NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-1237
BAYSTONE REVERE LLC
vs.
MARIAN OMIDIJI.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant, Marian Omidiji, a self-represented litigant,
appeals from an Eastern Housing Court judge's order denying the
defendant's "Motion to Withdraw Agreement for Judgment and
Dismiss the case" pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 Mass.
828 (1974) (rule 60 [b]). The defendant principally contends
that (1) the judge abused her discretion in denying the
defendant's motion, and (2) defects in the notice to quit
rendered the agreement for judgment void. We affirm.
Background. On December 6, 2024, the plaintiff, Baystone
Revere LLC, sent the defendant a notice to quit for nonpayment
of rent. The plaintiff filed a summary process complaint on
January 10, 2025. On March 7, 2025, the parties participated in mediation with a housing specialist but did not reach an
agreement to settle. The defendant did not appear at the March
24, 2025 trial and, on March 26, 2025, a judge entered a default
judgment against the defendant. On April 28, after a hearing, a
judge allowed the defendant's motion to vacate the default
judgment and scheduled a trial for May 12, 2025.
On May 12, 2025, the plaintiff and the defendant
participated in mediation with a housing specialist, the parties
signed an agreement for judgment, and the case was reported
settled to the trial judge. The next day, the defendant filed a
rule 60 (b) "Motion to Withdraw Agreement for Judgment and
Dismiss the case," contending that the plaintiff's notice to
quit was defective, she did not understand her rights, and that
the plaintiff's signing of the settlement agreement was neither
knowing nor voluntary. On May 14, 2025, the trial judge
approved the agreement for judgment. On June 2, 2025, the judge
who previously had allowed the defendant's motion to vacate the
March 26, 2025 default judgment held a hearing on the
defendant's rule 60 (b) motion to withdraw the agreement and
dismiss the case. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge
denied the motion. On June 3, 2025, the judge's order denying
the motion entered on the docket.
2 On June 11, 2025, the defendant filed a notice of appeal
"from Judgment dated 06/02/2025." On July 18, 2025, the same
judge who heard the motion to withdraw the agreement "denied"
the notice of appeal as untimely from the May 14, 2025 judgment
and directed the defendant to file a notice of appeal from the
postjudgment order. However, a single justice of this court
ruled that the June 11, 2025 notice of appeal was a timely
appeal from the June 2, 2025 postjudgment order, and directed
the Housing Court to assemble the record for this appeal.
Discussion. 1. The motion judge's order. "We review the
denial of a motion under Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) for abuse of
discretion." Matter of M.C., 481 Mass. 336, 344 (2019). "[A]
judge's discretionary decision constitutes an abuse of
discretion where we conclude the judge made a 'clear error of
judgment in weighing' the factors relevant to the decision, such
that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable
alternatives" (citation omitted). L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470
Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). "We accord the credibility
determinations of the judge who heard the testimony of the
parties . . . [and] observed their demeanor . . . the utmost
deference" (quotation and citation omitted). Noelle N. v.
Frasier F., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 660, 664 (2020).
3 The defendant advances several arguments to challenge the
judge's order denying her rule 60 (b) motion, none of which rise
to the level of appellate argument.1 See Mass. R. A. P.
16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).
Nevertheless, to the extent that the defendant contends that the
judge's denial of the rule 60 (b) motion was an abuse of
discretion, we disagree. See Matter of M.C., 481 Mass. at 344.
The judge's order denying the defendant's "Motion to
Withdraw Agreement for Judgment and Dismiss the case" states, in
full: " DENIED. This Court does not find any merit to the
defendant's claim that she 'did not understand the terms of the
Agreement for Judgment.'"2 During the motion hearing, the judge
repeatedly stated that she did not believe the defendant's claim
1 Namely, the defendant contends: (1) that the judge erroneously believed that she could not rule on the merits of the rule 60 (b) motion (though the judge, in fact did so); (2) that the judge arbitrarily considered the defendant's "sophistication" when stating why she did not credit the defendant; (3) that the mediation scheduled on the same day as the bench trial was a "surprise" meriting relief pursuant to rule 60 (b); and (4) that the motion judge's conduct and dismissal of her notice of appeal showed bias and contempt. To the extent that the defendant supports these arguments with case law, the defendant cites Federal law that is irrelevant to the issues on appeal. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).
2 The defendant's assertion that the judge erroneously believed that she could not rule on the merits of the motion is belied by the fact that the judge explicitly denied the motion on the merits.
4 that the defendant did not understand she had signed an
agreement for judgment. The judge supported this credibility
determination with her knowledge of the advisements that housing
specialists provide to parties prior to mediation, the
advisements on the consent to mediation form that the defendant
signed,3 and the fact that the defendant's motion demonstrated a
degree of sophistication. The judge was well supported in not
crediting the defendant's claim that she did not understand the
terms of the agreement for judgment. See Noelle N., 97 Mass.
App. Ct. at 664. We therefore discern no abuse of discretion in
the judge's denial of the defendant's rule 60 (b) motion. See
Matter of M.C., 481 Mass. at 344.
2. Notice to quit. We also disagree with the defendant's
contention that the notice to quit was defective such that it
rendered the Agreement for Judgment "void ab initio." To be
sure, the notice to quit that the plaintiff sent to the
defendant did omit required information on rental assistance
programs, applicable trial court rules, and relevant Federal or
State restrictions on residential evictions. See G. L. c. 186,
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-1237
BAYSTONE REVERE LLC
vs.
MARIAN OMIDIJI.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant, Marian Omidiji, a self-represented litigant,
appeals from an Eastern Housing Court judge's order denying the
defendant's "Motion to Withdraw Agreement for Judgment and
Dismiss the case" pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 Mass.
828 (1974) (rule 60 [b]). The defendant principally contends
that (1) the judge abused her discretion in denying the
defendant's motion, and (2) defects in the notice to quit
rendered the agreement for judgment void. We affirm.
Background. On December 6, 2024, the plaintiff, Baystone
Revere LLC, sent the defendant a notice to quit for nonpayment
of rent. The plaintiff filed a summary process complaint on
January 10, 2025. On March 7, 2025, the parties participated in mediation with a housing specialist but did not reach an
agreement to settle. The defendant did not appear at the March
24, 2025 trial and, on March 26, 2025, a judge entered a default
judgment against the defendant. On April 28, after a hearing, a
judge allowed the defendant's motion to vacate the default
judgment and scheduled a trial for May 12, 2025.
On May 12, 2025, the plaintiff and the defendant
participated in mediation with a housing specialist, the parties
signed an agreement for judgment, and the case was reported
settled to the trial judge. The next day, the defendant filed a
rule 60 (b) "Motion to Withdraw Agreement for Judgment and
Dismiss the case," contending that the plaintiff's notice to
quit was defective, she did not understand her rights, and that
the plaintiff's signing of the settlement agreement was neither
knowing nor voluntary. On May 14, 2025, the trial judge
approved the agreement for judgment. On June 2, 2025, the judge
who previously had allowed the defendant's motion to vacate the
March 26, 2025 default judgment held a hearing on the
defendant's rule 60 (b) motion to withdraw the agreement and
dismiss the case. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge
denied the motion. On June 3, 2025, the judge's order denying
the motion entered on the docket.
2 On June 11, 2025, the defendant filed a notice of appeal
"from Judgment dated 06/02/2025." On July 18, 2025, the same
judge who heard the motion to withdraw the agreement "denied"
the notice of appeal as untimely from the May 14, 2025 judgment
and directed the defendant to file a notice of appeal from the
postjudgment order. However, a single justice of this court
ruled that the June 11, 2025 notice of appeal was a timely
appeal from the June 2, 2025 postjudgment order, and directed
the Housing Court to assemble the record for this appeal.
Discussion. 1. The motion judge's order. "We review the
denial of a motion under Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) for abuse of
discretion." Matter of M.C., 481 Mass. 336, 344 (2019). "[A]
judge's discretionary decision constitutes an abuse of
discretion where we conclude the judge made a 'clear error of
judgment in weighing' the factors relevant to the decision, such
that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable
alternatives" (citation omitted). L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470
Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). "We accord the credibility
determinations of the judge who heard the testimony of the
parties . . . [and] observed their demeanor . . . the utmost
deference" (quotation and citation omitted). Noelle N. v.
Frasier F., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 660, 664 (2020).
3 The defendant advances several arguments to challenge the
judge's order denying her rule 60 (b) motion, none of which rise
to the level of appellate argument.1 See Mass. R. A. P.
16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).
Nevertheless, to the extent that the defendant contends that the
judge's denial of the rule 60 (b) motion was an abuse of
discretion, we disagree. See Matter of M.C., 481 Mass. at 344.
The judge's order denying the defendant's "Motion to
Withdraw Agreement for Judgment and Dismiss the case" states, in
full: " DENIED. This Court does not find any merit to the
defendant's claim that she 'did not understand the terms of the
Agreement for Judgment.'"2 During the motion hearing, the judge
repeatedly stated that she did not believe the defendant's claim
1 Namely, the defendant contends: (1) that the judge erroneously believed that she could not rule on the merits of the rule 60 (b) motion (though the judge, in fact did so); (2) that the judge arbitrarily considered the defendant's "sophistication" when stating why she did not credit the defendant; (3) that the mediation scheduled on the same day as the bench trial was a "surprise" meriting relief pursuant to rule 60 (b); and (4) that the motion judge's conduct and dismissal of her notice of appeal showed bias and contempt. To the extent that the defendant supports these arguments with case law, the defendant cites Federal law that is irrelevant to the issues on appeal. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).
2 The defendant's assertion that the judge erroneously believed that she could not rule on the merits of the motion is belied by the fact that the judge explicitly denied the motion on the merits.
4 that the defendant did not understand she had signed an
agreement for judgment. The judge supported this credibility
determination with her knowledge of the advisements that housing
specialists provide to parties prior to mediation, the
advisements on the consent to mediation form that the defendant
signed,3 and the fact that the defendant's motion demonstrated a
degree of sophistication. The judge was well supported in not
crediting the defendant's claim that she did not understand the
terms of the agreement for judgment. See Noelle N., 97 Mass.
App. Ct. at 664. We therefore discern no abuse of discretion in
the judge's denial of the defendant's rule 60 (b) motion. See
Matter of M.C., 481 Mass. at 344.
2. Notice to quit. We also disagree with the defendant's
contention that the notice to quit was defective such that it
rendered the Agreement for Judgment "void ab initio." To be
sure, the notice to quit that the plaintiff sent to the
defendant did omit required information on rental assistance
programs, applicable trial court rules, and relevant Federal or
State restrictions on residential evictions. See G. L. c. 186,
3 The judge explicitly noted that the consent to mediation form that the defendant signed states that "[m]ediation is a voluntary and confidential process," and "[t]he parties understand that they have a right to be heard and [the case] decided by a judge if any party does not want to meet with a housing specialist, any party wants to end mediation once it begins, or the parties do not settle."
5 § 31. However, "[t]o be void, a judgment must issue from a
court that 'lacked jurisdiction over the parties, lacked
jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failed to provide due
process of law'" (citation omitted). McIntire, petitioner, 458
Mass. 257, 264 (2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 1012 (2011). The
notice to quit did not cause the court to lack jurisdiction
because "the issue whether a notice to quit is legally adequate
is not jurisdictional." See Cambridge St. Realty, LLC v.
Stewart, 481 Mass. 121, 128 (2018). We are also satisfied that
any omissions from the notice to quit did not deny the defendant
due process of law. See McIntire, petitioner, supra. The
motion judge held a hearing on the defendant's motion and had
previously allowed the defendant's motion to vacate the March
26, 2025 default judgment. See Spenlinhauer v. Spencer Press,
Inc., 81 Mass. App. Ct. 56, 65 (2011) ("Due process
fundamentally requires notice and the opportunity to be heard at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner" [quotations and
citation omitted]). As a result, any defects in the notice to
quit did not deny the defendant due process, the judgment is not
void, and the judge did not err or abuse her discretion in
6 denying the rule 60 (b) motion on that basis. See Matter of
M.C., 481 Mass. at 344.
Order dated June 2, 2025, denying motion to withdraw agreement for judgment and to dismiss case, affirmed.
By the Court (Rubin, Desmond & Allen, JJ.4),
Clerk
Entered: June 9, 2026.
4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.