Beard v. Aldrich

149 A. 57, 106 N.J.L. 266, 1930 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 363
CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey
DecidedFebruary 13, 1930
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 149 A. 57 (Beard v. Aldrich) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Beard v. Aldrich, 149 A. 57, 106 N.J.L. 266, 1930 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 363 (N.J. 1930).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Trenchard, J.

This matter is before the court on a demurrer to the plea of the respondent to the information filed by the relator by leave of court. .

The pleadings exhibit the following matters of fact:

The information was filed by relator, a citizen and taxpayer of the town of Westfield, to test the validity of the election of the respondent, Roger C. Aldrich, to the office of permanent chairman of the “Joint Meeting,” consisting of the municipalities of the city of Rahway, borough of Gar-wood, borough of Roselle Park, borough of Kenilworth, township of Cranford, town of Westfield, township of Springfield, township of Clark and the township of Woodbridge, organized under an act of the legislature of the State of New Jersey, entitled “An act to authorize two or more municipalities in this state to jointly construct and maintain outlet or trunk sewers,” approved March 15th, 1899, and the acts amendatory thereof and supplemental thereto. At the time of the organization of the joint meeting in November, 1928, Edward S. F. Randolph was a member of the town council of West-field and was elected “permanent chairman” of the joint meeting, and qualified as such. His term of office as a member of the town council of Westfield expired December 31st, 1928. No question was raised as to his eligibility to continue to act as chairman of the joint meeting until shortly before October 24th, 1929, when a resolution declaring the office of chairman vacant was passed, and an election was held and Eoger C. Aldrich, a member of the governing body of Cranford, was attempted to be chosen as permanent chairman to fill the alleged vacancy.

Counsel for Mr. Aldrich, the respondent, correctly state the issue. They say in their brief: “The main question to *268 be determined is whether, having cease.d to be a member of the town council of Westfield he [Randolph] thereupon, as a matter of law, became disqualified to continue in the office of permanent chairman, and hence, that a vacancy occurred which the statute required the joint meeting to fill and which it did fill by the election of Aldrich.”

Of course the solution of that question involves an examination and construction of the act of 1899 (Pamph. L., p. 48; Comp. Stat., p. 3588) and its supplements. Pamph. L. 1903, p. 36; Pamph. L. 1905, p. 268.

We think that the action of the joint meeting in attempting to remove Mr. Randolph and elect another in his place as permanent chairman is illegal and void.

Under the act of 1899, and its supplements, the person elected permanent chairman at the time of the organization of the joint meeting is entitled to continue as permanent chairman until the completion of the work, irrespective of the fact that subsequent to his election as permanent chairman he ceased to be a member of the governing body of one of the municipalities composing the joint meeting. While it is clear that the act contemplates that any newly elected permanent chairman shall at the time of his election be a member of one of the governing bodies composing the joint meeting, it is equally clear that it contemplates that when once elected, there shall be no change in the personnel of the office of permanent chairman until the completion of the work and the reorganization of the joint meeting for the purpose of operation.

Section 2 of the act of 1899, page 51, provides that at the organization meeting the members “shall proceed at once to organize as a joint meeting, by electing, by ballot, a member of one of the bodies, or boards of the municipalities composing such joint. meeting, a permanent chairman of such joint meeting; * * * such joint meeting shall continue to exist until the full completion of the work or improvement * * *; such joint meeting may meet and adjourn from time to time, as it may deem advisable, during the progress and continuance of the work of such public improvements and until the completion thereof,” &c.

*269 In this provision of the statute there are several things most significant as to the legislative intent. (1) It is provided that the joint meeting shall continue to exist until the full completion of the work. (2) It may meet and adjourn from time to time, as it may deem advisable, during the progress and continuance of the work of such public improvements and until the completion thereof. Obviously the legislature contemplated the joint meeting to continue through the full period of construction; and, most significant of all— (3) the chairman elected upon the organization of the joint meeting is a permanent chairman.

Turning to Webster’s New International Dictionary the word “permanent” is stated to be derived from the Latin verb permanere — “to stay or remain to the end, to last.” To elect a “permanent chairman” obviously is to elect one to stay and remain to the end, or in this case in the express words of the statute, “until the full completion of the work or improvement” (Pamph. L. 1899, p. 51, § 2); “until the final completion of the work contracted to be performed by the municipalities.” Pamph. L. 1903, p. 36, § 1.

There seems to be nothing in the act that would signifiy any other than this most clearly expressed intention, unless it be the last provision of section 2 of Pamph. L. 1899, p. 53, that “the secretary and treasurer and other officers o£ such joint meeting, except the chairman, need not be members of any municipal board represented therein.” From its juxtaposition to the clause concerning vacancies, the indication seems to be that it was intended to apply to vacancies only; but if considered to be applicable both to original, election to and the filling of vacancies in the offices mentioned, when considered in connection with the other provisions of the act it is evident that it was intended to pertain only to qualification at the time of selection and not to the tenure of office of the person selected. The exception as to the chairman was obviously inserted only to make this provision consistent with the earlier provision providing that at the time of the organization of the joint meeting a member of one of the bodies or boards of the municipalities composing *270 such joint meeting should be elected a permanent chairman of. such meeting. To make clear, when newly elected— whether originally or to fill a vacancy — the chairman must be 'a member of one of the governing bodies or boards of the municipalities composing the joint meeting. If this provision should be construed or considered to qualify the tenure of office of the person selected chairman, it would be irreconcilably inconsistent with the phrase “permanent chairman” and the other provisions of the act. Whereas, if applied as a necessary qualification at the time of selection for the office, it is entirely consistent with all of the provisions; and it is fundamental that the courts will adopt that construction of a statute which reconciles and gives reasonable meaning to all of .the provisions thereof, rather than one which leaves them in irreconcilable conflict. Steel

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
149 A. 57, 106 N.J.L. 266, 1930 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 363, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/beard-v-aldrich-nj-1930.