Batista v. Leveridge

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Batista v. Leveridge

133 A.D.3d 561, 18 N.Y.S.3d 562

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 4, 2015

Docket2014-11433

StatusPublished

This text of 133 A.D.3d 561 (Batista v. Leveridge) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Batista v. Leveridge, 133 A.D.3d 561, 18 N.Y.S.3d 562 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2015).

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Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Lewis, J.), dated October 24, 2014, as denied those branches of his motion which were for summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as alleged that the plaintiff sustained serious injuries to his left knee and right shoulder within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The defendant established, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury to his left knee and right shoulder within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219 [2011]). Leventhal, J.P., Austin, Roman, Miller and Barros, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Lewis, J.), dated October 24, 2014, as denied those branches of his motion which were for summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as alleged that the plaintiff sustained serious injuries to his left knee and right shoulder within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The defendant established, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury to his left knee and right shoulder within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219 [2011]). Leventhal, J.P., Austin, Roman, Miller and Barros, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

133 A.D.3d 561, 18 N.Y.S.3d 562, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/batista-v-leveridge-nyappdiv-2015.

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