Beasley v. Super. Ct.

• Court: California Court of Appeal
• Decided: May 19, 2025
• Docket: JAD25-04
• Status: Published

Opinion

Filed 4/28/25

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE APPELLATE DIVISION

ROBERT MICHAEL BEASLEY, Petitioner, Case No: APRI2400144 v. (Trial Court: 7N4N0037GRB) SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, Respondent, THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Real Party in Interest.

MAXIM YURIEVICH MARKOVIN, Petitioner, Case No: APRI2400145

v. (Trial Court: 00Q5001DYMM)

SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, Respondent, THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF PER CURIAM OPINION

CALIFORNIA, Real Party in Interest.

1 ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate and prohibition. Joshua Knight, Judge. Petitions

denied.

J. Brian Campbell for Petitioners.

No appearance for Respondent.

No appearance for Real Party in Interest.

THE COURT*

These two petitions for extraordinary writ present the question of whether an older and

slightly modified version of a traffic violation notice to appear form, which the Judicial Council

has since revised, remains eligible to serve as a complaint under Vehicle Code section 40513,

subdivision (b). We hold in the affirmative and deny the petitions, which we have consolidated

for decision. (See In re Carl H. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1022, fn. 1; People v. Superior Court

(Kenner) (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 65, 67–68.)

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In case APRI2400144, on May 2, 2024, an officer of the California Highway Patrol (CHP)

cited petitioner Beasley for an infraction violation of Vehicle Code section 22348, subdivision (c),

which generally prohibits driving certain large or specialized vehicles outside of the rightmost or

otherwise designated lane. The officer issued Beasley a notice to appear which purported to be on

“Judicial Council of California Form TR-135,” revised January 1, 2024.

In case APRI2400145, on June 18, 2024, a different CHP officer cited petitioner Markovin

for an infraction violation of Vehicle Code section 21461, subdivision (a), failure to obey a traffic

sign or signal. The officer issued Markovin a notice to appear on a form practically identical to

* FIRETAG, P. J.; WOOD, J.; VELÁSQUEZ, J. 2 the one issued to Beasley, except that it purported to be “Judicial Council of California Form TR-

130,” revised January 1, 2024.1

At their arraignments on October 22, 2024, both petitioners demurred to the notices to

appear, insofar as they were now serving as criminal complaints, on the ground that they were not,

in fact, on a form approved by the Judicial Council, and thus that they did not conform to the

statutory requirements for a complaint. In particular, each petitioner argued that the filed notice

was on an older, revoked form, falsely indicated that it was currently authorized, and fatally

differed from the approved form because the filed notice lacked a large amount of the approved

form’s instructional text informing the cited person of their options in response. Beasley further

pointed out that there actually is no form TR-135 with a revision date of January 1, 2024, because

the Judicial Council withdrew that form as of that date. The trial court overruled the demurrers

and petitioners entered pleas of not guilty.

On November 21, 2024, petitioners filed petitions for writ of mandate and prohibition in

this court. (See Lopez v. Superior Court (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 824 [engaging in writ review of

an order overruling a demurrer].) We issued orders to show cause and stayed proceedings in the

trial court. The District Attorney declined to respond to the orders to show cause. (See People ex

rel. Kottmeier v. Municipal Court (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 602, 608–610.)

DISCUSSION

Statutory Framework

Because “‘“‘[a] demurrer raises an issue of law as to the sufficiency of the accusatory

pleading, and it tests only those defects appearing on the face of that pleading,’”’” we will “‘review

1 There were a couple of other extremely minor differences between the two notices. For example, in one the space for the cited person’s name was labeled “Name (First, Middle, Last),” and in the other it was labeled “Name (First, Middle, Last)/(Company).” 3 the order overruling defendant’s demurrer de novo.’” (Hoffman v. Superior Court (2017) 16

Cal.App.5th 1086, 1090–1091 [applying the appellate standard to writ review].)

“[T]he vast majority of” traffic infraction cases begin after a traffic stop, during which “the

officer . . . prepare[s] a written notice to appear (i.e., a citation or “ticket”) and . . . release[s] the

violator “forthwith” when the latter in turn gives his written promise that he will appear as

directed” in court. (People v. Superior Court (Simon) (1972) 7 Cal.3d 186, 199.) The Legislature

has delegated to the Judicial Council the duty to “prescribe the form of the notice to appear” (Veh.

Code, § 40500, subd. (b)), but there is no rule of law that in this situation a citing officer is required

to use the Judicial Council form (see also post, at p. 8, fn. 5). Indeed, the basic contents of a valid

notice to appear are set forth by statute:

[T]he arresting[2] officer shall prepare in triplicate a written notice to appear . . . containing the name and address of the person, the license number of his or her vehicle, if any, the name and address, when available, of the registered owner or lessee of the vehicle, the offense charged and the time and place when and where he or she shall appear.

(Veh. Code, § 40500, subd. (a).) Once the notice to appear is complete, the officer gives a copy

to the cited person and files another copy with the court. (Veh. Code, §§ 40500, subd. (d), 40504,

subd. (a), 40506.)

The copy filed with the court is the one we are concerned with here, because Vehicle Code

section 40513 imbues it with special importance. Specifically, the notice to appear can serve as

the complaint — the accusatory pleading in the traffic infraction case — to varying scope, in lieu

of a traditional complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney. (See Gov. Code, §§ 26500, 72193,

2 A traffic violator is technically under arrest “when the officer determines there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and begins the process of citing the violator to appear in court,” and “‘[t]he Vehicle Code . . . refers to the person awaiting citation as “the arrested person.”’” (Simon, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 200.) 4 subd. (a); Pen. Code, §§ 19.7, 691, subd. (c), 949.) Any statutorily sufficient notice to appear

“shall constitute a complaint to which the defendant may plead ‘guilty’ or ‘nolo contendere.’”

(Veh. Code, § 40513, subd. (a).) However, if the defendant wishes to enter a different plea, almost

always a plea of not guilty (see Pen. Code, § 1016), a notice to appear can only suffice as the

complaint and confer jurisdiction to proceed to trial if it “has been prepared on a form approved

by the Judicial Council” (Veh. Code, § 40513, subd. (b); see generally People v. Barron (1995) 37

Cal.App.4th Supp. 1; cf. Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 752–753

[discussing the analogous provision for non-traffic cases]). If the notice to appear is not on a form

approved by the Judicial Council, and the defendant does not plead guilty or nolo contendere, the

case can only proceed if the prosecutor files a traditional complaint. (Veh. Code, § 40513, subd.

(a) [also noting that the defendant may, in writing, waive this requirement].) A demurrer is

available to challenge a non-conforming notice to appear. (Pen. Code, § 1004, subds. (a), (e).)

Vehicle Code section 40513, subdivision (b), however, contains a latent ambiguity that

forms the crux of this case: Does “a form approved by the Judicial Council” include a form that

has been approved by the Judicial Council, or does it exclusively mean a form that is currently

approved by the Judicial Council? A brief history of the forms in question will provide the

necessary background to this question, drawn from a report to the Judicial Council from that body’s

Traffic Advisory Committee (hereafter Report), the recommendations of which the Judicial

Council adopted in full at its meeting on September 19, 2023.3

3 We take judicial notice of the relevant documents. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).) The Report is available at: [as of Apr. 14, 2025]. The meeting minutes, with the relevant approval observed on pages 3 and 25, are available at: [as of Apr. 14, 2025]. 5 History of the Forms and Comparison with Those Used in the Present Case

From 2015 through 2023, the Judicial Council had promulgated separate forms, notably

TR-130 and TR-135, depending on whether or not the officer was going to execute the notice to

appear electronically. (Report, at pp. 2, 17–19, 59–61 [including copies of those forms].) The

changes recommended in the Report, which took effect on January 1, 2024 (see Report, at p. 1),

involved two significant components for purposes of this case. First, the Judicial Council made a

number of changes to form TR-130, which fall into three categories: (1) changes “to improve

litigants’ understanding of the necessary steps to address their citations,” such as moving the “date

of required action and court addresses to the top of the citation,” adding “a warning to the top to

emphasize consequences for failing to act,” and increasing “the font size on the back of the

citation”; (2) changes to “improve the form for law enforcement agencies,” like removing the

“redundant” field to enter the day of the week and replacing “‘Case No.’ with ‘Agency Case No.’”;

and (3) a change to comply with new legislation by replacing the box for noting evidence of

financial responsibility with a box for noting the reason for the traffic stop. (Report, at pp. 3–4,

14–16 [including a copy of the new form].) Second, “[g]iven technological advances,” it was

determined “that separate electronic notice to appear forms are no longer necessary and that the

redesigned form TR-130 can efficiently serve both paper and electronic formats.” (Report, at p.

5.) Accordingly, form TR-135 was “revoked” “as redundant.” (Report, at pp. 2, 5, 11, 17–19.)

It is beyond doubt that the notices to appear issued and filed in this case were not on forms

that were currently approved by the Judicial Council at the time, because they were on the old

versions of forms TR-130 and TR-135, not the new consolidated version of form TR-130. Further,

a comparison between the notices to appear in this case and the Judicial Council’s formerly

promulgated versions — with allowances for areas that the Judicial Council has permitted law

6 enforcement agencies to modify as desired — shows that there are no material differences between

them from the perspective of a court handling the ensuing infraction case. More to the point, the

forms used here lack none of the case-specific information that the Judicial Council required at the

time, and provide it in substantially the same order and format. Granted, they do include extra

information, but the Judicial Council effectively allowed for this by including a generic box for

comments in the standard form. (Compare appen., post, with Report, at pp. 17–19, 59–61; see

Judicial Council Forms, form TR-INST, §§ 5.000, 5.010; see also Veh. Code, § 2806.5, subd. (a).)4

The only notable differences are, first, that both notices to appear used here purport to be

on forms revised January 1, 2024. While it is true that the Judicial Council did not issue such a

revision of these forms in this format, it is plausible enough on the face of it that the revision date

actually refers to the last time CHP modified the form which, again, they have some ability to do.

Additionally, the TR-130 form used in Markovin’s case directed him to “follow the instructions

below” to appear in court, rather than “the instructions on the reverse,” and both notices to appear

seem to have lacked the detailed but generic information on the reverse side of the form. But these

are minor errors that do not affect the substance of the operative portion of the notice to appear,

for reasons we will discuss in more depth below.

Analysis

We return to the key legal question before us, and reiterate it: What does it mean for a

form to be “approved by the Judicial Council” within the meaning of Vehicle Code section 40513,

subdivision (b)?

In independently interpreting a statute, our task is to ascertain and effectuate the law’s intended purpose. [Citation.] In interpreting a statute, we look first to the statute’s words. . . .

4 We have redacted detailed identifying information from the forms used in this case as reproduced in the appendix, because that information is not relevant to the discussion. 7 However, if the statutory language is ambiguous and is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning, we look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part. [Citation.] Our ultimate objective in interpreting a statute is to construe the statute in a way that most closely comports with the apparent intent of the Legislature.

(People v. LaDuke (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 95, 100.)

It bears emphasis that our examination is into what the Legislature intended, as that body

was the one that enacted the applicable statutory text. There is no basis in that text to find a

legislative delegation to the Judicial Council of the plenary authority to determine, in every respect,

the manner in which traffic infractions must be alleged via notice to appear.5 And even if this were

a plausible reading, we would reject it as unnecessarily “‘“rais[ing] serious and doubtful

constitutional questions”’” (People v. Guiterrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1373), because such a

delegation, built on as thin a statutory foundation as we have here, would run a real risk of violating

the constitutional principle of the separation of powers due to lacking the necessary guidance from

the Legislature in establishing both “the fundamental policy” goals and “a yardstick guiding” the

exercise of the delegated power (People v. Wright (1982) 30 Cal.3d 705, 712–713; see Lovelace

v. Superior Court (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1081, 1097; Laborers’ Internat. Union of North

America, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 1002; see also Trans-Action Commercial Investors, Ltd. v.

5 Government Code section 68511 provides, as a general rule, that when the Judicial Council has “prescribed” a form “by rule,” “no court may use a different form” for the same purpose. This general rule must yield to the specific rule of Vehicle Code section 40315, which expressly recognizes the limited legitimacy of notices to appear on non-approved forms and distinguishes those, not with forms affirmatively prescribed for exclusive use by the Judicial Council, but rather with those merely approved by the Judicial Council. (See People v. Superior Court (Ortiz) (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 851, 884 [specific statutes control over general ones].) Additionally, case law has recognized that Government Code section 68511 does not itself endow the Judicial Council with the authority to determine the sufficiency of initial pleadings. (People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Superior Court (Verdeja) (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1484.) 8 Jelinek (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 352, 364 [the Legislature has the “primary constitutional authority

to provide the rules governing judicial procedure”]).

As a result, the Judicial Council’s own rules on how to use forms are only relevant to the

extent the Legislature has impliedly incorporated them in Vehicle Code section 40513, which is

simply another way of articulating the inquiry. The question is thus not broadly whether the use

of outdated forms is fully permissible under all applicable rules of court. (See Cal. Rules of Court,

rules 1.37 [“[a] person serving and filing a Judicial Council form must use the current version of

the form”]; 4.103(a) [mandating compliance with the instructional “requirements in the current

version of” form TR-INST]; see generally Judicial Council Forms, form TR-INST, §§ 2.010,

3.010.) Nor do we see that the Judicial Council has unequivocally advanced a particular

interpretation of the statute. (Compare Judicial Council Forms, form TR-INST, § 3.010(a)

[officers “must use the revised Notice to Appear form by the effective date of the revised form if

it is to serve as a complaint” (emphasis added)], with § 6.000 [“[l]aw enforcement agencies should

be aware that if a written Notice to Appear is not prepared on an approved Judicial Council form,

a court may conclude that it does not constitute a complaint to which a defendant may enter a plea”

(emphasis added)]; see also Cal. Rules of Court rule 1.37 [distinguishing between multiple

versions of a single approved form, not approved and nonapproved versions of the form].) Rather,

the question is, quite narrowly, whether the intent of the Legislature is that an older or slightly

modified Judicial Council form can remain competent for the sole and specific purpose of serving

as an infraction complaint in traffic court. The statutory incorporation of certain acts of the Judicial

Council in drafting forms does not necessarily mean that the statute assimilates everything the

Judicial Council has to say on the topic of notices to appear. On the contrary, “one must look at

the statutes enacted by the Legislature to determine the controlling authority of rules of court

9 adopted by the” Judicial Council. (Laborers’ Internat. Union of North America v. El Dorado

Landscape Co. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 993, 1005; see also California Court Reporters Assn. v.

Judicial Council of California (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 15, 22 [“the legislative branch [is] an

inherently higher authority than the Judicial Council”].) In short, deviations from the rules of court

do not necessarily constitute deviations from the statutory directive.

Looking, then, at the structure of Vehicle Code section 40513, the primary distinction the

statute makes is between variable and unscrutinized locally drafted notices to appear (subd. (a))

and standardized and vetted statewide notices to appear (subd. (b)). But there is no indication that

rigid uniformity is the primary legislative goal with respect to the latter. Even the Judicial Council

authorizes certain variations “[t]o meet the unique customs and/or needs of local law enforcement

agencies and courts . . . .” (Judicial Council Forms, form TR-INST, § 5.010.) And when the

Legislature does desire such uniformity, it gives the Judicial Council detailed guidance on how to

proceed. (Cf. Fam. Code, § 17400, subd. (d) [“[t]he Judicial Council . . . shall develop simplified

. . . forms for any action for support brought pursuant to this section”]; County of Lake v. Palla

(2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 418, 424–425.) Here, in the absence of such detailed guidance, we instead

surmise that the Legislature’s primary goal is to rely on the Judicial Council’s ample expert and

deliberative resources to audit notice to appear forms for legal sufficiency and completeness. The

Judicial Council’s positive assessment of the propriety of a given form is a matter of historical

fact, and does not necessarily and automatically vanish when they issue a revised form —

especially here, where the older forms in question had been approved and used without issue for

almost a decade before revisions were enacted.

10 Turning to the broader legal scheme, any interpretation of Vehicle Code section 40513,

subdivision (b) that mandates use of the most recent form on pain of demurrer retreats toward a

type of formalism in pleading that the Legislature eschewed almost a century ago.

“The statutes have relieved the administration of criminal law of much of the unnecessary strictness of the older English forms of pleading. They have abolished the subtle distinctions and technicalities formerly required in indictments, and have worked a change in pleading and practice in criminal actions similar to that wrought by the Code of Civil Procedure in civil actions.

Moreover, the amendments in 1927 and 1929 of the statutes relating to pleadings in criminal cases further liberalized the rules of pleading in criminal prosecutions, and the sufficiency of an accusatory pleading is not to be tested either by the rigorous rules of the common law or by the rules that existed before the statutory amendments of 1927 and 1929. The pleading is formally sufficient if, in substance, it charges the defendant with the commission of a public offense in words sufficient to give him notice of the offense of which he is accused. Only the essential elements of the offense need be charged.”

(Brown v. Superior Court (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 628, 632 [quoting 26 Cal.Jur.2d, Indictment and

Information, § 38].) In light of the law’s preference “to provide simplified and expeditious

procedures for the adjudication of less serious traffic offenses” (People v. Carlucci (1979) 23

Cal.3d 249, 257), we interpret the Legislature’s intent for traffic infractions consistently with, and

certainly not more strictly than, its intent for felonies and misdemeanors. And indeed here, the

once-approved Judicial Council forms the CHP officers issued to defendants in this case fully

honor the Legislature’s directions as to the information to be included in a complaint (Pen. Code,

§§ 950, 952, 958, 959), and fully serve the purpose of such a pleading. As was held in People v.

Bright (1996) 12 Cal.4th 652, 670, overruled on another ground in People v. Seel (2004) 34 Cal.4th

535,

the purpose of the charging document is to provide the defendant with notice of the offense charged. [Citation.] The charges thus must contain in substance a statement that the accused has committed some public offense, and may be phrased in the words of the enactment describing the offense or in any other words sufficient to

11 afford notice to the accused of the offense charged, so that he or she may have a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present a defense.

Furthermore, under Penal Code section 960, “[n]o accusatory pleading is insufficient, nor can the

trial, judgment, or other proceeding thereon be affected by reason of any defect or imperfection in

matter of form which does not prejudice a substantial right of the defendant upon the merits.”

Here, the use of an older form, that had long been approved but which has since been revised,

works no such prejudice.

Similarly, we do not observe any aspect in any modifications to the forms used here, or the

omission of any boilerplate instructional text, that materially impair the forms’ ability to function

as complaints. Substantial compliance, rather than strict compliance, is the appropriate lens to use,

as has been understood in the analogous non-traffic context. (People v. Gompper (1984) 160

Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 7–8 [so holding in the analogous context of Pen. Code, § 853.9]; see also Civ.

Code, §§ 3528 [“[t]he law respects form less than substance”], 3533 [“[t]he law disregards

trifles”].) Indeed, the Legislature knows how to prohibit alterations to a Judicial Council form, if

that is its intent. (See Veh. Code, § 40518, subd. (d) [so directing with respect to automated traffic

enforcement forms, though still only expressly authorizing dismissal for material alterations].)

Here, while there are a number of minor and superficial differences between the forms used in the

present cases and the current Judicial Council form, the core substance is overwhelmingly the

same. (Compare appen., post, with Judicial Council Forms, form TR-INST, at p. 14.)

We therefore conclude that once a notice to appear form has been approved by the Judicial

Council, it is “a form approved by the Judicial Council” within the meaning of Vehicle Code

section 40513, subdivision (b). The fact that the Judicial Council has recently promulgated a new

version of the applicable form, or has replaced it with a differently numbered form, does not, ipso

facto, change that character. We do not endeavor here to address under what circumstances an

12 older or modified form becomes incompetent for this purpose, because in the case before us any

deviations from the current form are immaterial in substance. Nevertheless, we strongly encourage

law enforcement agencies that use a Judicial Council form for a notice to appear to use the current

version of that form. Failure to do so remains a violation of the rules of court (see ante, at p. 9),

notwithstanding the fact that the error does not automatically grant defendants a remedy in their

ensuing traffic case.

For these reasons, the trial court properly overruled defendants’ demurrers and we will not

issue writs to disturb those rulings.

DISPOSITION

The petitions for writ of mandate and prohibition are denied. The stays this court imposed

on the trial court proceedings shall be deemed lifted upon this decision becoming final.

13 APPENDIX