Beatriz Maldonado v. Morgan Hill Unified School District

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: November 15, 2023
• Docket: 22-16572
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 15 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BEATRIZ MALDONADO; EFRAIN F. No. 22-16572 MALDONADO, Parents, D.C. No. 5:21-cv-06611-VKD Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. MEMORANDUM*

MORGAN HILL UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Virginia K. DeMarchi, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 13, 2023** San Jose, California

Before: GRABER, PAEZ, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiffs Beatriz and Efrain Maldonado appeal a partial denial of their

motion for attorney’s fees under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

(“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Plaintiffs argue that the district court

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). unreasonably reduced the fees and costs requested for work on two related

administrative disputes in which they sought accommodations and services for

their child, who has a learning disability. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We review the award of attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion, underlying

factual determinations for clear error, and legal analysis relevant to the fee

determination de novo. Beauchamp v. Anaheim Union High Sch. Dist., 816 F.3d

1216, 1220 (9th Cir. 2016). We affirm.

The district court’s reduction of the number of hours for which fees would

be awarded, although substantial, was thoroughly explained and proper under our

caselaw. See Aguirre v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.

2006) (noting that fees awarded under the IDEA are “governed by the standards set

forth by the Supreme Court in Hensley and its progeny” (citing Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983))). The district court acted within its discretion to

consider the reliability of the billing records, remove time spent on unnecessary

tasks, and reduce the total remaining hours based on the “degree of success.” See

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433–37 (noting that a district court may exclude hours that are

inadequately documented or “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary,” and

that it may reduce hours “to account for . . . limited success”); Thompson v.

Gomez, 45 F.3d 1365, 1367–68 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding district courts may reduce

a “fees-on-fees” award to reflect the percentage of “merits fees” recovered). And

2 although the district court was “mathematical” in its analysis of the degree of

success, it did not use the approach, disapproved by Hensley, of simply comparing

the number of successful and unsuccessful issues. See 461 U.S. at 435 n.11. If it

had, it would have reduced the fee much more—Plaintiffs do not dispute that they

were unsuccessful on thirty-eight out of forty sub-issues.

Contrary to Plaintiffs’ contentions on appeal, the district court did not rely

on the wrong billing records or overlook filings. Rather, the district court

concluded that it would be unfair to rely on the filings made belatedly with and

after Plaintiffs’ reply brief, and the court explained why it was not persuaded by

Plaintiffs’ justifications for the discrepancies between the billing records. Nor was

the district court obligated to award 100% of the requested fee just because it

found the relief obtained “significant” or because of the absence of a specific type

of rebuttal evidence. See id. at 440 (“A reduced fee award is appropriate if the

relief, however significant, is limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as

a whole.” (emphasis added)); Beauchamp, 816 F.3d at 1224–25 (noting that the fee

applicant’s burden to produce “satisfactory evidence” of reasonableness is “not

excused by lack of opposition” (citation omitted)).

The district court also did not abuse its discretion in lowering the hourly rate

requested by Plaintiffs by a relatively small amount. The district court properly

considered “fees awarded by other judges in the same locality in similar cases,”

3 Shayler v. 1310 PCH, LLC, 51 F.4th 1015, 1022–23 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting

Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th Cir. 2008)), and it was

not required to adopt other attorneys’ conclusions that a higher rate was

reasonable, Sam K. ex rel. Diane C. v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 788 F.3d 1033, 1041

(9th Cir. 2015) (“That other attorneys may think that a given rate is ‘reasonable’

does not necessarily say what the prevailing market rates actually are.”). The

district court carefully explained why each submitted declaration was not

determinative, “how it came up” with the prevailing market rate, and why counsel

was not entitled to an increased rate for the time spent on the fees motion.

Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1111.

Regarding costs, the district court also permissibly awarded only the filing

fee given counsel’s failure to provide the documentation required by statute and

the local rules for the other requested costs. See 28 U.S.C. § 1924; N.D. Cal. Civ.

R. 54-1.

AFFIRMED.