CARDINE, Justice.
The parties in this case stipulated to the following facts: The town of Saratoga had taken over supervision of the ambulance service from Carbon County approximately thirty days prior to this injury. The appellant was employed part time by the town of Saratoga as a member of the ambulance service. She suffered a ruptured eardrum in the course of her employment on December 14, 1981, and sought medical treatment the next day. She was advised by her supervisor that she was not covered by worker’s compensation because she was a part-time employee.1
Appellant underwent surgery on March 24, 1982. In March 1983, when it became apparent that additional surgery would be necessary, appellant requested that the hospital apply for payment under worker’s compensation. The second surgery for the injury that occurred during her employment was performed on April 6, 1983. At that time she again discussed worker’s compensation with the chief executive officer of her employer, the mayor of Saratoga, who agreed that she should be covered. Appellant then, during April 1983, attempted to file a worker’s compen[1050]*1050sation claim. The clerk of court rejected the claim because it was not timely filed.2 Appellant was allowed to file her claim on July 19, 1983. The court, thereafter, determined that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
We reverse.
The only issue presented by appellant is: “Whether Appellant has a legally, excusable reason for failure to comply with § 27-12-503, W.S.1977.” This statute provides in part:
“(a) No order or award for compensation involving an injury which is the result of a single brief occurrence rather than occurring over a substantial period of time, shall, be made unless in addition to the reports of the injury, an application or claim for award is filed with the clerk of court in the county in which the injury occurred, within one (1) year after the day on which the injury occurred or for injuries not readily apparent, within one (1) year after discovery of the injury by the employee. The reports of an accident do not constitute a claim for compensation.”
We stated in In re Martini, 38 Wyo. 172, 265 P. 707 (1928), that the legislature had fixed the applicable time in which a claim could be filed and, therefore, an exception could not be read into the law because the result would be legislation rather than statutory construction. We, however, expressly did not resolve the question here presented, stating:
“Whether the limitation, notwithstanding the fact that it is said to be jurisdictional, may be waived under certain circumstances, as is held by some of the courts, need not be decided, for the question does not arise here. It is clear that without such waiver, the limitation is, under the authorities already cited, mandatory.” (Emphasis added.) In re Martini, supra, 265 P. at 708-709.
The question we treat here does not involve statutory construction. The statute is clear and unambiguous. It contains no provision for tolling because of excusable neglect or to relieve hardship in particular circumstances. Thus, the statute here has run and is a bar to this claim unless the doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents raising the statute-of-limitations defense.
It is established policy that worker’s compensation statutes and the law applicable thereto should be liberally construed to the end that just claims of workers will be paid whenever possible. Jurisdictions such as ours, with statutes not providing tolling for excusable neglect, apply waiver or equitable estoppel to prevent the employer from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense where the lateness was the result of the employer’s assurances, misrepresentations, negligence, or fraudulent deceptions. 3 Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 78.45.
There are no jurisdictions which always hold their statutes of limitation to be a total bar in worker’s compensation cases. All jurisdictions allow late filings under some circumstances. These circumstances range from good faith misrepresentations by employers to a requirement of deliberate and actual fraud. Fraud, either actual or legal, will toll the statute of limitations, Perkins v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 147 Ga.App. 662, 249 S.E.2d 661 (1978), as will a reasonable reliance on incorrect information and active misleading conduct. Cohen v. Industrial Comm’n of Arizona, 133 Ariz. 24, 648 P.2d 139 (1982). [1051]*1051Thus, where the failure to file the claim resulted from the direct intervention of the employer’s agents and all parties believed that the accident was not covered by worker’s compensation, equitable estoppel prevented the defense of statute of limitations. Levo v. General-Shea-Morrison, 128 Mont. 570, 280 P.2d 1086 (1955). Estoppel flows from the actual consequences produced by the conduct of A on B regardless of whether A intended those consequences or not. Pino v. Maplewood Packing Co., Me., 375 A.2d 534 (1977). It is immaterial whether the conduct falsely misrepresented the situation or fraudulently concealed the truth. The employer is estopped to plead the statute of limitations. Cambron v. Co-operative Distributing Co., Ky., 405 S.W.2d 687 (1966); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 66 Cal.App.2d 376, 152 P.2d 501 (1944). Where the employer’s carrier gave information with no intent to deceive or mislead but his conduct did just that, estoppel applied because the employer, having assisted the employee, could not complain about action taken or not taken. Robertson v. Brissey’s Garage, Inc., 270 S.C. 58, 240 S.E.2d 810 (1978). The employer is estopped when the claimant is deceived; the deception occurs when the employee is lulled into a false sense of security. Taglianetti v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 63 Pa.Cmwlth. 456, 439 A.2d 844 (1981); Ashcraft v. Hunter, 268 Ark. 946, 597 S.W.2d 124 (App.1980).3 But fraud should not be the [1052]*1052only basis for relief in worker’s compensation cases. The limitation period is short— just one year. The injury resulting to the worker during the course of her employment is our concern. If she has a valid claim which is lost because of some action by the employer or the insurance provider (here the state of Wyoming) reasonably relied upon by the employee to her detriment, relief should be granted.
In McKaskle v. Industrial Comm’n of Arizona, 135 Ariz. 168, 659 P.2d 1313 (1982), the injured employee was told by the employer that he was not covered by worker’s compensation because he was an independent contractor and not an employee. Later he learned that he was covered. The court stated:
“The claimant may be equally harmed by his reasonable reliance on either ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ assertions.
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CARDINE, Justice.
The parties in this case stipulated to the following facts: The town of Saratoga had taken over supervision of the ambulance service from Carbon County approximately thirty days prior to this injury. The appellant was employed part time by the town of Saratoga as a member of the ambulance service. She suffered a ruptured eardrum in the course of her employment on December 14, 1981, and sought medical treatment the next day. She was advised by her supervisor that she was not covered by worker’s compensation because she was a part-time employee.1
Appellant underwent surgery on March 24, 1982. In March 1983, when it became apparent that additional surgery would be necessary, appellant requested that the hospital apply for payment under worker’s compensation. The second surgery for the injury that occurred during her employment was performed on April 6, 1983. At that time she again discussed worker’s compensation with the chief executive officer of her employer, the mayor of Saratoga, who agreed that she should be covered. Appellant then, during April 1983, attempted to file a worker’s compen[1050]*1050sation claim. The clerk of court rejected the claim because it was not timely filed.2 Appellant was allowed to file her claim on July 19, 1983. The court, thereafter, determined that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
We reverse.
The only issue presented by appellant is: “Whether Appellant has a legally, excusable reason for failure to comply with § 27-12-503, W.S.1977.” This statute provides in part:
“(a) No order or award for compensation involving an injury which is the result of a single brief occurrence rather than occurring over a substantial period of time, shall, be made unless in addition to the reports of the injury, an application or claim for award is filed with the clerk of court in the county in which the injury occurred, within one (1) year after the day on which the injury occurred or for injuries not readily apparent, within one (1) year after discovery of the injury by the employee. The reports of an accident do not constitute a claim for compensation.”
We stated in In re Martini, 38 Wyo. 172, 265 P. 707 (1928), that the legislature had fixed the applicable time in which a claim could be filed and, therefore, an exception could not be read into the law because the result would be legislation rather than statutory construction. We, however, expressly did not resolve the question here presented, stating:
“Whether the limitation, notwithstanding the fact that it is said to be jurisdictional, may be waived under certain circumstances, as is held by some of the courts, need not be decided, for the question does not arise here. It is clear that without such waiver, the limitation is, under the authorities already cited, mandatory.” (Emphasis added.) In re Martini, supra, 265 P. at 708-709.
The question we treat here does not involve statutory construction. The statute is clear and unambiguous. It contains no provision for tolling because of excusable neglect or to relieve hardship in particular circumstances. Thus, the statute here has run and is a bar to this claim unless the doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents raising the statute-of-limitations defense.
It is established policy that worker’s compensation statutes and the law applicable thereto should be liberally construed to the end that just claims of workers will be paid whenever possible. Jurisdictions such as ours, with statutes not providing tolling for excusable neglect, apply waiver or equitable estoppel to prevent the employer from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense where the lateness was the result of the employer’s assurances, misrepresentations, negligence, or fraudulent deceptions. 3 Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 78.45.
There are no jurisdictions which always hold their statutes of limitation to be a total bar in worker’s compensation cases. All jurisdictions allow late filings under some circumstances. These circumstances range from good faith misrepresentations by employers to a requirement of deliberate and actual fraud. Fraud, either actual or legal, will toll the statute of limitations, Perkins v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 147 Ga.App. 662, 249 S.E.2d 661 (1978), as will a reasonable reliance on incorrect information and active misleading conduct. Cohen v. Industrial Comm’n of Arizona, 133 Ariz. 24, 648 P.2d 139 (1982). [1051]*1051Thus, where the failure to file the claim resulted from the direct intervention of the employer’s agents and all parties believed that the accident was not covered by worker’s compensation, equitable estoppel prevented the defense of statute of limitations. Levo v. General-Shea-Morrison, 128 Mont. 570, 280 P.2d 1086 (1955). Estoppel flows from the actual consequences produced by the conduct of A on B regardless of whether A intended those consequences or not. Pino v. Maplewood Packing Co., Me., 375 A.2d 534 (1977). It is immaterial whether the conduct falsely misrepresented the situation or fraudulently concealed the truth. The employer is estopped to plead the statute of limitations. Cambron v. Co-operative Distributing Co., Ky., 405 S.W.2d 687 (1966); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 66 Cal.App.2d 376, 152 P.2d 501 (1944). Where the employer’s carrier gave information with no intent to deceive or mislead but his conduct did just that, estoppel applied because the employer, having assisted the employee, could not complain about action taken or not taken. Robertson v. Brissey’s Garage, Inc., 270 S.C. 58, 240 S.E.2d 810 (1978). The employer is estopped when the claimant is deceived; the deception occurs when the employee is lulled into a false sense of security. Taglianetti v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 63 Pa.Cmwlth. 456, 439 A.2d 844 (1981); Ashcraft v. Hunter, 268 Ark. 946, 597 S.W.2d 124 (App.1980).3 But fraud should not be the [1052]*1052only basis for relief in worker’s compensation cases. The limitation period is short— just one year. The injury resulting to the worker during the course of her employment is our concern. If she has a valid claim which is lost because of some action by the employer or the insurance provider (here the state of Wyoming) reasonably relied upon by the employee to her detriment, relief should be granted.
In McKaskle v. Industrial Comm’n of Arizona, 135 Ariz. 168, 659 P.2d 1313 (1982), the injured employee was told by the employer that he was not covered by worker’s compensation because he was an independent contractor and not an employee. Later he learned that he was covered. The court stated:
“The claimant may be equally harmed by his reasonable reliance on either ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ assertions. Nor are we persuaded that a characterization of coverage or compensability as a ‘question of law’ renders the principle of es-toppel inapplicable.” Id. 659 P.2d at 1317-1318.
In Levo v. General-Shea-Morrison, supra, the court stated:
“The doctrine of equitable estoppel is a flexible one, founded in equity and good conscience; its object is to prevent a party from taking an unconscionable advantage of his own wrong while asserting his strict legal rights. Seemingly the only strict legal right that we are asked to adhere to is the statute which was passed solely for the benefit of the employer and the insurance carrier, i.e., the Statute of Limitations.
* * * * * *
“It is contended that there is involved a question of law as opposed to a question of fact and that the claimant is as responsible for knowing the law regarding the situation as were the insurance company, the employer, the industrial accident board and those others involved. However, even if we were to ascribe to the contention that it is solely a question of law, it would be a very narrow construction of the statutes regarding Workmen’s Compensation if this court were to say that a claimant should find it his duty to examine all the technicalities concerning the Workmen’s Compensation Act and come to a right conclusion while the employer and the insurance carrier, whose responsibilities are far greater, should be excused because of their misinterpretation of the Act itself, which misinterpretation the employer in turn foisted off upon the claimant.” 280 P.2d at 1090.
The State here contends that estoppel is not warranted because the bad advice was merely an honest mistake and cites Larson for the proposition,
“[i]f the employer’s bad advice was the result of an honest mistake due to the uncertain state of the law at the time, estoppel is not warranted.” 3 Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 78.45.
The basis for that statement is a California case which held that the city’s advice was reasonable when given “due to the uncertain state of the law” at that time. City of Los Angeles v. Industrial Accident Commission, 63 Cal.2d 255, 46 Cal.Rptr. 105, 404 P.2d 809 (1965). In the instant case, the state of the law is not uncertain. The worker here was covered by worker’s compensation. That is not disputed. And had she, contrary to the advice of her employer, filed a claim, it would have been paid.
The State also contends that even if estoppel should be applied to the town of Saratoga,
“ * * * it would not be appropriate as to the Appellee State of Wyoming, as the Appellee State of Wyoming not only administers and defends the Town of Sara-toga’s industrial accident account, but also all the monies in the worker’s compensation fund.”
Section 27-12-608, W.S.1977, provides:
“The director or his designee may for any reason appear in the district court and defend against any claim and shall in all respects have the same rights of defense as the employer. Failure to con[1053]*1053test a claim does not constitute waiver by the director of his right to reopen an award where he does not appear and defend at the original trial.” (Emphasis added.)
The purpose of this statute is to establish the rights of the State “as broad as the right of the employer and employee, so as to give the state full measure of protection.” Wyoming State Treasurer, ex rel. Worker’s Compensation Div. v. Svoboda, Wyo., 573 P.2d 417, 420 (1978), quoting Marsh v. Aljoe, 41 Wyo. 220, 227, 284 P. 260 (1930). Although the worker’s compensation division of the state of Wyoming is granted rights as broad as those of the employer, there is nothing in the statute which confers greater rights or would permit the State to assert defenses not available to the employer.
Appellant had a valid, meritorious claim that was not filed because of reliance upon her employer’s representation that she was not covered by worker’s compensation. We hold that the employer’s misleading statements, although unintentional, were sufficient to constitute estoppel and prevent the employer and the state of Wyoming from invoking the statute of limitations as a defense. This case is, therefore, reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.