Beach v. Texaco Inc

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: August 29, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01146
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 GLEN BEACH and TANA BEACH, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-01146-JNW 8 Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ 9 MOTION FOR REMAND v. 10 TEXACO INC. et al., 11 Defendants. 12 13 1. INTRODUCTION 14 This motion comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion to remand. Having 15 considered the motion, the record, and the applicable law, the Court DENIES the 16 motion to remand. Dkt. No. 40. 17 2. BACKGROUND 18 This case involves Plaintiff Glen Beach’s exposure to gasoline and benzene as 19 a gasoline station attendant and automotive mechanic at a Texaco gas station in 20 Wapato, Washington, between 1970 and 1974. Dkt. No. 1-2 at 6–7. He alleges that 21 these exposures caused him to develop cancer. He and his spouse, Tana Beach, sued 22 Defendants in King County Superior Court for negligence, gross negligence, strict 23 1 products liability, and breach of warranty on April 16, 2025. They served the 2 removing Defendants (Texaco Inc. and Union Oil Co. of California) on April 30,

3 2025, and they amended their complaint in state court on May 7, 2025. The 4 amended complaint states that diversity jurisdiction does not exist because “[t]here 5 is no diversity of citizenship.” Dkt. No. 1-5 at 3. The removing Defendants learned 6 through their own investigation, however, that complete diversity existed. On June 7 18, 2025, they removed the case based on diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiffs move to 8 remand, arguing that removal was untimely.1

9 3. DISCUSSION 10 Plaintiffs argue that removal was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), which 11 sets a thirty-day cutoff to remove a case to federal court. Dietrich v. Boeing Co., 14 12 F.4th 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2021). “Often, the basis for removal is clear from the 13 complaint (or other initial pleading), and so the thirty days begin to run from the 14 date a defendant receives the initial pleading.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1)). 15 Courts call this the “first pathway to removal.” Id. “But ‘if the case stated by the

16 initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days 17 after receipt by the defendant . . . of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or 18 other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or 19 has become removable.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3)). “This is the second 20 pathway to removal.” Id. 21

22 1 Initially, Plaintiffs also argued that Defendants failed established complete 23 diversity, but they later withdrew that argument. Dkt. No. 54 at 2. 1 As Defendants correctly point out, these two pathways to removal are not 2 exclusive. A defendant may also remove a case “on the basis of its own information,”

3 rather than documents received from the plaintiff. Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. 4 Ctr. L.P., 720 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2013). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has 5 clarified that the removal statutes “permit a defendant to remove outside the two 6 thirty-day periods on the basis of its own information, provided that it has not run 7 afoul of either of the thirty-day deadlines.” Id. “In other words, as long as the 8 complaint or ‘an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper’ does not reveal

9 that the case is removable, the 30-day time period never starts to run and the 10 defendant may remove at any time.” Rea v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 742 F.3d 1234, 11 1238 (9th Cir. 2014); Fagen v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., Case No. 6:21-cv-01502, 2022 12 WL 214635, at *1 (D. Or. Jan. 25, 2022) (quoting Rea). 13 Here, the removing Defendants learned that complete diversity existed, 14 making this case removable, through their own, informal discovery. Plaintiffs now 15 agree that the requirements for diversity jurisdiction are met, even though the

16 complaint states otherwise. Dkt. No. 54 at 2. Because neither 30-day removal 17 “pathway” triggered, the removing Defendants were not on a clock. Removal was 18 thus timely. 19 Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. They maintain that 20 Defendants should have known this information and recognized that the case was 21 immediately removable. Plaintiffs also argue that removal is improper because

22 Defendants failed to disclose exactly when they learned that complete diversity 23 existed. But the Ninth Circuit has rejected similar arguments and confirmed that 1 the thirty-day clock does not start when the defendant discovers information

9 making the case removable. Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 3 1141 (9th Cir. 2013). “Preferring a clear rule, and unwilling to embroil the courts in

4 inquires ‘into the subjective knowledge of [a] defendant,’ [the Ninth Circuit has] 5 declined to hold that [defendant’s] materials outside the complaint start the thirty- G day clock.” Jd. (quoting Harris v. Bankers Lie and Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 696 (9th 7 || Cir. 2005)). 8 4. CONCLUSION

9 Because the removing Defendants were not subject to a 30-day removal

10 deadline, and because they removed based on their own information, removal was

11 timely. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to remand. Dkt. No. 40.

12 13 Dated this 29th day of August, 2025.

14 15 CL = N. Whitehead United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23