Beard v. Baxter

258 Ill. App. 340, 1930 Ill. App. LEXIS 584
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
DecidedJune 11, 1930
DocketGen. No. 8,318
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 258 Ill. App. 340 (Beard v. Baxter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Beard v. Baxter, 258 Ill. App. 340, 1930 Ill. App. LEXIS 584 (Ill. Ct. App. 1930).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Eldredge

delivered the opinion of the court.

On November 10, 1925, a judgment by confession was entered in favor of appellant against appellee on four promissory notes for the principal and interest" thereon in the sum of $27,629.85. Appellee made a motion to open up the judgment and for leave to plead and supported the same by affidavits. This motion was overruled and on appeal to this court the judgment of the circuit court in overruling said motion was reversed and the cause remanded with directions to grant the motion. Beard v. Baxter, 242 Ill. App. 480, 482. Upon the reinstatement of the case in the court below, pursuant to the mandate of this court, the judgment was opened up and appellee granted leave to lead to the merits and thereupon he filed a plea of general issue and 8 special pleas. A demurrer was sustained to all of the special pleas, and 14 additional pleas were filed thereafter by leave of court from time to time. To a number of these pleas demurrers were sustained and amendments made so that when the case came to trial the issues were presented by the ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth and twenty-third additional pleas. At the close of all the evidence the trial court withdrew from the consideration of the jury the twenty-third plea, and excluded all the evidence introduced thereunder.

The notes on which the judgment was entered were all executed at Springfield, Illinois, May 2, 1924, payable 6 months after date, to the order of E. Bryant Crump with interest at 7 per cent per annum from date until paid and were signed by appellee, H. B. Baxter. They were all indorsed on the back by E. Bryant Crump. Two of these notes were for the principal sum of $5,000 each, one for $6,000 and one for $9,000, and each contained the usual power of attorney to confess judgment.

It is averred in the ninth additional plea that the several notes were without consideration of which fact the plaintiff had notice.

It is averred in the tenth, eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth additional pleas in substance that the notes were signed and delivered to Crump to enable the latter to obtain a “collateral reserve” for the development of certain asphalt deposits and upon his promise not to transfer or assign the same but to keep them in his name and use them only as such reserve to obtain money from other sources for the purpose of developing and selling such asphalt deposits and for no other purpose; that Crump having obtained said notes by reason of his promise aforesaid did not use them as “collateral reserve” or security to obtain money from other sources to develop and sell such asphalt deposits but assigned them to the plaintiff in violation of his promise aforesaid, and at the time said notes were so assigned to the plaintiff, the latter had notice that the consideration for the same had failed.

In the fourteenth additional plea it is averred that the notes were obtained from the defendant by duress and undue influence, that is to say, that at the time of their execution the defendant was 85 years of age, in a condition of mental infirmity and weakness, which rendered him incapable of transacting ordinary business and the said Crump well knowing said mental infirmities of the defendant and intending to defraud him by divers promises, professions of friendship, declarations of religious fervor, pretenses of favoritism and personal affection, which included cor-Despondence entered into between said Crump and the defendant for a year prior to the execution of said notes, obtained defendant’s signature thereto and the delivery thereof to him and having isolated him from his family and obtained dominance over him and his mind and will fraudulently and falsely represented to him that he, said Crump, would not be able to complete an asphalt investment and pay to the defendant the sum of $55,000 which he then owed him unless the defendant would sign and deliver said notes to Crump to be used as “collateral reserve” or security in securing money from other sources to be used in completing or developing said asphalt investment; that said Crump by his personal influence and dominance over defendant as aforesaid induced the defendant to execute said notes without consideration and with the understanding and agreement that said notes were not intended to be and should not take effect or become valid and binding obligations of the defendant and should not be assigned or delivered by Crump and that the defendant should incur no liability by the execution of the same; that at no time did Crump or any person in his behalf pay or deliver to defendant any money or thing of value-for the execution of said notes and the same were not executed upon any good and valuable consideration and were never delivered to Crump or to anyone in his behalf as a present and binding obligation; that Crump fraudulently and in violation of the agreement aforesaid and in furtherance of the design to defraud, transferred, assigned and delivered said notes to the plaintiff who took said assignment with notice of all matters and things aforesaid.

In the twenty-third additional plea it is charged that the plaintiff and Crump did unlawfully conspire with certain other persons to obtain the execution and delivery of said notes without consideration and by the practice of a comprehensive scheme to defraud • and that said notes were obtained by Crump pursuant to and in carrying out said unlawful conspiracy without consideration, by fraud and circumvention through the practice upon the defendant of the confidence game and were transferred to plaintiff pursuant to and in carrying out said conspiracy as an innocent .holder for value without notice of defenses as between the defendant and Crump.

The jury found the issues joined in favor of the defendant and judgment was rendered upon the verdict, to reverse which, this appeal is taken.

Numerous errors have been assigned by appellant and nearly as many cross errors by appellee. The most material aiid important error presented by appellant is that the verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. In order to prove the conspiracy between appellant, Crump and others as - alleged in the twenty-third additional plea, a large amount of evidence was introduced by appellee which the court admitted upon the promise of counsel for the latter' of further proof to show the connection of appellant with the conspiracy. The trial court held that appellant’s knowledge or connection of such a conspiracy, if there was any, had not been shown by the evidence and excluded all the evidence introduced in support of this plea. As appellee' has assigned this action ‘of the court as one of his cross errors and as chronologically the facts sought to be proved by such evidence occurred prior to the execution of the notes in question and, as it were, formed the background of what transpired later resulting in the execution of the notes by appellee, in order to arrive at a proper understanding of the issues involved, it is necessary to discuss the facts in the order in which they occurred.

In 1922, Thomas H. Beard, appellant, resided at Bowling G-reen, Kentucky. At this, time there was what is commonly called an oil boom in Warren county, Kentucky and there were a number of producing oil wells in operation. There was an extensive business in the purchase and sale of oil leases and drilling of oil wells in the vicinity of Bowling Green.

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Bluebook (online)
258 Ill. App. 340, 1930 Ill. App. LEXIS 584, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/beard-v-baxter-illappct-1930.