Baush Mach. Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America

60 F.2d 586, 1932 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1363
CourtDistrict Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedJune 15, 1932
DocketNo. 2182
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 60 F.2d 586 (Baush Mach. Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Baush Mach. Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 60 F.2d 586, 1932 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1363 (D. Conn. 1932).

Opinion

THOMAS, District Judge.

This matter is now before the court on plaintiff’s motion to strike out defendant’s answer. This suit is a bill of discovery in aid of an action at law now pending in this court between the same parties. After the bill was filed and prior to the interposition of the an[587]*587swer, tlie defendant filed its motion to dismiss the hill upon various grounds assigned in the said motion which attacked the sufficiency of the bill and challenged the jurisdiction of the court. As the record will show, by memorandum of decision on lile, that motion was denied and thereupon the defendant filed its answer to the bill.

Three grounds are assigned in the motion to strike out the answer. First, it is asserted that the answer was not filed within the time limited by the rules. 1 am of the opinion that this ground is untenable. Motions to strike out, based upon matters dehors the pleadings, should be affirmatively alleged in some affidavit or petition purporting to state such matters. I have doubt as to whether this court can take judicial notice, for instance, of the fact that the plaintiff has not extended the defendant’s time to plead. It is alleged in the plaintiff’s brief that the bill was filed on February 8, 1932, and that the answer was filed on April 25,1932, which, obviously, was more than twenty days after service of the subpoena issued thereon. However, rule 29 of the Supreme Court Equity Rules (28 USCA § 723) provides that if the defendant moves to dismiss the bill, and if such motion be denied, an answer may be filed within five days thereafter. The court’s denial of the defendant’s motion, as appears by the statement on the brief, was entered on April 20, 1932, and on the same brief it is conceded that the defendant’s answer was filed on April 25, 1932.

The second ground set forth in the motion is “that the matters set out in the answer are insufficient in law tq deny the plaintiff’s right to a discovery.” It is apparent that the answer is a somewhat amorphous document. It embodies a motion to dismiss the bill; it contains a considerable amount of argumentative matter as well as, here and there, specific denials of some of the allegations in the bill together with various objections to particular interrogatories. As a pleading it hardly measures up to the succinct and categorical document contemplated by Equity Rule 30 (28 USCA § 723).

On the other hand, there seems to be no authority under the Equity Rules for striking out an answer, as such, for insufficiency. Equity Rule 33 (28 USCA § 723) provides that: “If an answer set up an affirmative defense, ‘set-off, or counter-claim, the plaintiff may, upon five days’ notice, or such further time as the court may allow, test the sufficiency of the same by motion to strike out.”

In other words, it appears that the motion to strike out addressed itself to an affirmative defense, set-off, or counterclaim, and not to an answer, in its entirety.

So much of the answer as embodies objections to the jurisdiction of the court, or the sufficiency of the bill — that is to say, the matters set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 — are stricken out as insufficient on their face to constitute matter of defense. In so far as they embody or purport to embody a motion to dismiss the complaint, they are stricken out for the reasons heretofore stated by this court in its memorandum of decision rendered on defendant’s motion to dismiss the bill, and on the further ground that the defendant, having availed itself of the alternate remedy provided for by rule 29, is concluded by the adjudication thereon. Equity Rule 29 (28 USCA § 723) provides for the abolition of demurrers and pleas. It then says: “Every defense, in point of law arising upon the face of the bill, whether for misjoinder, nonjoinder, or insufficiency of fact to constitute a valid cause of action in equity, which might heretofore have been made by demurrer or plea, shall be made by motion to dismiss or in the answer.” There is nothing in this answer which was not comprehended in the motion to dismiss heretofore made and decided.

Paragraph 3 of the answer may remain.

Paragraph 4 of the answer does not embody any defense to the bill, but criticizes the scope of the interrogatories. It is, therefore, stricken out as insufficient. Likewise paragraph 5.

Paragraph 6 of the answer, to the effect that the plaintiff is already taking depositions in the law action, furnishes no defense to the bill, and is therefore stricken out.

Paragraph 7, which purports to set out undue hardship inflicted upon the defendant in being compelled to make investigations upon whieh to formulate its answers to the interrogatories, constitutes no defense to the bill, but will have consideration at the conclusion of this memorandum, where final ruling will be made respecting the interrogatories.

Paragraph 8 sets up no facts of any kind, and neither admits nor denies any allegation of the bill, and is, therefore, stricken out.

Commencing with paragraph 10 and eon-1 inning through to the conclusion of the answer, we have nothing but objections to the interrogatories annexed to the bill. These ob[588]*588jections should not be part of the answer. Nevertheless the matters alleged -will have consideration at the conclusion of this memorandum where final ruling will be made in a separate memorandum regarding such objections.

The balance of the answer in effect joins issue with such allegations of the bill as purport to set out the merits of the action at law. Issue so joined is ineffective for the purpose of defeating the entry of a decree upon a bill of discovery. Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pacific R. Co. (D. C.) 241 F. 964; Zolla v. Grand Rapids Store Equipment Corp. (D. C.) 46 F.(2d) 319.

The third ground for the motion to strike o.ut is in effect nothing more than a restatement of the second ground and requires no further consideration. The plaintiff may submit an order for the entry of a decree upon the pleadings in conformity with this memorandum.

Memorandum de Interrogatories Attached to the Bill of Discovery.

The plaintiff seeks to propound to the defendant 635 interrogatories for the purpose, as stated in its bill of discovery, of disclosing the facts with respect to the defendant’s cost of aluminum ingot production, which cost, it is claimed by the plaintiff, can only be disclosed from the books and records of the defendant and constitutes a material, if not an* essential, part of the evidence necessary to substantiate the plaintiff’s claim in the action at law.

A careful examination of the interrogatories shows that while it is true there are 635, yet they are addressed separately to the years 1925 to 1930, inclusive, so that in effect there are approximately but 105 separate interrogatories. It also appears that there is a further duplication because practically the same interrogatories are propounded with respect to the Massena, Niagara Falls, and Tallassee plants and as to the hydro-electric power furnished by the Tallas-see Company and the St. Lawrence River Power Company. So it appears that the number of questions propounded is attributable to the diversity of the operations involved, the number of corporate agencies and plants ■operated by the defendant, as well as the number of years covered in the interrogatories.

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Bluebook (online)
60 F.2d 586, 1932 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1363, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/baush-mach-tool-co-v-aluminum-co-of-america-ctd-1932.