Beatrice Pitre v. Robert Forward Sr. Independent of the Estate of Marie Mahathy Forward

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJuly 24, 2014
Docket09-12-00336-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Beatrice Pitre v. Robert Forward Sr. Independent of the Estate of Marie Mahathy Forward (Beatrice Pitre v. Robert Forward Sr. Independent of the Estate of Marie Mahathy Forward) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Beatrice Pitre v. Robert Forward Sr. Independent of the Estate of Marie Mahathy Forward, (Tex. Ct. App. 2014).

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont _________________ NO. 09-12-00336-CV _________________

BEATRICE PITRE, Appellant

V.

ROBERT FORWARD SR. INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF MARIE MAHATHY FORWARD, Appellee ________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the County Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. 97905 ________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This appeal involves a will contest concerning the estate of Marie Mahathy

Forward. Marie died on November 24, 2008, at the age of ninety-six years old.1 On

December 4, 2008, Robert Forward Sr., Marie’s son and appellee herein, filed an

application to probate Marie’s will executed on November 22, 2002, which left

Marie’s entire estate to Robert (the “2002 Will”). However, on December 16,

1 We note that the medical records and testimony at trial is inconsistent regarding Marie’s date of birth and thus her age at her death. However, because both applications to probate Marie’s will indicate that she died at ninety-six years of age, we presume that to be her correct age at death. 1 2008, Marie’s daughter, Beatrice Pitre, and appellant herein, filed an application to

probate a will executed by Marie on October 17, 2008, which left Marie’s entire

estate to Beatrice (the “2008 Will”). Robert filed an objection to Beatrice’s

application, contesting the validity of the 2008 Will. The case was tried to a jury.

Based on the jury’s findings, the trial court rendered judgment that the will offered

by Beatrice be denied probate. Beatrice filed a motion for new trial alleging that

the evidence was factually insufficient to support the jury’s verdict that Marie

lacked testamentary capacity and was unduly influenced to execute a new will.2

Because we do not find a signed order in the appellate record denying Beatrice’s

motion for new trial, we presume the motion for new trial was overruled by

operation of law. Beatrice then filed this appeal. We conclude the evidence is

sufficient to support the jury’s findings, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I. Preservation of Error

On appeal, Beatrice contends the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to support the jury’s finding that Marie lacked testamentary capacity

on the day she signed the 2008 Will or that Marie was unduly influenced by

Beatrice to execute the 2008 Will. To preserve a legal sufficiency claim, a party

2 The motion for new trial indicates Mary Pitre, not Beatrice Pitre, filed it. Mary Pitre is Beatrice’s daughter; however, she is not a party to this lawsuit. We attribute this to a clerical error as no party has claimed error. We conclude that this clerical error has no bearing on the issues presented in this appeal. 2 must raise the complaint first with the trial court through a motion for directed

verdict, a motion for JNOV, an objection to the submission of the question to the

jury, a motion to disregard the jury’s answer to a vital fact question, or a motion

for new trial. See T.O. Stanley Boot Co. v. Bank of El Paso, 847 S.W.2d 218, 220

(Tex. 1992); Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509, 510-11 (Tex. 1991). While Beatrice

filed a motion for new trial, her motion argues only that the evidence is factually

insufficient to support the jury’s findings. Her motion does not contend that the

evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s findings. Our review of the

record further reveals that Beatrice took none of the other actions identified above

to preserve her legal sufficiency argument for our review. Accordingly, Beatrice

has waived her challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence. See Tex. R. App.

P. 33.1. We overrule Beatrice’s contention that the evidence was legally

insufficient to support the jury’s finding that Marie lacked testamentary capacity or

that Marie was under the influence of Beatrice when she executed the 2008 Will.

Having overruled Beatrice’s legal sufficiency contention, we now address whether

the evidence is factually sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.

II. Standard of Review

When a party challenges the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on an

issue on which she has the burden of proof, she must demonstrate on appeal that

the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.

3 Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001). We will consider all

the evidence in the record, both in support of and contrary to the finding. See id.

We will set aside the trial court’s finding only if it is so contrary to the great weight

and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.

See id. Where there are disputed issues of fact, we give deference to the factfinder

as it is the “sole judge[] of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be

given their testimony.” Jaffe Aircraft Corp. v. Carr, 867 S.W.2d 27, 28 (Tex.

1993).

III. Testamentary Capacity

Beatrice complains that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the

jury’s finding that Marie lacked testamentary capacity on October 17, 2008 to sign

a new will. Each party contends the other party had the burden of proof on this

issue at trial. When a will is contested before it is admitted to probate, the

proponent of the will bears the burden of establishing that the testatrix had

testamentary capacity. See Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 57 (Tex. 1983);

Schindler v. Schindler, 119 S.W.3d 923, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet.

denied). The proponent of the will may make a prima facie case on this issue by

introducing a will with a self-proving affidavit into evidence. Schindler, 119

S.W.3d at 931. At that point, the burden of producing evidence negating

testamentary capacity shifts to the opponent of the will. Id. The burden of

4 persuasion, however, always remains with the proponent of the will. In re Estate of

Coleman, 360 S.W.3d 606, 611 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.). Robert filed

his contest to the 2008 Will before it was admitted to probate. Thus, Beatrice, as

the proponent of the 2008 Will, had the burden of proof to establish that Marie had

testamentary capacity at the time the 2008 Will was executed. Because the 2008

Will, which the trial court admitted into evidence, contained a self-proving

affidavit, the burden of production shifted to Robert, as the contestant of the 2008

Will, to produce evidence to overcome Beatrice’s prima facie case that Marie

possessed testamentary capacity on the day she executed the 2008 Will. The

burden of persuasion on the issue of testamentary capacity, however, remained

with Beatrice at all times.

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Related

Bracewell v. Bracewell
20 S.W.3d 14 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2000)
Cecil v. Smith
804 S.W.2d 509 (Texas Supreme Court, 1991)
Dow Chemical Co. v. Francis
46 S.W.3d 237 (Texas Supreme Court, 2001)
Long v. Long
196 S.W.3d 460 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2006)
Croucher v. Croucher
660 S.W.2d 55 (Texas Supreme Court, 1983)
Horton v. Horton
965 S.W.2d 78 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1998)
Chambers v. Chambers
542 S.W.2d 901 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1976)
City of Keller v. Wilson
168 S.W.3d 802 (Texas Supreme Court, 2005)
Schindler v. Schindler
119 S.W.3d 923 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2003)
T.O. Stanley Boot Co. v. Bank of El Paso
847 S.W.2d 218 (Texas Supreme Court, 1993)
Jaffe Aircraft Corp. v. Carr
867 S.W.2d 27 (Texas Supreme Court, 1993)
in the Estate of Edmund B. Coleman
360 S.W.3d 606 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2011)

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