Bayer Healthcare, LLC v. Norbrook Laboratories, Ltd.

777 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30924, 2011 WL 1113366
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedMarch 24, 2011
DocketCase 08-C-953
StatusPublished

This text of 777 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (Bayer Healthcare, LLC v. Norbrook Laboratories, Ltd.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bayer Healthcare, LLC v. Norbrook Laboratories, Ltd., 777 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30924, 2011 WL 1113366 (E.D. Wis. 2011).

Opinion

DECISION AND ORDER

RUDOLPH T. RANDA, District Judge.

Defendants Norbrook Laboratories, Ltd., and Norbrook, Inc. USA (collectively “Norbrook”) filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s October 14, 2010, Decision and Order to the extent that it granted the Civil Local Rule 7(h) expedited nondispositive motion 1 of Bayer Healthcare LLC (“Bayer”) to strike the expert reports of Stephen R. Byrn (“Byrn”) and Laurel J. Gershwin (“Gershwin”) and the amended interrogatory responses of Norbrook Laboratories, Ltd., and Norbrook, Inc. USA (collectively “Norbrook”) as those materials related to its § 112 defense(s) and eounterclaim(s). Alternatively, pursuant to Rules 15(a)(b) and 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Norbrook requests leave to file a Third Amended Answer and Counterclaims.

This Decision and Order further articulates and memorializes this Court’s rulings with respect to the motion as stated during *1140 the March 23, 2011, in-person status conference in this matter. Although Nor-brook has not established a basis for granting its motion for reconsideration, the Court is persuaded that it should allow Norbrook to amend its pleadings thereby-making relevant the expert reports of Byrn and Gershwin as well as Norbrook’s amended interrogatory responses that were previously stricken. Therefore, the Court will vacate that portion of its prior order.

Reconsideration

In seeking reconsideration, Norbrook cites only Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure arguing that the Court overlooked the requirements of that rule. However, Norbrook’s contentions present several problems.

As a threshold matter, Norbrook simply terms its motion as a motion for reconsideration. However, the motion either falls within the scope of Rule 59(e) or Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is subject to the requirements of the applicable rule. 2 See Hope v. United States, 43 F.3d 1140, 1142 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating “strictly speaking,” a motion for reconsideration does not exist under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.)

Norbrook filed its motion less than 28 days after the Court issued its October 14, 2010, Decision and Order. The motion also encompasses matters decided on the merits. Therefore, the motion is deemed to be a Rule 59(e) motion. See Obrieeht, 517 F.3d at 493.

Rule 59(e) allows a court to amend a judgment “only if the [movant] can demonstrate a manifest error of law or present newly discovered evidence.” Id. at 494. It is well-settled that a Rule 59(e) motion is not properly utilized “to advance arguments or theories that could and should have been made before the district court rendered a judgment....” Sigsworth v. City of Aurora, 487 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir.2007) (citations omitted).

However, Norbrook did not mention Rule 41 in its filings in opposition to Bayer’s Civil Local Rule 7(h) motion to strike the reports of Byrn and Gershwin and Norbrook’s amended interrogatory responses. Thus, the argument is new and could have been previously advanced.

Norbrook also argues that the submissions were truncated due to the restrictions imposed under Civil Local Rule 7(h) 3 *1141 —the format of the motion chosen by Bayer. This too is a new argument that could have been advanced earlier. Regardless, both parties’ submissions were subject to the constraints of that rule.

Moreover, even if the Court considered Norbrook’s contentions, they are not persuasive. As aptly stated in Berthold Types Ltd. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 242 F.3d 772, 777 (7th Cir.2001), Rule 41(a)(1)(A)© does not speak of dismissing one claim in a suit; it speaks of dismissing “an action”— which is to say, the whole case. See also, 9 Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2362 & n. 12 (collecting cases) (3d ed. 2008). Norbrook has not established that Rule 41 applies to the dismissal of claims. None of Norbrook’s other arguments establish that this Court made a manifest error of law or present newly discovered evidence. Therefore, Norbrook’s motion for reconsideration is denied.

Amendment of Pleadings

Alternatively, Norbrook seeks permission to file a Third Amended Answer and Counterclaims that includes the § 112 defenses and counterclaims. The proposed amended pleading is proffered as attachment nine to the Declaration of Dillon Kim in support of Norbrook’s motion for reconsideration or to amend.

In opposition, Bayer asserts that Nor-brook has not been diligent in seeking to amend its pleadings. It also maintains that Bayer will experience tremendous prejudice if the § 112 defense is now added to this action.

Rule 15(a)(2), which governs amendments to pleadings before trial, allows a party to amend its complaint with the district court’s leave; the rule adds that “the court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Joseph v. Elan Motorsports Techs. Racing Corp., No. 10-1420, 638 F.3d 555, 558, 2011 WL 855852, *2 (7th Cir. Mar. 14, 2011). This Court may deny leave to file an amended complaint in the event of “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment.” Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 562 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 666 (7th Cir.2007) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962))). While a court may deny a motion for leave to file an amended complaint, such denials are disfavored. Id.

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Related

Foman v. Davis
371 U.S. 178 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Bausch v. Stryker Corp.
630 F.3d 546 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Joseph v. Elan Motorsports Technologies Racing Corp.
638 F.3d 555 (Seventh Circuit, 2011)
William Hope v. United States
43 F.3d 1140 (Seventh Circuit, 1995)
Berthold Types Limited v. Adobe Systems Incorporated
242 F.3d 772 (Seventh Circuit, 2001)
Noel Borrero v. City of Chicago
456 F.3d 698 (Seventh Circuit, 2006)
Sigsworth v. City Of Aurora
487 F.3d 506 (Seventh Circuit, 2007)
Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT & T Mobility LLC
499 F.3d 663 (Seventh Circuit, 2007)
Obriecht v. Raemisch
517 F.3d 489 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)

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Bluebook (online)
777 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30924, 2011 WL 1113366, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bayer-healthcare-llc-v-norbrook-laboratories-ltd-wied-2011.