Beard v. St. Francis Medical Center

286 S.W.3d 245, 2009 Mo. App. LEXIS 834, 2009 WL 1176996
Missouri Court of Appeals·Decided May 4, 2009·No. SD 29126·Published

Opinion

DANIEL E. SCOTT, Presiding Judge.

Appellant sued Respondent Hospital under § 287.140.13 of the Workers’ Compensation Law, 1 which provides in part that a *246 health care provider, unless it was selected by the employee at his own expense, cannot bill or attempt to collect any fee for treating a workers’ compensation injury if the provider is given statutory notice. § 287.140.13(1), (2). A provider who pursues any action to collect from an employee after such notice may be sued for actual damages, statutory damages, and attorney’s fees. § 287.140.13(4). The trial court granted Hospital summary judgment, finding that Appellant selected medical treatment at her own expense, and alternatively that Hospital did not pursue an action to collect within the statute’s meaning.

Facts and Background

Appellant suffered a 1996 work injury to her back and hip, and was treated under workers’ compensation through October 1997. In early 2000, she renewed her complaints. Following an independent medical examination, her employer refused further treatment and denied Appellant’s formal workers’ compensation claim.

On her own, Appellant sought back surgery at Hospital through her group health plan. She realized Hospital would bill her for co-payments and the like. However, she wanted treatment despite her employer’s denial, with which she disagreed.

Hospital billed Appellant per her group plan for treatment rendered thereunder. She kept using her group plan to get her own treatment, even after she won a temporary workers’ compensation award for her employer to provide future medical treatment.

Appellant later started responding to Hospital’s bills and collection efforts with § 287.140.13(2) notices asserting that the bills related to Appellant’s workers’ compensation claim and should be sent to her employer instead. Despite six such notices, Hospital sent numerous bills and collection letters, all for charges that Appellant authorized and incurred through her group health plan. Appellant eventually sued Hospital under § 287.140.13, and af *247 ter discovery, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted Hospital’s motion, as previously noted, and denied Appellant’s motion.

Conclusion

The trial court did not err in ruling, as a matter of law, that Appellant could not invoke § 287.140.13(4) or prevail on her claim. Appellant used her group health plan to arrange for her own medical treatment, from providers she chose, after her employer refused treatment. As between Appellant and Hospital, Appellant was obligated to pay, which she proposed to do through her group plan, fully understanding that she would be billed and expected to remit at least co-payments. 2

Appellant thus induced Hospital to treat and bill her as a group health patient; accepted the benefits thereof; and persisted in doing so even after the temporary award against her employer. She could not fairly complain when Hospital billed her in the manner she invited, nor can she invoke § 287.140.13 against a provider she chose at her expense.

The trial court’s alternative basis for summary judgment involves statutory interpretation issues of first impression. Our ruling makes it unnecessary to reach those issues, and we decline to do so. Summary judgment was properly entered. The judgment is affirmed. 3

BARNEY and BATES, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Beard v. St. Francis Medical Center, 286 S.W.3d 245, 2009 Mo. App. LEXIS 834, 2009 WL 1176996 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).

286 S.W.3d 245 (Beard v. St. Francis Medical Center) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Martin v. Town and Country Supermarkets
220 S.W.3d 836 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 2007)