Beakes v. Phoenix Insurance

New York Supreme Court

Beakes v. Phoenix Insurance

24 N.Y.S. 544, 54 N.Y. St. Rep. 290, 71 Hun 613

DecidedJuly 28, 1893

StatusPublished

This text of 24 N.Y.S. 544 (Beakes v. Phoenix Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Beakes v. Phoenix Insurance, 24 N.Y.S. 544, 54 N.Y. St. Rep. 290, 71 Hun 613 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1893).

Pincite

Opinion

PRATT, J.

The only questions seriously discussed are whether the circuit judge fell into error in his instructions as to the rule of damages, and, if error exists, whether it requires a new trial. The jury were told that, if lightning was the primary cause of the destruction, they might give a verdict for the whole damage sustained, $2,747; but, if lightning was not the primary cause of the destruction, they should give only such verdict as would compensate for the damage directly caused by lightning. Had the jury given a verdict for $2,747, we should have been compelled to carefully construe the language of the policy. It is, however, evident that the jury made the discrimination suggested by the court, and allowed a recovery for such portion of the loss as they believed to be caused by the direct action of the lightning, ascribing $1,647 of the loss to other causes. The question whether they could have properly given a verdict for the larger sum becomes unimportant. No other subject requires discussion. Affirmed, with costs.

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PRATT, J.

The only questions seriously discussed are whether the circuit judge fell into error in his instructions as to the rule of damages, and, if error exists, whether it requires a new trial. The jury were told that, if lightning was the primary cause of the destruction, they might give a verdict for the whole damage sustained, $2,747; but, if lightning was not the primary cause of the destruction, they should give only such verdict as would compensate for the damage directly caused by lightning. Had the jury given a verdict for $2,747, we should have been compelled to carefully construe the language of the policy. It is, however, evident that the jury made the discrimination suggested by the court, and allowed a recovery for such portion of the loss as they believed to be caused by the direct action of the lightning, ascribing $1,647 of the loss to other causes. The question whether they could have properly given a verdict for the larger sum becomes unimportant. No other subject requires discussion. Affirmed, with costs.

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Bluebook (online)

24 N.Y.S. 544, 54 N.Y. St. Rep. 290, 71 Hun 613, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/beakes-v-phoenix-insurance-nysupct-1893.