Bayha v. Taylor

36 Mo. App. 427, 1889 Mo. App. LEXIS 289
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kansas
DecidedMay 20, 1889
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 36 Mo. App. 427 (Bayha v. Taylor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bayha v. Taylor, 36 Mo. App. 427, 1889 Mo. App. LEXIS 289 (kanctapp 1889).

Opinion

Per Curiam.

— This was a suit in equity begun in the circuit court of Jackson county, the object of which was to have certain special tax bills declared void and cancelled. The plaintiff is the owner of certain lots of ground in Kansas City. The tax bills were issued in favor of the defendant, Taylor, against' the plaintiff as the owner of the lots for their share of the cost of the construction of a certain district sewer.

The tax bills were held by the other defendant to which Taylor had assigned them as collateral security.

The circuit court after hearing the cause on its merits dismissed the petition, without prejudice for the reason that if the tax bills were null and void as alleged by the plaintiff he had an adequate remedy at law and therefore was not entitled to the relief asked. This was unquestionably error. For the special tax bills, though void, being an apparent lien on the land and thereby clouding plaintiff’s title, furnished ample ground for the relief he seeks. And so it has been decided by the supreme court of this state, since this case was originally submitted. State ex rel. v. Kansas City Court of Appeals (not yet reported). The question now remaining in the case and which we have to decide is whether said tax bills are valid.

The sewer in controversy on account of which the tax bills were issued was a district sewer, which the charter of the City of Kansas required should connect “ with a public sewer or other district sewer or with the natural course of drainage.” The ordinance directing the construction of the sewer provided for its connection with “the stream or ravine on the north line of Fifth street, in the centre of the alley between Harrison and Grillis streets.” The claim is made that the connection [435]*435provided by the ordinance is not such a connection as was required by the charter, that the ordinance for that reason was void, and that the tax bills are invalid. The charter of the city is its organic law outside of whose provisions it is powerless to act, and if it be true that the connection provided by the ordinance was not such as that required by the charter, then the ordinance was void and the tax bills invalid. City of Kansas to use v. Swope, 79 Mo. 448.

The charter required the connection to be with a public or other district sewer, or with the natural course of drainage. The connection provided by the ordinance was neither with a public nor district sewer and the question is, was it with the natural course of drainage.

If, as contended by defendant’s counsel, the ordinance should be deemed a declaration of the legislative authorities of Kansas City that the connection was with the natural course of drainage, the question arises: What effect has such declaration ? Is it binding and conclusive? The requirement of the charter is to connect with the natural course of drainage in fact and in reality, and not with that which the mayor and council may declare by ordinance to be the natural course of drainage. Since the charter provisions control absolutely, and the charter has commanded the connection named, that connection had to be in fact made.

The requirements of the charter can no more be evaded by declarations contained in an ordinance than in any other manner. The meaning of the words “the natural course of drainage” is a question of law, and whether any given connection of a sewer is with the natural course of drainage in accordance with that meaning is a question of fact, and both questions are questions for the determination of the courts, and not of the municipal legislature. In the Swope case, supra, the connection of the sewer was by ordinance directed to be [436]*436made with the “old bed of Turkey creek,” but the court held that such connection was not with the natural course of drainage.

The real question in this case, therefore is, was the connection of the sewer, provided by the ordinance, with the natural course of drainage in the meaning of those words as used in the charter of Kansas City %

In order to determine the sense in which these words are used in the charter it is necessary to examine the provisions of the charter so far as they bear on the subject, and to consider all such provisions together in the light of the object intended to be accomplished thereby.

The provisions of the charter bearing upon the subject are found in article 9 of an act to revise and amend the charter of Kansas City, approved March 24, 1875. Laws of Mo. 1875, pp. 256, 257. Section 1, provides: “The common council shall have power to cause a general sewer system to be established, which shall be divided into three classes, to-wit, public, district and private sewers.

“ Public sewers shall be established along the principal courses of drainage, at such times, to such extent, of such dimensions, and under such regulations as may be provided by ordinance, and these may be extensions or branches of sewers already constructed or entirely new throughout, as may be deemed expedient.” After providing the means of payment for the public sewers out of the public revenue the section continues : “No sewer shall be run diagonally through private property, when it is practicable without injury to said sewer to construct it parallel with one of the exterior lines of such property ; nor shall any public sewer be constructed through private property, where it is practicable to construct it-along or through a street or other public highway.” Section 2 provides : “ District sewers shall be established within the limits to be described by [437]*437ordinance connecting with a public sewer or other district sewer, or with the natural course of drainage, as each case may be.” After providing for changing the limits of the districts, the section continues: “The common council shall cause sewers to be constructed in each district, whenever a majority of the property-holders, residents therein, shall petition therefor, or whenever the common council may deem such sewer necessary for sanitary or other purposes ; and said sewer shall be of such dimensions as may be prescribed by ordinance, and may be changed, enlarged or extended, and shall have all the necessary laterals, inlets and other appurtenances which may be required.” The section then provides for the computation and assessment of the cost of the work, and the issuance of certified bills therefor, which provisions so far as material we have already noticed.

Section 3 provides : “Private sewers connecting with public and district sewers may be constructed under such restrictions and regulations as the common council may prescribe by general ordinance ; but the city shall be at no expense in the construction, repairing and cleaning the same.”

Section 4, the last section of the article, provides: “The common council shall have power to condemn private property for use, occupation or possession in the construction and repair of public sewers, in the same manner as other property is condemned for other public uses.”

By these provisions the common council are given power to cause a general sewer system to be established. In many and in material respects the common council are given large discretion, while in other respects they are left no discretion, and they are directed to act in the manner prescribed. It wrill be noticed that the system must be divided into three classes, public, district and private sewers, and that the public and district sewers, which are to be constructed by the city, must be ordered [438]

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Bluebook (online)
36 Mo. App. 427, 1889 Mo. App. LEXIS 289, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bayha-v-taylor-kanctapp-1889.