Bats v. Martinez

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: September 23, 2025
• Docket: 24-1081
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 23 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT BOBBIE BATS, Jr., No. 24-1081 D.C. No. 3:22-cv-03245-TSH Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM* L. MARTINEZ, Warden of CTF; T. MAK, Captain (A) of CTF Facility,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Thomas S. Hixson, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**

Submitted September 17, 2025***

Before: SILVERMAN, OWENS, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Robert Bobbie Bats, Jr. appeals pro se from the

district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). *** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). deliberate indifference to his health and safety. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Bair v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 982 F.3d 569,

577 (9th Cir. 2020). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant Martinez

because Bats failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether

Martinez was deliberately indifferent to Bats’s risk of contracting COVID-19. See

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (holding that a prison official

violates the Eighth Amendment if the official was deliberately indifferent, that is,

knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to an inmate’s health and safety; the

official must have been aware of facts from which inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm existed, and must have drawn that inference); id. at

844 (holding that an official who actually knew of a substantial risk of harm is not

liable if they reasonably responded to the risk, even if harm ultimately was not

averted).

The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant Mak

because Bats failed to exhaust his administrative remedies or raise a genuine

dispute of material fact as to whether administrative remedies were effectively

unavailable. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642-44 (2016) (explaining that an

inmate must exhaust such administrative remedies as are available before bringing

suit and describing limited circumstances under which administrative remedies are

2 24-1081 effectively unavailable); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (explaining that

exhaustion requires “using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so

properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits)” (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted)).

AFFIRMED.

3 24-1081