Bayk v. Martini

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Bayk v. Martini

142 A.D.3d 484, 35 N.Y.S.3d 923

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedAugust 3, 2016

Docket2015-09824

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 142 A.D.3d 484 (Bayk v. Martini) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Bayk v. Martini, 142 A.D.3d 484, 35 N.Y.S.3d 923 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2016).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Rebolini, J.), dated August 3, 2016, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff’s spine did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]).

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of his spine constituted a serious injury under the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). The plaintiff submitted an affirmed report from his treating physician, who concluded that the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff’s spine sustained range-of-motion limitations as a result of the subject accident. However, the affirmed report fails to identify the objective tests that were utilized to measure range of motion and, thus, does not support the limitation conclusion (see Schilling v Labrador, 136 AD3d 884, 884-885 *485 [2016]; Durand v Urick, 131 AD3d 920 [2015]; Gibbs v Hee Hong, 63 AD3d 559 [2009]; Exilus v Nicholas, 26 AD3d 457, 458 [2006]; Barrett v Jeannot, 18 AD3d 679, 680 [2005]; Black v Robinson, 305 AD2d 438, 439 [2003]; cf. Bacon v Bostany, 104 AD3d 625, 627 [2013]). Accordingly, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Rivera, J.R, Leventhal, Hinds-Radix and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Rebolini, J.), dated August 3, 2016, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff’s spine did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]).

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of his spine constituted a serious injury under the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). The plaintiff submitted an affirmed report from his treating physician, who concluded that the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff’s spine sustained range-of-motion limitations as a result of the subject accident. However, the affirmed report fails to identify the objective tests that were utilized to measure range of motion and, thus, does not support the limitation conclusion (see Schilling v Labrador, 136 AD3d 884, 884-885 *485 [2016]; Durand v Urick, 131 AD3d 920 [2015]; Gibbs v Hee Hong, 63 AD3d 559 [2009]; Exilus v Nicholas, 26 AD3d 457, 458 [2006]; Barrett v Jeannot, 18 AD3d 679, 680 [2005]; Black v Robinson, 305 AD2d 438, 439 [2003]; cf. Bacon v Bostany, 104 AD3d 625, 627 [2013]). Accordingly, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Rivera, J.R, Leventhal, Hinds-Radix and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

142 A.D.3d 484, 35 N.Y.S.3d 923, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bayk-v-martini-nyappdiv-2016.

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