Beacon Products Corp. v. Ronald Wilson Reagan

814 F.2d 1, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 18308, 55 U.S.L.W. 2567
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedMarch 11, 1987
Docket86-1410
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 814 F.2d 1 (Beacon Products Corp. v. Ronald Wilson Reagan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Beacon Products Corp. v. Ronald Wilson Reagan, 814 F.2d 1, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 18308, 55 U.S.L.W. 2567 (1st Cir. 1987).

Opinion

BREYER, Circuit Judge.

Appellants are merchants who wish to trade with Nicaragua. They believe that the regulations prohibiting that trade, 31 C.F.R. Part 540, are legally invalid. Their argument rests upon what they perceive to be a critical legal flaw in the statutory scheme that authorizes the regulations. See National Emergencies Act (NEA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651; International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706.

IEEPA grants the President the power to prohibit trade in response to a foreign threat “if [he] declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.” 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (emphasis added). The President may declare a “national emergency” only in accordance with procedures set forth in the NEA. But, when the President declared a national emergency with respect to Nicaragua, the NEA contained a “legislative veto” provision of a sort held unconstitutional in INS v. Ckadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983).

Appellants argued before the district court that this unconstitutional legislative veto provision (allowing Congress to terminate national emergencies by congressional resolution) destroyed the legal efficacy of the NEA, invalidated the “national emergency,” and thereby deprived the trade regulations of necessary statutory authority. They asked the court to declare the emergency and the regulations invalid.

The government agreed that the legislative veto provision was unconstitutional. But, it argued that the veto provision was “severable” from the rest of the National Emergencies Act. In its view, the remainder of the NEA continued to have legal effect. Hence the national emergency was valid, and the regulations should stand.

Like most courts that have considered “severability” questions after Chadha, the district court agreed with the government and held that the legislative veto clause was severable from the rest of the statute. Cf Alaska Airlines v. Donovan, 766 F.2d 1550, 1559-65 (D.C.Cir.1985) (section 43 of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978), cert. granted, —U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 1259, 89 L.Ed.2d 569 (1986); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Dyke, 734 F.2d 797, 802-05 (Temp.Emer.Ct.App.) (Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act and Energy Policy and Conservation *3 Act), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 852, 105 S.Ct. 173-74, 83 L.Ed.2d 108 (1984); EEOC v. Hernando Bank, Inc., 724 F.2d 1188, 1190-92 (5th Cir.1984) (Reorganization Act of 1977); Allen v. Carmen, 578 F.Supp. 951, 968-71 (D.D.C.1983) (section 104 of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act). But cf. City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900, 904-09 (D.C.Cir.1987) (holding that the challenged portion of section 1013 of the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 is so bound up in the whole scheme of section 1013 that the rest of the section cannot stand independently); EEOC v. CBS, Inc., 743 F.2d 969, 971-74 (2d Cir.1984) (same in regard to Reorganization Act of 1977). Appellants seek reversal of the district court decision, 633 F.Supp. 1191 (1986). We cannot appropriately consider their basic legal claim, however, and, since we reject their subsidiary claim, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

I

We cannot review the district court’s decision about severability because the issue has become moot. The President initially declared a national emergency, following the procedures set forth in the National Emergencies Act, on May 1, 1985. See Exec. Order No. 12, 513, 3 C.F.R. 342 (1985). At that time, the NEA contained a legislative veto clause. In August 1985, however, Congress amended the NEA and replaced the unconstitutional clause with a constitutional counterpart. See Act of Aug. 16, 1985, Pub.L. 99-93, § 801, 99 Stat. 448 (1985) (amending section 202(a)(1) of the NEA to provide for termination by joint resolution, which requires the President’s signature, instead of by concurrent resolution, which does not). Then, on April 22, 1986, just a few days before the district court issued its decision in this case, the President notified Congress that he was continuing the state of emergency under the now-amended statute, which the parties concede is constitutionally valid. See 51 Fed.Reg. 15,461 (1986). This “notice,” in our view, redeclared the national emergency. The regulations therefore have adequate statutory support.

Appellants resist the proposition that their claim is moot by arguing that the President’s April 1986 notice to Congress was not legally sufficient to redeclare a national emergency. They note that the April document says on its face that it is a “[cjontinuation ” of an emergency (emphasis added); it does not say that it “declares" an emergency. But, it seems to us that this is a distinction without a difference. The formal statutory requirements for declaring and for continuing an emergency are the same: notice, transmission of the notice to Congress, and publication in the Federal Register. Compare 50 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (prescribing procedures for declaring an emergency) with 50 U.S.C. § 1622(d) (prescribing procedures for continuing an emergency). Both Presidential notices complied with these requirements. Moreover, the second notice cross-referenced the first.

Both notices also satisfied the more substantive requirements specified in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which empowers the President to impose restrictions on trade if a national emergency is in effect. IEEPA requires the President to tell Congress:

(1) the circumstances which necessitate such exercise of authority;
(2) why the President believes those circumstances constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States;
(3) the authorities to be exercised and the actions to be taken in the exercise of those authorities to deal with those circumstances;

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Bluebook (online)
814 F.2d 1, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 18308, 55 U.S.L.W. 2567, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/beacon-products-corp-v-ronald-wilson-reagan-ca1-1987.