstrate that he is likely
to succeed on the merits, that the balance of the equities tips in
his favor and that the public interest favors granting of the TRO.
See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374. Assessing the likelihood of
success on the merits “does not involve a final determination of
the merits, but rather the exercise of sound judicial discretion
on the need for interim relief.” Nat’l Org. for Women, Wash. D.C.
Chapter v. Soc. Sec. Admin. of the Dep’t of Health and Human
Servs. et al., 736 F.2d 727, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (footnote and
internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Beattie’s scant brief
supporting his motion for a temporary restraining order asserts
that he has “obviously proven a possibility of success,” but
provides no support for his assertion. (Pl.’s Br. at 3.) Beattie
largely fails to address the substance of his underlying claims,
and merely makes conclusory or unsubstantiated allegations that
the defendants’ failure to provide him with the requested
documents violated FOIA and the Privacy Act, and the defendants
have denied him due process by failing to allow him to call
witnesses, submit evidence, be represented by an attorney, or
testify. (Id. at 2-3.) Furthermore, Beattie’s blanket statement
that he qualifies for social security benefits is not sufficient
to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.
Beattie also alleges that the balance of the equities tilts
sharply in his favor because he is destitute and the defendant is - 7 -
infinitely wealthy. He claims that he has no income and little
resources and the defendant should pay him $600 per month until
the case is resolved. (Id. at 3.) Beattie, however, has failed
to show that any money is owed to him or that his penury should
weigh against an agency that he has not demonstrated either has
destroyed any documents or is even obligated to provide the
requested documents. Moreover, Beattie makes no showing that
there is a strong public interest that favors reinstating by TRO
social security benefits that were terminated by agency decision,
or ordering an agency not to destroy documents it has not even
threatened to destroy.
CONCLUSION
Beattie has failed to show that he will suffer irreparable
injury if his motion for a temporary restraining order is not
granted. Nor has he shown that other considerations warrant
issuing the relief he seeks. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that Beattie’s motion for a temporary restraining
order and expedited decision [70] be, and hereby is, DENIED.
SIGNED this 20th day of October, 2009.
/s/ RICHARD W. ROBERTS United States District Judge