Bayeh v. Crow

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedMarch 4, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-00616
StatusUnknown

This text of Bayeh v. Crow (Bayeh v. Crow) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bayeh v. Crow, (D. Nev. 2025).

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 EDGAR BAYEH, 4 Plaintiff, Case No.: 2:24-cv-00616-GMN-MDC 5 vs. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 6 STEPHEN E. CROW, and DOES 1-10, REMAND 7 Defendants. 8

9 10 Pending before the Court is the Motion to Remand, (ECF No. 6), filed by Plaintiff Edgar 11 Bayeh. Defendant Stephen E. Crow filed a Response, (ECF No. 8), to which Plaintiff filed a 12 Reply, (ECF No. 11). Because the Court concludes that Defendant has failed to meet his 13 burden of demonstrating that he is domiciled in Iowa, it finds that complete diversity does not 14 exist, and GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. 15 I. BACKGROUND 16 This action arises from Defendant’s breach of an oral contract related to a loan obtained 17 from Plaintiff. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1–2). During Plaintiff and Defendant’s 18 friendship, the two exchanged substantial sums of money, without any issue, primarily for the 19 purpose of buying and selling horses. (Compl. ¶¶ 6–7). In 2023, Defendant requested a Loan 20 (the “Loan”) for the sum of $525,000.00 from Plaintiff for the purchase of precious metals that 21 were to be sold for a profit. (Id. ¶¶ 19–20). Defendant represented to Plaintiff that the funds 22 would be repaid quickly, however, Defendant never repaid Plaintiff and the Parties have ceased 23 communications with one another. (Id. ¶ 33). Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendant 24 for breach of an oral agreement in relation to the Loan. (See generally id., ECF No. 1–2). 25 Plaintiff originally filed his Complaint in the Eighth Judicial District Court for Clark County, 1 Nevada against Defendant before Defendant removed this case to federal court based on 2 diversity jurisdiction. (See generally Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1). Plaintiff now seeks to 3 remand this action back to state court arguing that the Parties are not diverse. (See generally 4 Mot. Remand, ECF No. 6). 5 II. LEGAL STANDARD 6 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and “possess only that power 7 authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” 8 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (internal citations 9 omitted). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden 10 of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citations 11 omitted). The federal removal statute provides that a defendant may remove an action to 12 federal court based on federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. 13 To remove a state law civil action to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, a removing 14 defendant must show that the parties are completely diverse and that the matter in controversy 15 exceeds the sum or value of $75,000.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Complete diversity of

16 citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires that each plaintiff must be a citizen of a different 17 state than each defendant. Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 18 2001). “The ‘strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always 19 has the burden of establishing that removal is proper,’ and that the court resolves all ambiguity 20 in favor of remand to state court.” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 21 2009) (quoting Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.1992) (per curiam)). “If at any 22 time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the 23 case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 24 25 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 Plaintiff moves to remand, arguing that removal is improper because he and Defendant 3 are both citizens of Nevada and complete diversity therefore does not exist. (Mot. Remand 4 1:19–24). But Defendant maintains that he is a citizen of Iowa and complete diversity exists 5 between the Parties. (Notice of Removal, ¶ 10). 6 A party’s state of domicile for purposes of diversity is determined at the time the action 7 is filed. Owens v. Nuxoll, No. 2:12-CV-01482 KJN, 2013 WL 5553897, *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 8 2013). The actual fact of residence and a real intention of remaining there, as disclosed by a 9 party’s entire course of conduct, are the controlling factors in ascertaining domicile. Id. 10 Domicile must be evaluated in terms of objective facts, and statements of intent should be 11 accorded little weight if they conflict with objective evidence. Heinz v. Havelock, 757 F. Supp. 12 1076, 1081 (C.D. Cal. 1991). The intention to remain may be established by objective factors 13 such as: current residence; voting registration and practices; location of personal and real 14 property; location of brokerage and bank accounts; location of spouse and family; membership 15 in unions and other organizations; place of employment or business; driver’s license and

16 automobile registration; and payment of taxes.” Kyung Park v. Holder, 572 F.3d 619, 624–25 17 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1986)). Importantly, no single 18 factor is determinative. Lew, 797 F.2d at 750. The Court first addresses Defendant’s possession 19 of a Nevada driver’s license before weighing additional factors. 20 A. Nevada Driver’s License 21 The Court finds that Defendant’s Nevada driver’s license is a key indicator of his intent 22 to remain in Nevada. Although residency and domicile are distinct legal concepts, Nevada’s 23 use of the term “Resident” in the context of obtaining a driver’s license closely aligns with the 24 requirements for establishing domicile for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. For instance, 25 Nevada defines a “Resident” as a person whose legal residence is in the state, who physically 1 resides in Nevada and engages in a trade, profession, or occupation, or accepts gainful 2 employment within the state, and someone who declares themselves a resident to obtain 3 privileges not typically granted to non-residents. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 483.141(1)(a), (c), (d). The 4 term “Resident” does not include individuals who are tourists, out-of-state students, foreign 5 exchange students, a border state employee or a seasonal temporary resident. Id. § 483.141(2). 6 The Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles will not issue a license to non-residents. Id. 7 § 483.250(7). Moreover, Nevada law makes clear that an individual should maintain only one 8 valid driver’s license at a time. Id. § 483.230(4). In addition, a person must surrender any other 9 driver’s licenses upon receiving their Nevada driver’s license. Id. 10 Here, Defendant argues he remains a citizen of Iowa for purposes of diversity 11 jurisdiction, in part, because he claims to still possess an Iowa commercial driver’s license. 12 (Resp. 2:20–23, ECF No. 8). But Defendant does not attach such identification as an exhibit.

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Related

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America
511 U.S. 375 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Solomon Lew v. Stanton Moss and Harlean Moss
797 F.2d 747 (Ninth Circuit, 1986)
Hunter v. Philip Morris USA
582 F.3d 1039 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Youn Kyung Park v. Holder
572 F.3d 619 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Stephen Yagman v. Paul Gabbert
684 F. App'x 625 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc.
236 F.3d 1061 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
New York v. United States
757 F. Supp. 10 (N.D. New York, 1990)

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Bayeh v. Crow, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bayeh-v-crow-nvd-2025.