Baudison v. Walmart Inc.

District Court, S.D. Illinois·Decided November 9, 2020·No. 3:19-cv-00512·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SHERRY BAUDISON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) Case No. 3:19-CV-512-MAB ) WALMART, INC., ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge: This matter is currently before the Court on Defendant Walmart’s (“Walmart”) motion to dismiss, or in the alternative motion to strike (Doc. 22), Plaintiff Sherry Baudison’s (“Plaintiff”) amended complaint (Doc. 21). For the reasons outlined below, Walmart’s motion to dismiss will be granted. Procedural Background After removing this case, Walmart filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, or in the alternative, seeking a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e) (Doc. 4). The Court ordered Walmart to first file an amended notice of removal to clarify certain jurisdictional allegations before addressing the sufficiency of the complaint (See Doc. 11). Walmart did as requested (Doc. 12). In the meantime, Plaintiff filed a supplement to her complaint in state court on June 19, 2019 (Doc. 6-1), and Walmart filed a motion to strike the supplement, or in the alternative, a response to the supplement (Doc. 6). Plaintiff then filed a “Second Addition to the Original Claim” on August 7, 2019, in this Court (Doc. 7). The Court carefully reviewed the pleadings and ultimately granted Walmart’s

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and found its motion to strike moot (Doc. 13). The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice, giving her an opportunity to file an amended complaint in an attempt to state a claim (Id.). Plaintiff did, in fact, file an amended complaint (Doc. 21) and Walmart again moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, to strike pursuant to Rule 12(f) (Doc. 22). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion to dismiss (Doc. 26).

Factual Background On October 3rd or 4th, 2016, Plaintiff and her husband were shopping at the Walmart in Marion, Illinois (Doc. 21, p. 6).1 They noticed two hot wheels boxes on the top shelf of a toy aisle (Id.). The Plaintiff decided to go looking for a Walmart store employee to help them get one or both of these hot wheels boxes off the top shelf (Id.). She had no

luck, but when she returned to tell her husband he informed her that help was not necessary because he had “already got it” – meaning he already got the box off the top shelf (Id.). He placed the box of hot wheels back on the top shelf and then called Plaintiff over to him to show her a “treasure hunt” hot wheels box he had just found. (Id. at pp 6- 7).

1The facts in the background section are taken from the amended complaint (Doc. 21). For the purposes of this Order, these facts are presumed true and all reasonable inferences from these facts are drawn in Plaintiff’s favor. E.g., Squires-Cannon v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook Cty., 897 F.3d 797, 802 (7th Cir. 2018). Plaintiff was admiring this apparently unique find when she “barely heard” her husband tell her that he knocked the box over (Id. at p. 7). The Plaintiff was then struck

on the top of her head by a 72 count hot wheels box (Id.). An unidentified Walmart employee was walking by right as she was struck on the head; the employee gestured to her to ask what happened when her husband came around the aisle and she told him the hot wheels box hit her on the head (Id.). Plaintiff’s amended complaint acknowledges that she and her husband “were together at Walmart” but alleges they are considered “two individual customers.” (Id. at

p. 8). Plaintiff acknowledges that her husband is the one who removed the box of hot wheels from the top shelf and replaced it, which ultimately hit her on the head (Id.). The amended complaint makes several references to the fact that she and her husband must be considered separate customers even though they were shopping together (Doc. 21, pp. 8-9). Plaintiff also asks the Court, at one point, to “suppress any information about the

customer who knocked the box off the top shelf which hit me causing injury” because if she “did not know the other customer, courts would only refer to them as ‘the other customer.’” (Id.). The fact that the other customer was her husband, she claims, creates an image that the two were working as a team, when in fact they were shopping independently (Id. at p. 9).

Plaintiff also alleges that Walmart stacks and stores products in a manner that violates the requirements of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) (Doc. 21 at p. 13). Elaborating on her OSHA allegations, Plaintiff contends that employees of Walmart do not practice proper safety procedures when removing items from the top shelf (Id.). Plaintiff makes several references to the pictures she has that demonstrate OSHA violations (none of which are attached to the amended complaint)

(See, e.g., Doc. 21 at pp. 12-14). Ultimately, Plaintiff seeks damages, as well as punitive damages for the injuries she suffered from the hot wheels box that struck her head (Doc. 21, p. 20-21). Discussion a. Legal Standard The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is to address the legal

sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claim for relief, not the merits of the case or whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail. Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept as true all well-pleaded facts, and draw all possible

inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See, e.g., Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008)). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must allege facts sufficient to “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’ and ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Camasta, 761 F.3d at 736 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

Because Plaintiff’s complaint was filed pro se, it must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Beal v. Beller, 847 F.3d 897, 902 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). b. Plaintiff’s negligence claim Based on the Court’s reading of Plaintiff’s amended complaint, it appears she is attempting to advance a negligence claim against Walmart. To state a claim for negligence

under Illinois law, “a plaintiff must plead a duty owed by a defendant to that plaintiff, a breach of duty, and injury proximately caused by the breach of duty.” Reynolds v. CB Sports Bar, Inc., 623 F.3d 1143, 1148 (7th Cir. 2010).

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